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This study provides the first comprehensive empirical evidence on the economic
impacts and distributional effects of the District of Columbia First-Time Homebuyer
Credit program. This program is the only federal program that provides an income tax
credit for targeted lower-income households to purchase homes in a central city. Based on
IRS data, the findings indicate that the program is very successful and popular, with the
participants accounting for 77 percent of all home purchasers in the District each year.
Among them, the first-time homeowners represented 67 percent of all purchasers each
year, a rate 27 percentage points higher than the national average. The largest cluster of
program beneficiaries was those with incomes between $30,000 and $50,000, which
corresponds to only about 42 to 69 percent of the area median income. 
Using a three-stage intervention analysis, this study further finds that the program
has significant impact on wealth creation through house price appreciation. The credit
could explain most of the amenity-adjusted house price appreciation differentials between
the District and its surrounding suburban markets, estimated at 4.9 percent each year.
Larger distributional effects are observed in the District’s low/moderate-income and
minority neighborhoods as compared to high-income and white neighborhoods and in the
townhouse/condo sub-markets as compared to single-family detached units. 
The intervention was also effective in stabilizing city neighborhoods, increasing
local tax revenues, driving up owner housing supply through conversion of rental units,
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since it appeared to have spurred an increase of voluntary displacements of District
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key benchmarks, and improvements of our understanding of public subsidies.
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The Impact of Targeted Homeownership Tax Credit Program:
Evidence from Washington, D.C.
Zhong Yi Tong
Executive Summary
The goal of this study is to provide the first comprehensive assessment of the
targeted homeownership tax credit program as implemented in Washington, D.C. The
District of Columbia First-Time Homebuyer Credit program is the only federal program
that provides an income tax credit (up to $5,000) for targeted low/moderate-income
families and individuals to purchase their first homes in a central city. The key findings
indicate the following:
1. The D.C. homebuyer tax credit is very successful and popular. Based on IRS data
released only to this author, 21,821 claims (in the amount of $76.7 million) were filed
for the tax credit between 1997 and 2001. On average, the program participants
accounted for about 77 percent of all home purchasers in the District each year.
Among the participants, those who were the first-time homeowners (as understood by
the common definition) represented 67 percent of all home purchasers in the District
each year, which was 27 percentage points higher than the national average (40
percent) and 16 percentage points higher than the central city average (51 percent) in
terms of first-time homeownership rate.
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2. The largest cluster of program beneficiaries was low-income homebuyers or those
with incomes between $30,000 and $50,000, which corresponds to only about 42 to
69 percent of the area median income. While the vast majority of the credit claimants
were D.C. residents, the homeownership credit also attracted a sizable number of
homebuyers whose previous addresses were in the District’s suburbs. These buyers
accounted for about 14 percent of all home purchasers in the District each year
studied.  
3. The program’s impact and distributional effect on wealth creation through house price
growth are also significant. The D.C. homebuyer tax credit could explain most of the
house price appreciation differentials between the District and its surrounding
suburban markets, estimated at 4.9 percent per year after adjusting for housing and
neighborhood characteristics. Larger effects on house prices are observed in
low/moderate-income and minority neighborhoods, compared to high-income and
white neighborhoods. The homeowners of lower-priced townhouses/condos also
experienced better appreciation than the owners of the traditionally more expensive
single-family detached units. 
4. The impact on house prices was estimated through a three-stage intervention analysis,
including hedonic regression and interrupted time series analysis, in the framework of
the difference-in-differences approach. These outcomes are further verified by median
house price comparisons using three different geographic samples: census tracts
adjacent to the D.C./Maryland border, D.C. vs. surrounding suburban markets, and
D.C. vs. Baltimore City. Moreover, robustness checks were also performed to
determine the conclusiveness of these results. They suggest that, in tandem with the
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“Williams gradual effect” large-scale investments undertaken by private-public
partnerships and the D.C. Financial Control Board, the District of Columbia First-
Time Homebuyer Credit could have accounted for most of the 4.9-percent price
increase above its surrounding markets during the 1998-2002 period. 
5. The impact of the D.C. homeownership credit was so substantial that it seems to be
inconsistent with the standard theory of public subsidies. However, at least two
unique features of the homebuyer credit program that emerged from the practice or
were built into the design may explain the inconsistency. One is that the tax credit
subsidizes not only housing consumption but also housing investment or wealth
creation, a critical point that is assumed away from the standard subsidy model. The
other is that the credit is able to remove or reduce some important homeownership
market “imperfections,” such as the entry barriers of wealth and income to
homeownership for a typical low-income and first-time homebuyer. In comparison,
the standard subsidy theory is built upon the assumption that there are no market
“imperfections.”  
6. The D.C. homebuyer tax credit helped stabilize distressed District neighborhoods.
House price movements during the impact period were only about 43 percent as
volatile as those observed prior to the intervention. House price volatility in the
low/moderate-income neighborhoods was also reduced by over 50 percent after the
homebuyer credit took effect. 
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7. The tax credit also helped increase the overall homeownership rate, drive up
homeowner housing supply through conversion of rental into owner units, and reduce
vacant housing units for rent in the District of Columbia.  
8. Although new construction (measured by residential building permits) increased
significantly during the impact period, the increase was almost exclusively
attributable to the HOPE VI revitalization program. The credit did not seem to be
effective in stimulating a supply response in new construction from private
investments. 
9. The empirical evidence also suggests an adverse effect of the homeownership credit
on housing affordability for future homebuyers and especially for renters. With a
substantial increase in house prices and reduction of rental housing stock, the credit
appears to have spurred a large increase in voluntary displacements of District renters
because of rent burdens and other financial reasons.     
These findings have important implications for public policies and also contribute
to the literature in a number of ways:
 The income-targeted homebuyer tax credit as implemented in D.C. can indeed serve
as an effective tax incentive to increase first-time, low-income homeownership rates
and reverse the exodus of population in a central city. 
 The program also serves as a viable supplement or remedy to the existing tax
treatments to homeownership (mortgage interest and property tax deductions). It has
been well documented that the existing national homeownership tax policy provides
substantially fewer economic benefits and weaker incentives for low-income families.
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 The substantial impact and distributional effect on house prices indicate that the
homeownership tax credit is an effective policy instrument that can create home
equity wealth for low-income individuals/families and also contribute to tax revenues
for state and local governments. 
 The D.C. homeownership tax credit also represents an innovative approach that could
help solve urban problems by stabilizing the distressed neighborhoods, increasing
owner housing supply, and reducing vacancy. 
 The targeted homeownership tax credit program facilitated two types of income and
wealth redistribution that advance social goals of resource allocation. One is
income/wealth redistribution from high-income to low/moderate-income households
and neighborhoods. The other is the income/wealth transfer that takes place from
suburbs to central cities or from federal government to state/local governments.
 This paper has developed an innovative research methodology (a three-stage
intervention analysis), three verification methods, and a number of important
benchmarks that can be used to assess the impact and effectiveness for other
urban/housing policy interventions. It also substantially improves our understanding
of public subsidies and their actual values in a reality where the assumptions of the
standard subsidy theory are no longer held. Such an improvement makes an important
contribution to the literature of public policies, public/welfare/urban economics, and
housing markets.
Based on these empirical evidences from the District of Columbia, I would like to
make the following policy recommendations to help either design a future homebuyer tax
credit or improve the existing one as implemented in Washington, D.C.:
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 To maximize its effectiveness, equity, and economic efficiency, any future design or
improvement of a homeownership tax credit shall target low/moderate-income first-
time homebuyers. It should explicitly build a mechanism allowing homebuyers to
transfer the credit into cash for the down payment and closing costs at the time of
home purchase. It should include a larger incentive to attract homebuyers into
minority neighborhoods. It also should be refundable to encourage very low-income
households to participate in wealth creation through purchasing a piece of their own
property. 
 To minimize the unintended adverse effect, any future homeownership tax credit
program should seek to incorporate a form of compensation for the losers of the
intervention, particularly the existing low-income renters who would be at the risk of
involuntary or voluntary displacement. It should also be accompanied by a supply-
side policy action to stimulate at least the short-term supply of private investments on
new construction to improve housing affordability for future homebuyers.
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Introduction
Historically, homeownership has been a major public policy goal in the United
States. The primary policy vehicle used to promote homeownership is taxation, including
nontaxation of net implicit income from owner-occupied housing, mortgage interest tax
deductions, property tax deductions, and tax-exempt capital gains on owner-occupied
home sales. Increasingly, however, empirical and theoretical evidence indicates that while
homeowner tax subsidies are the single largest federal tax expenditure, these preferential
tax treatments for homeowners may be biased toward benefiting upper-income families.
The key reasons are twofold: First, upper-income households are able to purchase and
sustain more expensive homes and as a result reap substantially more tax benefits in all
categories associated with homeownership. Second, the deductibility of mortgage interest
and property taxes can be realized only through itemized deductions, which are in
practice not an option for many low-income homeowners who have little tax liability or
who use standard deductions for their tax returns because they own small properties. In
other words, the existing tax codes provide low- and moderate-income families with
significantly fewer economic benefits and weaker incentives for homeownership than to
high-income families (Follain et al. 1993; Bourassa and Grigby 2000).  
Therefore, in the past several decades, a new policy instrument has been proposed
by various groups—academics, advocacy groups, politicians, and trade associations—as a
remedy or supplement to the existing tax treatment for homeownership. The instrument
being proposed is the so-called “tax credit,” “targeted homeownership tax credit” or
“progressive homeowner tax credit.” But is this proposed tax credit a good idea?
While the concept of the targeted (or progressive) homeownership tax credit
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seems theoretically justified on the grounds of equity or social justice (Green and Vandell
1999; Dreier 1997), there exists no empirical evidence on such grounds. More
importantly, there is no empirical evidence on the possible impact of the targeted
homeownership tax credit on economic efficiency (that is, there are only results obtained
from econometric simulation exercises conducted by such researchers as Follain et al.
(1993) and Collins et al. (1999)). The goal of this research is to fill up these gaps. Based
on an innovative federal program in targeted homebuyer tax credits that has been recently
implemented in Washington, D.C., this research provides the first real-world evidence on
both distributional effects and economic impacts of the targeted homeownership tax
credit.
Understanding the effects of the targeted homebuyer tax credit program is very
important to convince policy makers to consider using the homebuyer tax credit as a
potentially innovative and cost-effective policy instrument to assist with urban turnaround
and to revive distressed neighborhoods. In the last four decades, the most profound
changes in urban landscapes and housing markets in the United States are urban decay
and central city neighborhood distress. Common problems in these distressed cities
include low homeownership rates, depopulation (due to outmigration to the suburbs),
depressed housing values, lack of fiscal resources, high crime rates, concentration of
poverty, segregation of race and housing, and disinvestment in inner-city neighborhoods. 
While problems, causes, dynamics, and possible solutions about urban declines
and deteriorated housing markets in central cities are well studied by academics such as
Wilson (1987 and 1996), Massey and Denton (1993), Downs (1999), and George Galster
(1998), little is known about real-world success stories and their catalysts. While not
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many central cities and their residential property markets have experienced a comeback, a
few of them seem to be on their way back up, according to the 2000 Census. Such cities
include Chicago, Denver, and New York City. To a certain extent, Washington, D.C., is
another example. The new census put the population of the District of Columbia at
572,059 in April 2000, a 5.7-percent decline during the 1990s. However, data showed a
surprising rebound of more than 53,000 residents since a 1999 Census estimate, the first
population increase in five decades for the nation’s capital city. Additionally, the city
gained racial and ethnic diversity and has balanced its budget, and its housing market is
also booming. All these suggest that Washington, D.C., has just begun a great comeback
and renewal for the future. 
Unfortunately, researchers and policy analysts have largely failed to catch up with
the fast-changing reality to explain why these changes are taking place in some cities and
not others and what other distressed central cities can learn from the successful
experiences. The exceptions are a few demographers and sociologists who attribute the
renewed viability of a few metropolises to demographic forces—in particular, the recent
tide of immigration from Hispanics and Asians in gateway cities. There are not many
studies to identify the key factors other than such demographics, which may include
federal interventions, local innovations, or some other market forces. In Washington,
D.C., the key factor is widely perceived to be the new and unique first-time homebuyer
credit program. Therefore, an important goal of this research is to conduct the first
comprehensive study of the experiences of the D.C. homebuyer tax credit program that
may have contributed significantly to the recent renewal of the city.  
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This study is structured as follows: Section I provides an overview of the District
homebuyer credit program and its policy and theoretic research framework. Section II of
this paper contains a critical literature review of urban renewal and neighborhood
revitalization. Section III offers a literature review of low-income homeownership and its
tax incentive policies. Section IV provides a descriptive analysis of new empirical
evidence on the distributional effects of the existing homeownership tax policies in the
United States. The purpose is to demonstrate whether the tax treatments for
homeownership have served as an effective policy vehicle of encouraging low-income
homeownership, thereby justifying the targeted homeownership tax credit approach.
Section V conducts a brief comparative policy analysis of various proposals and existing
government programs featured the targeted homeownership tax credit. Government
innovations as well as proposals in homeownership tax credit will be analyzed through
their targets: those targeted directly at homebuyers (demand-side); those targeted at
lenders; and those targeted at developers (supply-side). 
The rest of the research is devoted to empirical analyses of the impacts and
effectiveness of the homebuyer tax credit programs in Washington, D.C. Section VI
discusses research design, especially empirical design, data, and methodology for using
the amenity-adjusted house price appreciation rates as the most important indicator in this
study. Section VII reports empirical results for the effectiveness of the homebuyer credit
program based on the data obtained from this author’s special requests to the Internal
Revenue Services. Section VIII reports empirical results for the impact and distributional
effect of the District homebuyer tax credit program on house price appreciation. It also
includes verifications of the empirical findings, robustness checks, and analyses of the
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D.C. tax credit’s unique features that may explain why its observed substantial impact is
not explainable by the standard theory of public subsidies. Section IX reports the
empirical results concerning the impact on home equity wealth creation, tax revenues,
and neighborhood stability, based on house price appreciation rates and volatility (two
key benchmarks). Section X provides findings about the impact on homeownership,
housing supply, vacancy through supplemental indicators, as well as the detrimental
impact on housing affordability. Section XI concludes with summaries of the empirical
evidences and discussions about policy implications of the findings. 
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I. The District of Columbia First-Time Homebuyer Credit Program: A Policy
and Theoretic Framework
The first-time homebuyer tax credit program as implemented in the District of
Columbia was enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Since President Clinton
signed the law August 5, 1997, the program was extended several times. This legislation
provided that taxpayers who had not owned a main home in Washington, D.C., “during
the 1-year period ending on the date of purchase” could receive a one-time federal income
tax credit of up to $5,000 for purchase of a main home in D.C. The eligible homebuyers
have to claim the credit at the end of the tax year by filing IRS Form 8859 “District of
Columbia First-Time Homebuyer Credit” and also by entering the amount of the credit
claimed in the tax credit section of Form 1040. Unused credit is allowed to carry forward
until all of it has been used. This legislation is currently set to expire January 1, 2004.
There are no eligibility requirements regarding purchase price or homeownership outside
the District. However, the program features income targeting. It requires that the tax
credit be phased out as incomes increase. Specifically, the program’s eligibility
requirements read as follows:
Who may claim the credit? In general, you may claim the credit if (1) you
purchase a main home during the tax year in the District of Columbia and (2) you are a
first-time homebuyer in D.C., that is, you (and your spouse if married) did not own any
other main home in the District of Columbia during the 1-year period ending on the date
of purchase. The main home purchased or constructed is the one you live in most of the
time. It can be a house, houseboat, house trailer, cooperative apartment, condominium,
etc. However, you may not claim the credit if any of the following apply: (1) You
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acquired your home from certain related persons or by gift or inheritance. (2) Your
modified adjusted gross income is $90,000 or more if single, married filing separately,
head of household, or qualifying widow(er); or $130,000 or more if married filing jointly.
(3) You previously claimed this credit for a different time.
Amount of the credit. In general, the credit is the smaller of (1) $5,000 if single,
married filing jointly, head of household, or qualifying widow(er)  ($2,500 if married
filing separately) or (2) the purchase price of the home. The credit is phased out over a
range that begins when your modified adjusted gross income exceeds $70,000 if single,
married filing separately, head of household, or qualifying widow(er)  ($110,000 if
married filing jointly) and ends at $90,000 if single, married filing separately, head of
household, or qualifying widow(er) ($130,000 if married filing jointly).
This income-targeted homeownership tax credit program appears to have a
substantial impact on the District. Although there is no in-depth research on this program,
according to a survey by the Greater Washington Research Center (currently part of
Brookings Institute), the tax credit is “widely used” and the program is “very successful”
and popular. In late 1998 and early 1999, the center conducted a mail survey of a random
sample of 1,600 home purchasers in the District. Based on valid responses from 529
purchasers, the center estimates that about “70.1 percent of purchasers of residences in
the District in 1998 claimed (or expected to claim) the new homebuyer credit. ...The total
value of the credits earned in 1998 was approximately $14.9 million” (Dearborn and
Richardson 1999).
While this survey provides an important snapshot of the effectiveness of the
District first-time homebuyer credit program, it clearly raises more questions than have
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been answered. First, since the survey was conducted at the end of the program's first full
year (1998), the program’s full impact in the four years since then remains unknown.
Second, given the survey’s relatively small sample size and low response rate (33.1
percent), one might question the representativeness of the sample and generalizability of
the results. Even if the reliability of the estimates from the survey may not be a major
concern to some, it is about the time to obtain the administrative data from the Internal
Revenue Services to reveal the program’s actual participation. Third and most
importantly, many critical and even basic questions are left unanswered. In particular,
what are the policy goals and objectives the program is intended to accomplish? Has the
program been effective in accomplishing these objectives? More broadly, is the policy
intervention economically efficient or otherwise equitable? These are questions critical to
understanding the viability of a public policy intervention and are precisely what this
paper seeks to address. 
 The District's income-targeted homebuyer credit program is supposed to have two
important policy goals: 1) To provide a tax incentive for lower-income families or
individuals to participate in homeownership, and 2) To help cure urban decay and
stabilize (revitalize) the central city neighborhoods in the nation’s capital. These goals are
made explicit by the legislation that initiated this program. The D.C. First-Time
Homebuyer Credit program was in fact part of a policy package that combines initiatives
on taxpayer relief with those aiming at urban renewal and neighborhood revitalization—
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The District of Columbia First-time Homebuyer Credit
was included in this legislation, along with other tax incentives designed for urban and
neighborhood revitalization (including the D.C. enterprise zone designation, tax-exempt
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economic development bonds, and a zero percent capital gains rate), in TITLE VII,
Section 701 “Tax Incentives for Revitalization of the District of Columbia.”  
While not made explicit in a concentrated place, the specific policy objectives of
the homebuyer credit intervention are embedded in various places including the
legislation, speeches of the bill’s major sponsors (such as D.C. Congresswoman Eleanor
Holmes Norton), and news reports. The objectives appear to be: 
 Helping remove the entry barrier to affordable homeownership through
targeted tax relief and incentives, which are not currently offered by the
existing tax system, in order to retain or attract population into the city.
 Helping solve the core problems facing Washington, D.C. Specifically, it is
intended to boost the urban home values, increase homeownership, increase
tax bases for local governments, stimulate investment activities, and reduce
vacancy in the city.
 Stabilizing distressed neighborhoods.
In general, justification of a public policy change must come from meeting the
criterion of either efficiency or equity. The efficiency arguments are rooted in the welfare
economics tradition that program X improves the welfare of society if it makes at least
one person better off and no one worse off (Pareto’s rule). Since the Pareto efficiency rule
can hardly ever be adhered to in reality, the Kaldor-Hicks rule becomes the most popular
and acceptable efficiency criteria in judging a public policy intervention. This rule states
that program X has positive net benefits if the gainers could compensate the losers and
still be better off.  
On the other hand, even if a policy intervention is not economically efficient, it
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may still be justified on the ground of equity arguments. The equity criterion states that a
policy change or a distribution of resources/income is justified if it is judged to be
equitable in the sense that the policy intervention promotes social justice. Social justice is
served if the disadvantaged groups in the society are helped even at the expense of the
advantaged population. Since the advantaged groups have sufficient resources to help
themselves, a society or government should take the responsibility to improve the welfare
of disadvantaged groups such as minorities, the poor, and the handicapped.    
In the case of the District's targeted homeownership tax credit program, this study
seeks to use both the equity and (to a certain extent) efficiency criteria to judge its impact
or success. To assess its impact on equity and efficiency, two questions must be
answered. The first question is this: “Assuming the homeownership tax credit program as
implemented in the District is effective, can it meet the efficiency and equity criteria?”
And second, “Is the District homebuyer credit intervention effective to accomplish these
policy objectives, thereby meeting the efficiency and equity criteria? And if so, how
effective is it?” I found that the policy objectives of the District homeownership credit
program do help improve the welfare of society while the program as a whole is
essentially designed to serve social justice. 
Concerning the first question involving equity criterion, since the homebuyer
credit program targets lower-income taxpayers, there is no doubt that the major
beneficiaries are expected to (or should) be the disadvantaged, including low/moderate-
income families and individuals, minorities, and the distressed city neighborhoods. In
other words, as measured by the program’s participation (claim rates, amount, etc.),
changes in property value, neighborhood stability, homeownership, and other policy
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objectives, the program's distributional effect should be substantial and significant. By
largely serving the disadvantaged groups and distressed neighborhoods, this innovative
policy intervention can indeed be a justified remedy or supplement to the existing tax
treatments to homeownership that seem to mostly benefit the wealthy.
With respect to efficiency, if the program succeeded in accomplishing its intended
policy objectives, the overall economic impact on public welfare or net benefits to society
should, or is expected to, be positive and substantial. Population growth (or deceleration
of population loss) helps change the course of urban decay and enhances urban viability
and welfare through a number of important ways, such as an increased demand for and
supply of housing, increased activities in commercial consumption and investment, and
increased tax base. More investment (residential or commercial) activities in the city,
which may have been a victim of the so-called “disinvestment” in the past decades,
represent a net increase of housing producers’ surplus. They also generate chain reactions,
creating strong consumer confidence and positive neighborhood atmosphere. An increase
in the municipal government’s revenues, which rely on property and sales taxes, can be
translated into the delivery of more and better public goods and services including
education, public transportation, infrastructure, and police.  
Social benefits of stable city neighborhoods stem from avoided social costs
typically incurred in distressed communities. As discussed in the following section on
urban decay and renewal and elsewhere in this paper, social costs of neighborhood
distress include a decline in urban property value, abandonment, an increase in crimes,
disinvestment, population loss, and a smaller tax base.  
An increase in homeownership and property value also contributes substantially to
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the gain in the welfare of society. Social benefits of homeownership have been widely
recognized in two aspects. One is that it provides an accommodation for a family to live
and raise their children. The other is the homeownership externality. There is a growing
literature documenting the externalities. Examples include a better educational outcome
of homeowners’ children, a higher rate of participation in local and neighborhood
activities, better maintained properties, and higher value of owner-occupied housing and
its neighborhood. I would like to add a third type of social benefits: homeownership (and
an appreciating housing unit in general) is the most important and effective investment
vehicle of wealth creation for average people in this country. 
According to Carr and Tong (2003), in the United States, owner-occupied housing
is the best investment for many of reasons. First, it offers the best long-term returns of
any other typical investment. A family that put $10,000 down on a $100,000 home in
1990 would clear about $67,000 in equity wealth today if the home merely appreciated at
the national rate. Meanwhile, that same $10,000 invested in an S & P 500 index fund
would have produced only $16,000 in capital gains, and even less after capital gains
taxes. Further, a home can also be used as collateral to leverage capital by taking a loan to
finance a small business, higher education, purchase of a rental property, and other forms
of physical or human investment activities to create additional wealth. Or, alternatively, a
home can be refinanced to take advantage of an improved interest rate, and in the process
equity can be taken out with little increase in the monthly debt payments on the mortgage.
In fact, in 2001 and early 2002, more than $131.6 billion of equity has been leveraged
from home equity cash-out refinances. Data from the 1995 Survey of Income and
Program Participation shows that home equity wealth accounts for more than 70 percent
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of the net worth (or $28,427 out of $40,200 per household) for all households in the
United States. And minority households have substantially less home equity wealth and
therefore net worth than the national median.
This leads to the second theoretic question for this paper: “Is the District
homebuyer credit intervention effective to accomplish these policy objectives, thereby
meeting the efficiency and equity criteria? And if so, how effective is it?” The rest of the
paper (especially the empirical sections) addresses this important question. The
hypotheses of this policy research are therefore developed around assessing whether, and
the extent to which, the District homebuyer credit program has been effective in
accomplishing the intended policy objectives. 
Null hypothesis 1 is that overall the D.C. homebuyer credit program is a success,
as measured by participation (or claims) and amount, such that it is effective in using
homeownership to reverse the exodus of population by retaining the city residents for
first-time homeownership participation and also attracting homebuyers from suburbs. On
the ground of equity or the program’s distributional effect, I hypothesize that the primary
beneficiaries of the credits are indeed low- and moderate-income homebuyers, rather than
wealthy households. The purpose of testing this hypothesis is to provide a crucial big
picture of the program’s overall effectiveness and participants’ income profile. It can also
create a solid foundation of empirically testing research hypotheses pertaining to the
program’s economic impact and distributional effect on the housing and neighborhood
outcomes discussed as follows. 
Null hypothesis 2 concerning efficiency is that the targeted homeownership tax
credit program has positive housing outcomes as measured by house prices. In other
19
words, the D.C. homebuyer credit intervention is hypothesized to have significantly
raised house prices (residential property values) in Washington, D.C., thereby created
home equity wealth for individual homebuyers and existing homeowners and also
generated property tax revenues for the District government. Relating to the equity
concerns, I further hypothesize that the targeted homebuyer credit intervention has a more
sizable distributional effect on house prices and wealth creation for homeowners/buyers
or neighborhoods that are more likely to be disadvantaged. The alternative hypothesis is
that the intervention does not have these effects. 
Null hypothesis 3 is that the homebuyer intervention stabilizes the overall housing
market in Washington, D.C. More importantly, concerning equity or distributional effect
on neighborhood outcomes, the hypothesis is tested in the sense that neighborhood
stability is more evident in the distressed (low-income and minority) neighborhoods than
in the wealthy, white neighborhoods, as a result of the implementation of the targeted
homebuyer intervention. The alternative hypothesis is that the program fails to
accomplish this important goal.
Null hypothesis 4 is that the first-time homebuyer credit program is also able to
have an impact on a higher rate of homeownership, more owner housing supply including
more private investments (residential and/or commercial), and a reduction of vacancy in
Washington, D.C. On the ground of equity, the expectation is that these effects are more
substantial in low-income and minority neighborhoods. Also, related to distributional
effect, if an increase in owner housing supply is verified, it is expected that the D.C.
homebuyer credit program may generate some unintended consequences or detrimental
impact on housing affordability. The alternative hypothesis is that these impacts are not
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materialized at all.  
Before testing these hypotheses, it is important to conduct literature and policy
reviews that are most relevant to this research. In this regard, I undertook two brief but
comprehensive literature and policy reviews in the following sections: One concerns low-
income homeownership, existing tax incentive policies for homeownership, and proposed
targeted homeownership tax programs. The other is a review of urban/neighborhood
distress and renewal, as well as government programs that have attempted to solve these
urban and neighborhood problems in the past. The purpose of these reviews is to put this
study in a broad context since the targeted homebuyer credit intervention in the District
intersects at these two bodies of the literature. Further, if the reviews reveal that the urban
and tax incentive problems addressed by the District homebuyer intervention are not
unique to nor hypothetical for Washington, D.C., but true and widespread at the national
level, it represents a great potential for replicating the targeted homeownership tax credit
program into other central cities to help solve these common problems. 
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II. A Critical Review of Urban Renewal and Neighborhood Revitalization
Urban Distress
There is no shortage of literature describing the problems affecting U.S. cities.
Some contend that the economic distress of the inner city is one of the most pressing
problems in America today (Porter 1997). Others call attention to the problems caused by
social inequality, such as racial segregation and discrimination, and call for sweeping
reforms to bring opportunities to the residents of distressed neighborhoods. (Wilson
1996; Krumholz and Keating 1999; Quigley 1994)  Most scholars and experts agree on
the conditions that characterize urban distress: Loss of population—especially middle
class households—high unemployment, low homeownership rate, disinvestment, racial
segregation, poor quality public schools, high crime rates, concentration of poverty,
female-headed households, low levels of educational achievement, abandonment, high
vacancy rate, and concentrations of households receiving public assistance.
Rigorously defining neighborhood quality, however, has proven difficult.  The
most common definitions use census tract poverty rates as a proxy for other aspects of
neighborhood quality. Others, such as Kasarda (1993) and Newman and Schnare (1997)
combine various census-based social indicators such as number of female-headed
households and welfare recipients, as well as joblessness. Paul Jargowsky argues strongly
for using the poverty measure alone, rather than combining it with other measures. Most
analysts follow the Jargowsky prescription, using various poverty level thresholds to
determine a ghetto or underclass neighborhood (Kasarda 1993).
Most scholars agree that the pattern of suburbanization was more than just
consumer preferences and changing technologies. Rather, the pace and shape of this
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growth was the direct result of public policies and private institutions. The primary causes
of urban decline and decentralization are most often cited as federal government policies
on mortgage interest and real estate tax deductions, deindustrialization, technological
advancement that led to rapid growth in Sunbelt states where sprawl-like growth was the
norm, higher tax rates in center cities, exclusionary zoning by suburban governments,
outmigration of jobs to suburbs, spatial concentration of racial minorities and low income
families, and red-lining by banks and insurance companies.
Data from 2000 Census: Changes in Urban Landscape in Recent Decades
Since the 1930s, a pattern of decentralization and outward expansion has become
the norm, leaving many center cities in distress. This is true especially in the older
industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest.  Recent Census data show that many of the
largest cities in those regions have steadily lost population.1  Baltimore, Maryland's
largest city, has lost residents for the past five decades. Baltimore's population dropped
11.5 percent to 651,154 in 2000 from 736,014 in 1990. Meanwhile, its suburbs have
experienced continued growth in people2, jobs, and wealth. Washington D.C., also
experienced a population decline in the 1990s. The city lost 5.7 percent or 35,000
residents over the decade, while its suburbs posted a 13.1 percent population increase.
The suburbs showed uneven growth during the 1990s. While suburban areas in the entire
U.S. grew roughly 14 percent in the 90s, several suffered decline, specifically, those
                                                
1 A study by the Brookings Institute of the largest 34 metro areas showed the following Central Cities
experiencing population decline from 1990 to 2000: Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit,
Milwaukee, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Washington D.C.
2 Baltimore’s suburbs experienced 17.1 percent growth in population.
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located in the slow growing areas of the Midwest and Northeast.3 However, many
suburban areas continue to grow capturing a majority of the nation’s new employment
and population growth.  The most recent Census shows that the suburbs are now
attracting single-person households, childless couples, and immigrants—groups that tend
to gravitate toward cities.  
Not all of the news from the 2000 Census was bad. Data from 2000 revealed
evidence of a possible turnaround. Cities that had lost population for decades like New
York, Boston, and Chicago registered population gains.  By far the fastest growing cities
were in the West, Sunbelt, and Southern areas of the U.S.  These center city gains
however, were still far outpaced by their suburbs. Glaeser and Shapiro (2001) found that
the main factors present in cities that experienced growth over the decade4 were a rise in
immigrants, low unemployment rates, growth in the prior decade, warmer climates,
higher levels of educational achievement, a service sector industrial base, and an
automobile orientation over mass transit. They caution that the increases registered by
cities with populations over one million5 are not statistically significant given the variety
of growth experiences across all cities. Therefore, it is important to reserve judgment of a
true comeback until evidence from future decades supports the upward trend.  
                                                
3 Metro Areas where majority of suburbs experienced decline from 1990 to 2000 were Buffalo, Cincinnati,
Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh.
4 Analysis is taken from all cities in U.S. with 1990 populations exceeding 100,000.
5 Cities with populations over one million grew an overall 7 percent in the 1990s compared to -0.8 in the
1980s.
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Neighborhood Revitalization and Stabilization
The Neighborhood Revitalization model seeks to rebuild low-income
neighborhoods and improve the lives of their residents. It is rooted in decades of federal
policy, the civil rights movement, antipoverty activism, and years of community
organizing efforts (Nowak 1997). Research shows that neighborhoods do matter. Local
neighborhoods are important because of the social capital they provide—such as dense
social networks and local identification. These public goods help support patterns of
social organization and human well-being (Sampson 1999; Wilson 1997). Ingrid Ellen
and Margery Turner (1997) have synthesized the wide range of empirical research on this
subject to establish the impact a neighborhood environment has on its residents.
According to Ellen and Turner, the following neighborhood characteristics are important
influences on individual outcomes:
 Access to local services, especially schools
 Presence of adults who can serve as role models for acceptable behavior
 Influence from peers, especially for teenagers
 Informal networks through which to gain access to services and employment
 Exposure to crime and violence
 Physical access to jobs.
Further, Jencks and Mayer (1990) find that growing up in a predominately black
neighborhood or a neighborhood with high numbers of welfare recipients leads to
decreased success in the job market.6   Research suggests that neighborhoods with
concentrated poverty and unemployment lead to negative behaviors and the inability to
                                                
6 A neighborhood’s median income did not appear to be a factor.
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escape poverty (Wilson 1987; Engberg 1996). Some caution that to be successful,
neighborhood stabilization must address the underlying causes of population shift and
decline. As such, the controversial issues of race and social class must be dealt with
explicitly; otherwise long-term improvements will be undermined and negligible (Varady
1986). 
Practitioners have long sought to improve conditions in distressed and isolated
neighborhoods. Beyond addressing the adverse social impacts upon residents, the
Committee for Economic Development (1995), a group of 250 business leaders and
educators, use a broader context in arguing the importance of neighborhood
revitalization: 
 Blight undermines the fiscal and operational health of major cities.
 Distress threatens important economic assets.
 Distress weakens the nation’s resources.
 The costs of the problems fall on all taxpayers, regardless of where they live.
 Isolation of distressed urban neighborhoods conflicts with our national ideals.
Revitalization Method
Several schools of thought have emerged as to the best method of bringing about
the revitalization and stabilization of distressed neighborhoods. According to Rosenthal
(2003) neighborhoods are in a constant state of economic change.7  Recognizing and
encouraging the factors that produce positive change over time has been the topic of
much debate. Central to this debate are two predominant themes: People vs. Place Based
                                                                                                                                                
7 Rosenthal found that rates of change are strongly influenced by local investments in human and physical
capital.
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Policy. People-based initiatives seek to aid the residents of distressed neighborhoods
through empowerment strategies. Examples of people-based approaches include helping
households move to other areas, direct cash transfers (TANF), and human investment
strategies such as vocational training, improving education, and linking residents to jobs
in other areas. By contrast, place-based measures focus on revitalization and
improvements in distressed areas such as infrastructure investments, housing
rehabilitation, and attracting economic activity. Downs (1999) and Ladd (1994) argue that
both are necessary to improve quality of life in distressed center cities.  Downs notes,
however, that current government policies do not adequately fund person-based
strategies, thus most community development practitioners turn to place-based
approaches. 
Place Based Initiatives
The most common approaches to neighborhood improvement supported by the
literature are the promotion of homeownership; improvement in physical infrastructure
such as housing stock and public amenities; social capital (improving social cohesion,
networks, trust, and other factors that make relationships feasible and productive); local
community development corporations (CDCs), emphasizing grassroots and neighborhood
participation and empowerment; and comprehensive proposals that comprise several or
all of the aforementioned. While these approaches can overlap, government and private
institutions have focused their strategies and efforts in these primary areas.
Homeownership
The U.S. has long demonstrated its preference for homeownership. A growing
body of literature on homeownership argues that homeowners invest in their
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neighborhoods and remain in their homes longer than renters (Glaeser and DiPasquale
1999). Homeowners have a financial stake in preserving and improving the quality of
their neighborhood and increasing property values. Thus, homeowners are apt to behave
in way that stem decline in higher-income areas and accelerate the improvement of lower-
income neighborhoods. 
Based on his research of neighborhoods in Philadelphia and Washington from
1950-2000, Rosenthal (2003) argues that “…policies designed to foster homeownership
are likely to elevate the future economic status of neighborhoods.” Additional recent
research on two affordable homeownership programs in New York City shows that
property values in the immediate surrounding area rose relative to their Zip codes.8
While this had a positive impact on property owners and property tax revenues increased,
the authors note that the higher property values do not benefit the low- and moderate-
income renters in the neighborhood.
Physical Improvements
In a sample of New Jersey residents, Michael Greenberg (1999) found that the
residents’ perception of neighborhood quality was strongly correlated to crime/vandalism
and physical decay. Sanoff (1975) states that physically decaying neighborhoods send a
“psychological message of death” to their residents.  As such, Greenberg argues that
comprehensive initiatives to revitalize neighborhoods are meaningless unless physical
blight and crime are first addressed. 
                                                
8 Ellen et al. (2001) examined the spillover effects of the Nehemiah Program and the Partnership New
Homes program in New York City from 1980 to 1999.
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One of the most famous examples of large-scale physical capital improvements
was New York City’s Ten-Year Plan, which rehabilitated 140,000 housing units for a
total city investment of $4.2 billion. The city’s goal was to “re-create neighborhoods” and
bring physical revitalization. Van Rzyin and Genn (1999) found that the Ten-Year plan
substantially improved the rate of boarded-up buildings and increased property values,
thereby indicating that some level of neighborhood revitalization had occurred.  On the
other hand, they also found the program to be associated with increased concentrations of
poor and disadvantaged households in the most distressed areas. 
Community Development Corporations (CDCs)
A common method used to bring revitalization to distressed neighborhoods is
through CDCs. Vidal (1995) and Krumholz (1999) Proscio and Grogan (2001) all make
the case that CDCs are in the unique position to work directly with the residents of
distressed communities. Though no rigorous studies directly link the work of CDCs to
increased property values, a number of published case studies point to the success of
CDCs in bringing economic development, low-income housing, job training, and physical
transformation. The book “Comeback Cities” by Paul Grogan and Tony Proscio (2000)
highlights stories of CDC-based renewal in places such as the South Bronx, Houston,
Cleveland, Chicago, and San Francisco. In the book, CDCs are given credit for their
ability to work with the community at the grassroots level, leverage public and private
investments into tangible improvements, help in policing efforts, and respond quickly, as
a result of being small and flexible. 
This idea contrasts with the ideas of Michael Porter (1997), who believes that
CDCs have strengths but have too often rested on limited and garbled communication
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between entrepreneurs, companies, and advocates for inner cities. He claims that
advocates often believe that companies are not doing enough for their communities, while
businesses feel “victimized” by what they observe to be arduous demands and
expectations. According to Porter, center cities need to move beyond the stage of
traditional CDCs to a focus on private, for-profit initiatives. He cites the failure of the
social model, which was built around meeting the needs of individuals rather than
generating jobs and economic opportunity that would mitigate the need for social
programs in the long run. Revitalization must harness the power of the market, especially
the labor market. Inner cities will succeed only where they welcome new investment and
provide autonomy for entrepreneurs.
Social Capital
In contrast to physical and human capital, social capital refers to social cohesion,
informal networks, and relationships among people where they feel trust and obligation
for one another.  The social capital theory suggests that neighborhoods with high social
capital are more likely to respond effectively to change, work toward neighborhood
improvement, and stem decline (Rohe and Temkin 1998). The Committee for Economic
Development (1995) calls on CDCs and public officials to include social capital
development as one of their main components in rebuilding distressed neighborhoods. 
Many studies have linked high levels of social capital to less crime and violence
and increased neighborhood stability.9 Saegert and Winkel (1998) examined several
reprivatized apartment buildings in some of New York City’s most distressed
                                                
9 Rohe and Steward (1996) found that homeownership helped stabilize communities through the
accumulation of social capital.
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neighborhoods. They found social capital to be a key determinant in the success of locally
sponsored low-income housing. They also found buildings in tax delinquency that were
revitalized as co-ops produce far more social capital than those taken over by CDCs. The
study suggests that social capital can add value to public investment in housing. An
empirical study by Rohe and Temkin (1998) examined neighborhoods in Pittsburgh and
found that social capital is more important to strong neighborhoods than other more
traditional indicators such as physical capital and vacancy rates. They conclude that social
capital “should be included in any neighborhood revitalization or stabilization effort”
(p.86).  
Comprehensive Approaches
The very nature of urban problems is often multi- dimensional in scope and therefore
requires a combination of revitalization techniques.  This approach recognizes that social
and economic conditions are inter-related. Thus, a combination of strategies based on
several theories can have a greater impact on neighborhood revitalization than any one
theory by itself. 
According to Brown (1998), comprehensive strategies seek to bridge the gap that
often exists between human services, community revitalization, and economic
development. Many CDCs often engage in comprehensive initiatives that can encompass
homeownership, physical and social capital, and job training. However, according to
Granger (1998) and Brown (1998), determining the effectiveness of comprehensive
approaches is difficult due to all of the stakeholders that have different notions of success
and the sheer complexity of the interaction between physical, social, and economic
factors.
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Government Policy Interventions 
In her discussion of urban policy, historian Alice O’Conner (1999) points to
recurring patterns that have stymied urban renewal and neighborhood revitalization. First
she notes that government urban policy has long worked against itself. Relatively small-
scale interventions are intended to revitalize distressed areas while large-scale public
policies undermine their very ability to survive. Downs (1999) agrees, asserting that
federal policy often works at cross-purposes, causing the very decline that urban policy
tries to reverse.10  Other patterns mentioned are the marginal treatment of place-based
strategies by the federal government, the weak political coalitions between stakeholders,
and devolution to the states and local government.
Urban Renewal
The Federal Government authored the first major program aimed to bring about
renewal specifically in urban areas.  The Federal Urban Renewal program was created
through Title I in the 1949 Housing Act. The strategy behind the program emerged out of
negotiations between city planners, public housing advocates, big-city mayors, and real
estate developers. A vital aspect to the program’s future success was eminent domain,
which allowed local redevelopment authorities to clear land and use it for nonresidential
purposes. From its inception, however, the program's goals were ambiguous and ill
defined (Teaford 2000), eventually leading to the displacement of many low-income
neighborhoods and further encouraging middle-class migration to the suburbs (O’Conner
1999).
                                                
10 For example, public policy was instrumental in racial segregation by encouraging redlining practices by
mortgage lenders and maintaining segregated practices in public housing-  at the same time, the Federal
government had modest programs deal with job loss, poverty, racial and economic polarization.
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Intended to clean cities of blight and bring new investment to distressed areas, by
the end, the program had instead become synonymous with bulldozers and displacement
of the poor, “evoking images of destruction and delay rather than renaissance and
reconstruction” (Teaford 2000). Urban Renewal removed hundreds of thousands of low-
rent housing units, yet most were not replaced by comparable units (Krumholz and
Keating 1999). The program was funded through the 1950s and 60s until funding was cut
off by Congress in 1974. 
Since Urban Renewal, urban policy has shifted from new construction and slum
clearance to housing rehab and neighborhood revitalization. The federal government has
taken a proactive role in urban development and revitalization typically through grant
programs focusing on physical improvement, social transfer payments, and economic
development initiatives.
Antipoverty Programs
During the 1960s, with social activism, racial tensions, and citizen protests
reaching the national level, the Johnson administration declared a war on poverty. During
this time, in addition to Urban Renewal efforts, several federal programs were initiated:
Community Action Programs, Model Cities, and the Special Impact Program.  These
programs proved largely ineffective partially because they were too limited in scope and
funding to alter the structural inequities that continued to segregate poor racial minorities
(O’Conner 1999). Furthermore, policy makers had not decided whether their aim was to
help rebuild communities or to help people leave distressed areas.
Block Grants
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In the 1970s, under the leadership of Nixon and increased devolution to states, the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program replaced all previous urban
programs. Initiated in 1974 under the Housing and Community Development Act, the
CDBG program allocated federal money to states, cities, and urban counties based on
certain indicators of distress.11 Cities were given wide latitude in how they used the
funds, but the primary beneficiaries were to be low and moderate-income residents. The
program still exists, with annual budgets (since 2000) ranging from $4.8 billion to just
over $5 billion. Grants can be over a one-, two-, or three-year period. According to
guidelines set by HUD, all CDBG activities must meet one of the following objectives:
benefit low- and moderate-income people, prevent or eliminate slums or blight, or meet
urgent community development needs because existing conditions pose a serious and
immediate threat to the health or welfare of the community. 
Little rigorous analysis has been conducted to measure the impact of the program
on distressed neighborhoods. The Urban Institute recently conducted research on 17 cities
to determine the progress made by these areas from 1995 to 2000.12  Overall, it found that
larger CDBG investments are connected to improvements in neighborhood quality13.
However, the authors caution the sample was not representative of the larger population
nor were other public investments taken into account.  Thus, results do not conclusively
                                                
11 Indicators such a population, poverty level, age of housing stock, and other need factors.
12 The two primary indicators used were home mortgage lending activity from Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act data, and the number of businesses and employees from Dun and Bradstreet- both were found to be
good indicators of neighborhood quality.
13 Measures of quality were based on numerous socio-economic neighborhood indicators as identified by
the Urban Institute’s National Neighborhood Indicator Partnership (NNIP) effort.
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show CDBG investments to be positively correlated with particular calculable outcomes
(Urban Institute 2002). 
In response to the continued losses experienced by older industrial cities, the
Urban Development Action Grant Program (UDAG) was authorized under the 1977
amendments to the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act. The UDAG
program was seen as a complement to the CDBG Program. This program offered federal
matching grants that could be used for commercial, industrial, or nonresidential
development in central cities in hopes of creating jobs for residents and reviving
downtown economies. Funds could be used for virtually any private development that
produced new jobs and increased local tax revenues. The UDAG program came under
criticism when most of the funding went for commercial initiatives rather than serving the
poor.14  From its inception to its cancellation in 1988, the legitimacy and effectiveness of
the program were in question. In the end, the UDAG program was known for its goals of
facilitating public-private partnerships in the targeted redevelopment and economic
recovery of urban areas, its requirements for leveraging, intergovernmental coordination,
and the placement of responsibility for proposals with local governments (O’Conner
1999).
Community Reinvestment Act
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in 1977 “to prevent
redlining and to encourage banks and thrifts to help meet the credit needs of all segments
of their communities, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods” (Statement
                                                
14 For instance, Boston used UDAG funds to finance luxury hotels and retail shops.  From 1978 to 1985 half
of all newly constructed downtown malls received UDAG funding (Teaford 2000).
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by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or OCC). The hope was that by
encouraging banks to lend in their local communities, the CRA would be a tool for
revitalizing communities and would stem the outward flow of capital (Haag 2000). In
practice, the CRA places “enormous” pressure on banks to extend more credit to low-
income areas than they otherwise would have (Grogan and Proscio 2000). 
The legislation does not call for explicit penalties; however, when financial
institutions seek permission to expand, merge, or otherwise change the scope of their
charter, their CRA record is held up to public and regulatory scrutiny. Furthermore,
legislation enacted in 1999 provides that financial holding companies and depositories are
prohibited from entering new lines of business if the depository or any of its affiliates fail
to maintain a satisfactory CRA record. 
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC), a group of
neighborhood-based community reinvestment leaders, has kept the only systematic
information on CRA commitments by depository institutions. According to NCRC, from
its inception in 1977 there have been a total of $1 trillion in total CRA commitments for
loans, investments, and services to low-income and minority households.15 Between 1993
and 1998, “CRA-covered” lenders and their affiliates increased mortgage lending to low-
and moderate-income borrowers and areas by 39 percent, while lending to other
borrowers increased by only 17 percent (NCRC 2000).  In her comprehensive literature
review, Haag (2000) cites studies that found banks with CRA commitments were more
likely to approve conventional mortgages for low-income minority residents than those
                                                
15 According to NCRC, 99 percent of all commitments have been committed since 1992.
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without agreements.  Further, CRA commitments are associated with larger increases in
lending to low-income and minority households.  
Regarding the profitability of CRA lending, a 1997 study conducted by Federal
Reserve economists Glenn Canner and Wayne Passmore finds “no compelling evidence
of lower profitability at commercial banks that specialize in home purchase lending in
lower-income neighborhoods or to lower-income borrowers…regressions for the three
years (1993, 1994, and 1995, which were years of high levels of CRA-related lending)
suggest that the profitability of banks seems unrelated to, or perhaps slightly positively
related to, the proportion of lending they extended in lower-income tracts” (NCRC 2000).
Empowerment Zones/ Enterprise Community
The 1980s were an era of increased devolution and “federal retrenchment”
(O’Conner 1999). The prevailing belief was that the absence of government was key to
neighborhood revitalization. A major initiative to emerge during this time was the
Enterprise Zone. Modeled after a British program, Enterprise Zones promised to
introduce free market principles and restore entrepreneurial activity to distressed areas
through tax breaks and regulatory relief for businesses. The program was initially adopted
by the states and did not become a federal program until 1993, when it became known as
the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) initiative. The EZ/EC program
is the most recent attempt by the U.S. to pursue a  “place-based people strategy”16 (Ladd
1994). Intended to not only boost economic development but also to help cities compete
in the global economy, the program provides explicit incentives to businesses, such as
                                                
16 It is place based in that it is tied to geographically designated areas and people based because of the block
grant that provides direct funding for social services targeted to disadvantaged populations.
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low-interest loans, job training assistance and subsidies, improvement of infrastructure
and public services, and various business development services and assistance. 
Engberg and Greenbaum (2001) examined the impact of Enterprise Zones on the
growth of property values in 22 states, using a sample of small cities with and without
zones. They note that typical evaluations focus on other desirable outcomes such as how
many businesses and jobs the program creates. They make the case that all of these
outcomes should be capitalized in local housing markets, thus property values make a
valid evaluation measurement. Their findings indicate that on average, Enterprise Zones
have had little impact on housing markets. In addition, zone programs in places that
began the decade with high vacancy rates actually reduced the housing value growth
rate.17  Their research suggests that zones should not be designated in the most distressed
areas, but are more likely to have a positive impact on areas that are moderately
distressed.
Other studies point to the ineffectiveness of the program. In England where the
program first began, a government-funded evaluation revealed that employment grew
more slowly in zones than outside zones, a majority of the jobs created in zones were not
attributable to the zone designation, and most economic activity was not new but was
relocated from nearby counties. Ladd (1994) presents additional research from Maryland
indicating that Enterprise Zones are not a cost-effective means of generating jobs.
Low Income Housing Tax Credit
                                                
17 Engberg and Greenbaum offer three possible explanations: (1) Places given zone designation may
experience a reduction in other forms of assistance that are more advantageous (2) Zone subsidies may
attract businesses that are not viable after the subsidy expires or businesses that have negative externalities
(3) A Zone label can carry a negative stigma, making it hard for distressed areas to overcome a reputation
of being unsuitable for economic activity.
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The primary vehicle of low-income housing production and rehabilitation, the
Low Income Tax Credit (LIHTC) program contains incentives for development in low-
income areas. To encourage affordable housing development in traditionally underserved
areas, legislators increased the credit amount given to low-income housing developments
in what are deemed “difficult development areas” (DDA)18 or “qualified census tracts”
(QCT)19.  A project in either a DDA or QCT qualifies for a 30 percent increase in the
amount of the tax credit awarded to the project.
Overall, just over one-third of all projects placed in service between 1995 and
1998 are located in one of these two designated areas. McClure (2000) notes that since
DDAs and QCTs can only make up 20 percent of a jurisdiction, the added incentives
appear to have an impact on location decisions, as development projects are
disproportionately located there.  Not surprisingly, Cummings and DiPasquale (1999) and
the GAO (1999) found that total development costs for projects in QCTs or DDAs were
higher than projects outside of those areas.
While comparatively little research has been conducted that examines the impact
of LIHTC projects upon their neighborhood, there does appear to be agreement that
LIHTC projects are contributing to the reinvestment of low-income neighborhoods
(Cummings and DiPasquale, 1999; Roberts and Harvey, 1999; Abt 2000b). Cummings
and DiPasquale found that in many neighborhoods, LIHTC projects stand as the only new
                                                                                                                                                
18 A difficult development area (DDA) is a defined by HUD as an area with high construction, land, and
utility costs relative to the median income of the area.
19 A qualified census tract (QCT) is defined as a tract where at least 50 percent of the households have an
income less than 60 percent of the area’s median family income.
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residential construction in recent years.  In center cities, 27 percent of the LIHTC projects
were the only rental housing construction in the previous 5 years.  They go further to
claim that LIHTC units are highly important additions to the rental housing stock as some
center cities “simply lack rental housing”.  LIHTC properties represent over 20 percent of
the 1990 housing stock in 13 percent of the census tracts in their sample20.  Likewise, the
Abt 2000b report indicates that many of the developments were the “first new
investments in the area.” Cummings and DiPasquale (1999) conclude that in center cities,
the “LIHTC program is used much more often to provide better housing in poor
neighborhoods than to provide affordable housing in higher-income neighborhoods.”
Roberts and Harvey (1999) assert that the tax credit has been successful in
bringing private capital into poor neighborhoods. Cummings and DiPasquale (1999)
found that about one in five LIHTC units were built in census tracts where the median
household income was 40 percent below the area median21.  In the database created and
maintained by Abt Associates, (2000a) from 1995 to 1998, one out of every four units
were developed in census tracts where more than half of the households had incomes
under the 60 percent of area median qualifying income. Additionally, during that same
time period, 19 percent of LIHTC units were developed in census tracts where 30 percent
of households were below the poverty line. The 19 percent is a reduction from nearly 40
percent of the units placed in service from 1992 to 1994. The authors attribute this to the
increased development of LIHTC units in suburban areas over center city locations.
State/Local Intervention: Washington-Baltimore Programs
                                                
20 Cummings and Dipasquale’s sample includes 1,820 census tracts.
21 Based on 1990 Census. 
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State and local leaders have long recognized the unique nature of neighborhoods
within city limits and the need to focus micro-level attention on problems affecting these
neighborhoods. In Baltimore, the mayor has initiated an Office of Neighborhoods, a
department whose principal task is to ensure that city government is an effective partner
with communities in improving the quality of life in neighborhoods. Furthermore, in both
Baltimore and Washington, D.C., the Department of Planning works at the neighborhood
level with residents to create Strategic Neighborhood Action Plans or SNAPs. These
plans have the stated goal of bringing revitalization to distressed neighborhoods.
Working to revitalize distressed neighborhoods, Maryland’s Department of
Housing and Community Development has 20 programs in its arsenal designed to bring
and leverage private investment, spur homeownership, and provide assistance to local
governments. One example is the Neighborhood Stabilization Act of 1996, which
provided an 80-percent property tax credit incentive to middle-income homebuyers in
several distressed neighborhoods.  While programs continue to be developed and
employed, knowledge regarding their effectiveness is limited to mostly anecdotal
evidence, not research and evaluation.  
A commitment to neighborhood revitalization is not unique to Baltimore or
Washington D.C., nor is the idea that homeownership is one of the best ways to
accomplish these goals. Many state and local governments use countless programs in 
their attempt to restore center city neighborhoods. 22 However, what’s unique and
important to Washington, D.C. and Baltimore is that their policy interventions are solely
                                                
22 In 1991, The National Center for the Revitalization of Central Cities, examined six cities under a
controlled framework.  The most commonly used strategies in these cities were:  Public investment as a tool
to spur private investment, use of private, non –profit development corporations, human capital building
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centered around promotion of homeownership for targeted income groups in a center city
or for a targeted distressed neighborhood. Moreover, in the case of Washington, D.C., the
first-time homebuyer credit program is the ONLY homeownership tax credit program
financed by the federal government and implemented in a state/local setting..
In summary, the programs and methods mentioned in this section are by no means
exhaustive.  There are numerous renewal initiatives throughout the country with the
expressed goal of revitalizing urban communities. To date, the academic literature is very
limited in its evaluation of these programs. There does appear to be a common theme:
Compelling, consistent, and generally accepted measures of neighborhood improvement
are not easily derived. Continued research as to what constitutes revitalization and
whether federal, city, or private initiatives can stem decline and promote renewal are
central to the future of urban policy. 
                                                                                                                                                
such as job training and career counseling, transit improvement, public- private partnerships, creation of
redevelopment agencies with strong financial backing, and a strong commitment to planning and managed
growth.
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III. A Literature Review of Low-Income Homeownership and Its Tax Incentive
Policy
Low-Income Homeownership
Both Presidents Clinton and Bush have promoted policy initiatives to improve the
rate of homeownership among low-income and minority households to narrow the
significant gaps in homeownership between these groups and the national total.
Homeownership for low-income households can have profound economic and social
benefits to owners, their families, and their neighborhoods. 
Homeownership provides economic benefits to individual households.
Homeowners generally live in larger, better-quality homes than renters, face costs that fall
over time, and are shielded against rent risk (McCarthy, Van Zandt, and Rohe 2001, Sinai
and Souleles 2001). Housing is a relatively low-risk investment, generally providing
homeowners with substantially increased wealth in the form of home equity. Moreover,
housing can be a good investment, even if one loses money on the investment, since it
also provides dividends equal to home’s rental value. Homeowners also gain access to
home equity or other lines of credit, which can serve as a buffer against income shocks or
facilitate additional investments (McCarthy, Van Zandt, and Rohe 2001). Finally,
residential construction and investment helps the economy as a whole. Housing-related
spending makes up 20 percent of the country’s gross domestic product  (Carr 1999).  
Moreover, homeownership may yield broader social benefits to individuals and
communities. First, homeownership grants owners a financial stake in the quality of the
surrounding environment, providing incentives for positive neighborhood effects and
strong local schools (Trefzger 1998). Second, homeownership may have a psychological
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effect upon households, granting homeowners with a motivation to work hard and to
become involved in their community. Social work professors Michael Sherradan and
Alice K. Johnson write that: “While income supports consumption, assets change
psychological outlook, behavioral effort, and social interaction” (Johnson and Sherradan
1992). Third, homeownership can provide financial and residential stability to
households, both of which are crucial to family and childhood outcomes. A study by
Joseph Harkness and Sandra Newman finds that the acquisition of home equity and the
reduction in residential mobility, both associated with homeownership, improve key
childhood outcomes (Harkness and Newman 2000). 
Several caveats apply to the argument for low-income homeownership.
Investments in housing by low-income households make up a larger portion of their
investment portfolio than optimal, leaving them vulnerable to downturns in the housing
market. This is particularly risky for homebuyers in low- and moderate-income tracts,
since these areas generally have lower than average or unstable levels of price
appreciation (McCarthy, Van Zandt, and Rohe 2001).  Moreover, low-income households
often face an unstable income stream and a lack of non-housing assets to cover
emergency housing repairs and monthly payments. As a result, foreclosure rates are high
among low-income homeowners, bringing to question the long-term sustainability of low-
income homeownership without further government assistance (Meyer, Yeager ,and
Burayidi 1994, Elugardo and Klein 1998). Finally, the social benefits associated with
homeownership may not manifest themselves for “pioneer” homeowners in distressed
neighborhoods (Harkness and Newman 2000).
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Low-Income Homeownership: Changes in Recent Years
In recent years, homeownership rates among low-income and minority households
have increased but still remain far below the average.  After rising for decades, the
national homeownership rate stagnated during the 1980s at 64 percent, largely due to
demographic changes and changes in household type (Green 1996). During the 1990s, the
homeownership rate increased by two percentage points, the largest gain since the 1950s.
By 2000, 66.2 percent of Americans owned their homes, the highest homeownership rate
ever recorded in a decennial census. There are, however, significant gaps among racial
groups. According to Simmons (2001), the homeownership rate for non-Hispanic whites
increased by 3.4 percentage points, compared with an increase of 2.8 percentage points
for all minorities. In 2000, the homeownership rate for non-Hispanic whites was 72.4
percent; African Americans, 46.3 percent; Hispanics, 45.7 percent; Asians, 53.2 percent;
and all minorities, 47.4 percent (Simmons 2001). Raphael W. Bostic and Brian J.
Surrette, in an analysis of CPS data from 1989 and 1998, found that the homeownership
rate rose for all groups during this time, but that it rose at a faster rate for blacks,
Hispanics, and lower-income families (Bostic and Surrette 2001).
Possible determinants of the growth in low-income homeownership include
economic and demographic factors, as well as regulatory changes and financial
innovation.  During the 1990s, mortgage lenders developed sophisticated methods of
credit scoring and utilized innovation in statistical modeling to expand risk-based
lending. At the same time, an expansion of HMDA and CRA requirements as well as
targets for affordable mortgage purchases for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provided new
incentives for low-income homeownership. Bostic and Surrette find that regulatory
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changes and technological innovation are largely responsible for the 1990s low-income
homeownership boom, rather than “family-related characteristics.” Family-related
characteristics, which include demographic and economic indicators, would have actually
predicted a decrease in low-income homeownership (Bostic and Surrette 2001). 
Low-Income Homeownership: Government Programs
In the past decades, the federal government has acted to support low-income
homeownership through several relatively small HUD programs. Turnkey III rewarded
public housing residents who maintained their apartments with a savings account for
homeownership. Section 235 was a mortgage support program for newly built units that
faced significant criticism for corruption among profit-maximizing real estate agents and
ineffective government agencies.  Section 236 subsidized the construction and operation
of cooperative housing run by nonprofit organizations. Tenants “owned” their units but
were prohibited from selling them for a profit. Finally, HOPE (Homeownership
Opportunities for People Everywhere) allows for tenant ownership of public housing
(Johnson and Sherradan 1992). The Clinton Administration’s National Homeownership
Strategy aimed to reach a 67.5-percent homeownership rate by 2001, largely by
expanding opportunities to traditionally underserved households. The Bush
Administration proposed several homeownership programs under its HUD budget,
including a down payment assistance program and American Dream Funds. 
Housing advocates have recommended new variations on these programs or
increased funding for the existing homeownership programs. The National Housing
Institute, for example, calls for housing vouchers that could be used for both rental units
and homeownership. They also propose a program similar to Section 236, where well
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functioning public housing units would be converted into cooperatives run by nonprofit
organizations.  
David W. Berson and Eileen Neely have projected a national homeownership rate
as high as 75 percent in 2005, conditional upon several policy changes:  (1) fiscal and
monetary policy decreasing interest rates, (2) expansion of low/no down payment
programs and credit-risk mechanisms, (3) cost-saving home building technology, (4)
programs to build low-cost manufactured or modular homes, (5) minority outreach
programs and enforcement of fair housing laws, and (6) demographic changes projected
to occur by 2005.  According to Berson and Neely, efforts to increase minority
homeownership would be have the most substantial effect (4.5 percentage points) on the
national homeownership rate (Berson and Neely 1998).  
Tax Incentives for Homeownership
By far, the largest government expenditure on housing comes not from HUD, but
in the form of tax deductions for homeowners. According to Cushing Dolbeare, the total
of all assisted housing payments made under all HUD programs from 1937 to 1980 is
greater than the cost of all housing-related tax expenditures in the year 1980 alone. In
1998, Steven C. Bourassa and William G. Grigsby calculate that all tax breaks for
homeownership cost the federal government about $700 billion in lost revenues
(Bourassa and Grigsby 2000).
American homeowners are able to deduct both mortgage interest and local real
estate taxes from their federal income taxes.  These deductions were developed in 1913,
when taxes were fairly low, but have become immensely popular since the rise in taxes
during and following World War II. Other tax concessions include the non-taxation of net
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imputed income from owner-occupied homes and the non-taxation of the first $250,000
($500,000 for married couples) of capital gains on the sale of a home. Similar tax
concessions exist in other developed countries, but are not uniformly as generous as the
United States (Bourassa and Grigsby 2000).
The mortgage and property tax deductions, while generally popular in the United
States, have raised considerable controversy among advocates of low-income
homeownership primarily because they go largely to wealthy households. The biased
distribution of tax deduction benefits by income seems to result from two reasons. First,
many low-income households don’t benefit from the deduction as they don’t find it
worthwhile to itemize their deductions. Citing data from the Joint Tax Committee of
Congress (FY 1995), Peter Dreier notes that over 80 percent of homeowners with income
over $200,000 claimed the deduction, compared to under 30 percent of homeowners with
incomes between $40,000 and $50,000 and under 7 percent of those in the $20,000-
$30,000 income bracket. Second, even without the gap between those who itemize and
those who don’t, the tax benefit is still regressive, since those with larger incomes are
more likely own larger homes, thus receiving greater tax benefits. For example, the
average benefit to homeowners with incomes over $200,000 is more than 10 times that
saved by those in the $40,000-$50,000 bracket (Dreier 1996).
Comparisons with Canada, which lacks a mortgage tax deduction, lead Bourassa
and Grigsby to believe that the deduction does little to increase the nation’s
homeownership rate. The tax concession may, in fact, lead to overconsumption of
housing, but Bourassa and Grigsby believe that this is a value judgment (Bourassa and
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Grigsby 2000). At the very least, the current tax concession is not a homeownership
incentive for those who do not itemize their deductions.  
Defenders of the tax deduction believe that it is a valuable tax incentive for
middle-class families and is justified by the positive externalities associated with
homeownership (Weicher 2000). Eliminating the deduction or lowering the cap on
qualifying home values (currently at $1 million) would be politically unpopular and
would lower existing real estate values as people move “down market” to less expensive
homes. Bourassa and Grigsby recommend phasing out the tax deduction over 15-20 years
to avoid capital losses for current homeowners and to allow for gradual adaptation on the
supply and demand sides of the housing market (Bourassa and Grigsby 2000).
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IV. New Empirical Evidence on Distributions of Mortgage and Property Tax
Deductions in the United States
This section offers new empirical evidence on the distributions of mortgage and
real estate tax deductions by income class for 1991 through 2001. While it is only a
descriptive analysis based on calculations of the data from the U.S. Joint Committee on
Taxation, it is central to this study. This empirical evidence verifies whether, and why,
the existing tax policies for homeownership do not provide an effective incentive for
lower-income families to participate in homeownership. This, in turn, provides a critical
context for the targeted homeownership tax credit as the appropriate remedy or
supplement to the current system.    
As shown in Table 1, only 72.7 million lower-income families (with family
income below the national median income in a given year) filed individual tax returns for
the real estate tax deductions for years 1991 through 2001. They accounted for merely 7.3
percent of all returns by lower-income families per year. In contrast, about 58.1 percent of
all higher-income tax filers (whose family income is above the national median income in
a given year) claimed the real estate tax deduction benefits every year. As a result, the
lower-income class received substantially fewer benefits from the deduction than the
higher-income class did. Between 1991 and 2001, the aggregate deduction claimed by
higher-income families was estimated at $175 billion in 2001 dollars, compared to only
$16.6 billion for lower-income families. Most strikingly, Figure 1a indicates that the real
estate tax deduction received by the higher-income class accounted for about 91 percent
of the aggregate real estate tax deductions for the period, while lower-income class
accounted for only 9 percent. 
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Table 1. Distribution by Income Class of Real Estate Tax and Mortgage Interest Deductions 
Under Individual Income Tax
[money amounts in millions of 2001 dollars, return in thousands]
YEAR Returns*
Returns as % of
All Returns Amount Returns*
Returns as % of
All Returns Amount
Real Estate Tax Deduction
1991 5,972 7.5 1,285 19,233 58.5 12,081
1992 6,083 7.6 1,373 20,784 60.5 14,061
1993 4,837 6.4 1,021 23,327 58.1 14,365
1994 4,579 5.3 954 23,486 53.1 14,653
1995 7,828 8.0 1,914 20,467 62.2 14,621
1996 8,024 8.3 1,964 22,304 62.7 15,109
1997 7,486 7.9 1,818 22,410 59.3 15,846
1998 7,243 7.7 1,726 23,350 58.4 17,132
1999 7,947 8.1 1,868 23,628 57.8 17,640
2000 6,465 7.0 1,479 26,479 55.4 19,334
2001 6,246 6.9 1,181 27,312 53.1 20,164
Sum (1991-2001) 72,710 16,583 252,780 175,007
Mean 6,610 7.3 1,508 22,980 58.1 15,910
Standard Deviation 1,206 0.9 370 2,406 3.2 2,422
Mortgage Interest Deduction
1991 6,009 7.6 5,074 18,049 54.9 42,758
1992 6,125 7.7 4,625 19,869 57.8 46,835
1993 5,087 6.7 3,498 22,382 55.8 47,551
1994 4,690 5.4 3,481 22,453 50.8 57,655
1995 7,910 8.1 7,082 19,939 60.6 60,708
1996 7,876 8.2 4,775 21,570 60.7 40,762
1997 7,107 7.5 4,578 21,379 56.6 41,565
1998 6,948 7.4 4,460 22,599 56.5 46,582
1999 7,753 7.9 5,478 22,572 55.2 51,308
2000 6,347 6.9 4,399 25,462 53.2 57,941
2001 6,080 6.7 3,777 26,001 50.5 60,753
Sum (1991-2001) 71,932 51,226 242,275 554,418
Mean 6,539 7.3 4,657 22,025 55.7 50,402
Standard Deviation 1,089 0.8 1,018 2,324 3.4 7,672
Source: Calculated from Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures, fiscal years 1991-2002
Note: According to a telephone conversation on July 24, 2002 with Mr. Thomas F. Koerner, Associate Deputy Chief of Staff at the Joint Committee on Taxation,
the statistics in these JCT reports are the estimates for the specified calendar year. The yearly estimate is derived from the JCT econometric models on the basis
of the past real data on income tax returns. Cautions must be exercised in comparing these estimates among various years due to methodological changes 
from time to time, which may have resulted in a somewhat inconsistent time series for estimations.
* Number of individual tax returns that filed real estate tax deduction or mortgage interest deduction under the itemization section.
Lower-Income Class (below Median Income) Higher-Income Class (above Median Income)
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Similarly, the lower-income class also received disproportionately fewer tax
benefits from the mortgage interest deduction. Over the 1991-2001 period the aggregated
mortgage interest deduction received by the higher-income class (or 55.7 percent of all
returns from the higher-income group) was $554.4 billion in 2001 dollars, compared to
$51.2 billion for the lower-income tax filers (whose claim rate was 7.3 percent per year).
This key information is illustrated in Figure 1b, which also shows that the aggregate
mortgage interest deduction claimed by the high-income class accounted for, once again,
about 92 percent of the national total, compared to 8 percent for the lower-income class. 
These data clearly indicate that lower-income families have not received
significant economic benefits from existing tax treatments to for homeownership. The
question remains as to why, or how, this has happened. There are two possible
explanations:
First, the majority of low- and moderate-income families in the U.S. are not able
to itemize their tax returns so as to receive the mortgage interest and property tax
deductions. This is because they either have little or no tax liability, they rent their
housing, or they own a home so small and inexpensive that itemizing the mortgage
interest and real estate taxes would have no impact on their returns. As a result, although
there were as many as 89.7 million lower-income families who filed tax returns each year
between 1991 and 2002, only 10.8 percent of them were able to itemize their tax returns.
In contrast, for an average of 39.9 million higher-income tax filers per year, their rate of
itemization was 65.4 percent during the same period (Table 2 and Figure 2).
Second, even for those who did itemize their tax returns for mortgage interest and
real estate tax deductions, the disparity in deductions per return between the lower- and
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Figure 1a. Distributions of Real Estate Tax Deduction (1991-2001)
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higher-income filers is substantial. Table 3 shows that a typical higher-income filer
received a total deduction of nearly $2,985 (in 2001 dollars) per return per year, including
$2,295 from mortgage interest deduction and $690 from real estate tax deduction, over
the 1991-2001 period. At the same time, the total deduction per return was merely $939
per year, including $713 from mortgage interest deduction and $226 from property tax
deduction, for a typical lower-income filer. Put differently, the tax benefits received by
the lower-income class from these two types of homeownership-related tax deductions
were slightly less than one-third of the benefits received by the higher-income families.
This may reflect the fact that the higher the family income, the more expensive the home
and the larger the mortgage loan (and property tax liability) would be. This key
information is illustrated in Figure 3a.
What would the pattern look like if the deductions are calculated as a percentage
of household income23? The results are also documented in Table 3 and depicted in
Figure 3b. They show that: (1) On average, the mortgage interest and real estate tax
deductions per household accounted for about 2.3% of median household income for the
lower-income class and 3.2% for the higher-income tax filers. (2) The small standard
deviations indicate that the gap of about 0.9 percentage point between the two groups was
largely consistent over time (1991-2001). Together, these results suggest that, as
compared to higher-income homeowners, the lower-income homeowners received fewer
homeownership-related tax benefits even relative to their incomes. Obviously, this
outcome is consistent with other findings reported in this section.  
                                                
23 Examining this question was suggested by Dr. Robert Goodman, the former research director of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lower-Income Class Higher-Income Class
Figure 3a. Real Estate Tax and Mortgage Interest Deduction Per Return
(1991-2001)



































Lower-Income Class (10.8%) Higher-Income Class (65.4%)
Figure 2. Rate of Itemization (1991-2001)
All Returns Itemized Returns
Figure 3b. Home Mortgage Interest and Real Estate Tax Deductions Per Return 
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 In summary, these findings suggest that the mortgage interest and real estate tax
deductions may not have serve as strong incentive instruments for lower-income families
to participate in homeownership, through which they can build home equity wealth. The
ineffectiveness is rooted in the structure of the current tax treatments to housing in which
the low/moderate-income families receive substantially fewer economic benefits because
of their substantially lower rate of itemization, higher rate of renting, or smaller homes
they own. 
These findings are consistent with a 2002 study by Edward Glaeser and Jesse
Shapiro of Harvard University. Their study finds that while externalities from
homeownership are significant, the home mortgage interest deduction is a particularly
poor instrument of encouraging homeownership since it targets the wealthy, who are
almost always homeowners. Using a time series, their empirical results show that the
homeownership subsidy moves with inflation and has changed significantly between
1960 and today, but the homeownership rates have been essentially constant.
The implications of these findings should be viewed with caution. First, although
the mortgage interest and property tax deductions as reported here are substantial, they
are still not the major tax benefits of homeownership in this country. The main portion of
homeownership subsidies comes from the non-taxation of imputed rent of owning a
home. That is, if owner-occupied and renter-occupied housing are treated the same way,
homeowners would be able to claim for mortgage interest and property tax deductions but
they would also have to be taxed for the implicit rent they pay themselves. Under the
existing tax system, however, the imputed (implicit) rent of homeownership is not taxed
but the deductions are still allowed. Second, even for the deductions themselves, the
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existing tax system contains some important built-in mechanisms such as deduction cap
and standard deduction. These mechanisms appear to have served as an effective break
that stops/prevents the wealthy from taking too many (or unlimited) tax benefits of
homeownership while they also provide the lower-income households with some tax
benefits even if they are without homeownership attainment.   
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V. Targeted Homeownership Tax Credit: An Overview and Analysis of Existing
Programs and Proposals in the U.S. 
Despite the substantial biases associated with the distributions of mortgage and
property tax deduction system, it appears to be not feasible both politically and practically
to end this system entirely in this country. Therefore, low-income homeownership
advocates, politicians, trade associations, as well as academics have instead focused on
tax credits, targeted at those homeowners who do not receive full tax benefits according
to the current tax code. Tax credits have been justified on equity grounds (Vandell 2000)
and for their potential in promoting local economic development (Norton 2002). Yet, a
tax credit in and of itself may not be a panacea for low-income homeownership, as it does
not address substantial wealth constraints of minorities and low-income households
(Green and Reschnovsky 2001, Rohe 1996).
Examples of tax credit plans have been implemented in the District of Columbia
and Baltimore and suggested by the Millennial Housing Commission, the Bush
Administration and various academics, politicians and advocacy organizations. The
remainder of this section (and Table 4) details these various tax credit plans. The first
programs (both existing and proposed) directly target homebuyers. Other proposed
homeownership tax credits target lenders and low-income housing developers. 
Target: Homebuyer  
As shown in Table 4 and also discussed in Section I, the D.C. First-Time
Homebuyer Tax Credit utilizes income targeting, allowing homebuyers in a specified
income range to claim a $5,000 credit against their federal income taxes. If those taxes
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The credit is phased out for single filers with incomes of $70,000-$90,000 and married
filers with incomes of $110,000-$130,000. Individuals qualify as “first-time
homeowners” if they have not owned a home in the District during the past year. 
District Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton credits this tax concession for
the District’s economic turnaround in the late 1990s. The District had experienced
massive flight to the suburbs in the 1980s and a financial crisis in the 1990s.  Beginning
in 1998, however, D.C. led the nation in home sales increases several times in the
quarterly house price index published by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight. According to the Greater Washington Research Center, 70 percent of the
District homebuyers used the credit in 1998 (Dearborn and Richardson 1999). Analysis
by Abt Associates further credits this tax system for its minimal transaction costs and
inefficiencies (Khadduri et al 2002).
While the District tax incentive appears to be successful, some caveats apply.
First, the credit goes to many homebuyers who would have purchased a home without the
tax incentive. Second, without being refundable, the tax credit has no effect on very low-
income people who have no tax burden (Khadduri et al 2002). Initially, there was also a
criticism that the tax credit alone addressed only the income constraints of low-income
homebuyers, not the wealth constraints. However, it is no longer the case since a new
enhancement to the credit was developed by the private sector several years ago. In
partnership with a number of local mortgage lenders, Fannie Mae has made a “tax credit
equity loan” available to the first-time homebuyers in the District allowing them to apply
the credit toward a down payment or closing costs.
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Politicians and academics have proposed expanding a first time homebuyer tax
credit nationally. Congressman English (R-PA) proposed the National First Time Buyer
Tax Credit, a credit of 10 percent of the sales price (up to $6,500) for all new
homebuyers, regardless of income or location. This proposal, which could cost $16
billion a year, would not target only low-income households and would reach the
households who already receive substantial tax benefits for homeownership (Khadduri et
al 2002).  
Finally, several proposals call for more radical changes in the tax system in order
to promote equity in homeownership tax incentives. Researchers at the University of
Wisconsin (Vandell and Green 1999, Green and Reshovsky 2001) call for a fixed credit
of $500 a year for all homeowners, as a replacement to the mortgage tax deduction. This
proposal would be revenue neutral and is projected to dramatically increase low-income
homeownership, raising the national homeownership rate by 2.3 percentage points. The
National Housing Institute has proposed a similar plan, where the credit would be
distributed progressively and capped at $250,000 mortgages.  
The second existing program is the Neighborhood Preservation and Stabilization
Tax Credit, established in Baltimore city and Baltimore County in 1996. This program
targets neighborhoods, rather than income groups, allowing homebuyers in specified
neighborhoods to claim a credit against 80 percent of the property taxes paid in the first
five years of ownership. The benefit declines to 10 percent a year until the 11th year. The
cost of the credit is split evenly between state income taxes and local property taxes. The
state projects that the tax credit will decrease revenues initially, but that revenue loss will
gradually taper off. Through neighborhood targeting, the program is largely aimed at
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revitalizing distressed areas with very low homeownership rates. After running a pilot
program from 1996 to 1999, the state has expanded through June 30, 2002 and added new
qualifying neighborhoods. (Department of Legislative Services, Maryland General
Assembly, 1999) 
Target: Lender  
A report by Abt Associates details proposals for lender-based tax credits for low-
income homeownership. Through a mortgage subsidy tax credit, a lender or mortgage
insurer would use tax credits or sell them to investors along with below-market financial
instruments. This paper details three different possible variations on a mortgage subsidy
tax credit.  
First, the Mortgage Subsidy Tax Credit, suggested by the Mortgage Guaranty
Insurance Company (MGIC), would provide a tax credit to lenders who make low-
interest first mortgages to low-income first time homebuyers. Lenders would lower
interest rates through prepaid interest points and could buy and sell the credits (Khadduri
et al 2002).
Second, academics at the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University
(Collins and Belsky) and Congresswoman Roybal-Allard (D-CA) have proposed the Low
Income Second Mortgage Tax Credit. This credit would allow state agencies to sell tax
credits to financial institutions or CDCs that originate and fund below-market interest rate
second mortgages. The subsidy would cover the difference between the below-market
interest rate and the expected rate of return on the mortgage. “Piggy back loans” could be
used to finance down payment and closing costs, thus reducing the loan-to-value ratio to
below 80 percent and eliminating the need for mortgage insurance. This proposal would
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cover low-income households and HUD defined underserved areas. Analysts from Abt
Associates note that since no well-developed secondary market exists for below market
second mortgages, it would be necessary to spend time and money collecting necessary
information on loan performance (Khadduri et al 2002).
Third, the Abt Associates report recommends a tax credit allocated to private
mortgage insurers, who use the credit in association with “deep mortgage insurance”
contract with below market premium. Deep mortgage insurance covers at least 50 percent
of mortgage balance, compared to 15-30 percent under regular mortgage insurance. Those
who would qualify for deep mortgage insurance require high-risk loans and would
otherwise likely use the subprime market (Khadduri et al 2002).
Target: Developers  
The Bush Administration has recently promoted a supply side tax credit to
encourage low-income homeownership. The subsidies, as proposed, would be distributed
to state agencies and bought and sold by developers who could use them or sell them
through a syndicator (like the LIHTC model). Subsidies could be used to cover up to half
the cost of development or rehabilitation of a housing unit. The tax credit could not
exceed the difference between the development cost of the home and a lower appraised
value of the unit, meaning that it would not provide a below-market sales price. (Bush
Administration 2001 and Khadduri et al 2002) This proposal is intended to overcome the
“appraisal gap” in some neighborhoods, where the market value of a house is too low to
cover construction or improvements.  
The Abt Associates report critiques this proposal, claiming that the subsidy will
go to housing that would have been built without it and that it does not lower the cost of
72
housing to the buyer. Furthermore, according to Abt Associates, there are high transaction
costs associated with syndication and the system would be inefficient, encouraging
developers to have high costs. Finally, the report states that this tax subsidy would be
more successful in community-based nonprofits helped to target it effectively (Khadduri
et al 2002). 
Flexible Tax Credit  
Finally, the Millennial Housing Commission recently recommended a flexible tax
credit. In this case, tax credits would be allocated to state housing finance agencies, which
could choose to offer the credits to developers or lenders. The supply-side choice would
be similar to that proposed by the Bush administration. For the demand-side approach,
states could auction off credits to lenders in return for their commitment to reduce
borrowing costs, down payment requirements or both. Credits would be applied against
the borrower’s mortgage in the form of prepaid points or below-market interest rates
(Millennial Housing Commission 2002). The Abt Associates report explains that the
proposal relies on regional flexibility and public-private partnerships. It stresses,
however, that this proposal must be carefully constructed to avoid negatively impacting
the existing low-income housing tax credit.
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VI. The Impact of First-Time Homebuyer Credit Program in Washington, D.C.:
Empirical Research Design, Data and Methodology
To empirically test the first hypothesis concerning the effectiveness of the District
of Columbia First-time Homebuyer Credit program, such key program information as the
number of tax returns/claims and their amounts has to be obtained and analyzed. Between
March 2001 and June 2003, I made a number of requests to the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) for permission to access its database related to IRS Forms 8859. Although I
have been unable to directly use the database because of confidentiality concerns and
regulations, in June 2003 Charles E. Hicks of the IRS Statistics of Income Division
provided me with special tabulations of some key information on Forms 8859 using the
IRS Individual Master File.  
To evaluate the program’s overall success and effects on retaining or attracting
population into the city through homeownership, I not only reported the IRS processing
data on the number of tax credit claims and amount of those claims but also develop a
number of conservative estimates. The estimates include new (initial) claim rate,
claimants’ first-time homeownership rate (as percent of all home purchasers in the
District), D.C. resident participation rate, and rate of participation by previous suburban
residents. These estimates are developed by integrating the IRS data, the survey data from
the Greater Washington Research Center, and a transaction-assessment database
purchased for this study. Furthermore, to assess the program’s distributional effect, I seek
to address the research question: “Who benefits the most?” In other words, are low- and
moderate-income individuals and families the primary beneficiaries of the D.C.
homebuyer credit program? To examine this question, I collected and analyzed the IRS
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data on the number of tax returns containing a claim for the credit, as well as total and
average amount of the credit claims, classified by the claimants’ household income.
These IRS data and my empirical estimates of the program’s effectiveness and
distributional effects by income are reported in section VII.   
To empirically test the research hypotheses relating to the economic impact and
distributional effect on the housing and neighborhood outcomes (as discussed at the
beginning of the study), several indicators have to be developed. The most important
indicator or benchmark is the amenity-adjusted house price appreciation rate. The rate of
house price appreciation is indicative not only to the District homebuyer credit program’s
overall economic impact on efficiency in testing hypothesis 2 but also to the program’s
distributional effect on various housing sub-markets. Moreover, the house price
appreciation rate also provides the foundation for developing the other key indicator—
house price volatility. This second benchmark, or volatility of house price movement, is
designed to test hypothesis 3 for evaluating the impact of the homebuyer credit
intervention on neighborhood stability in Washington, D.C. 
These two key indicators are then supplemented by five additional indicators,
which are used to test hypothesis 4 concerning housing supply and homeownership. The
supplemental indicators are: 
1) Housing units authorized by building permits for years 1991 through 2002,
2) Change in housing units by tenure in the 1990s, 
3) Change in homeownership rate in the 1990s, 
4) Change in vacant units from 1990 to 2000,
5) Change in renter’s displacement rates from 1993 to 1998.
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It is important to note that, similar to the two house-price-related key indicators,
the annualized data on building permits can also largely serve as conclusive evidence.
However, the other three supplemental indicators (housing units by tenure,
homeownership, and vacancy) may provide only suggestive evidence because these data
are available at only two points of time, namely 1990 and 2000. 
Since the house price appreciation rate is pivotal to test both research hypotheses
2 and 3, its empirical research design, data and methods are discussed in this section,
while the results are reported in section VIII. Following that are the sections that
document the remaining outcomes of the hypotheses to be tested in this paper, namely,
the impact on wealth creation, local tax revenues, neighborhood stability, as well as
supplemental indicators.
Empirical Research Design: House Price Appreciation as the Key Benchmark 
1. Impact on House Price Appreciation (Residential Property Values)
To assess the impact of the tax credit programs on economic efficiency, the
empirical study will seek to address the research question “Does the targeted tax credit
intervention have significant positive economic impacts on residential property values in
the affected city?” As discussed in the literature review section and elsewhere, depressed
housing value and residential disinvestment in the central cities (and underserved
neighborhoods) are both outcomes and added causes of urban decline in this country.
They discourage commercial investment and homeownership and reduce the city’s tax
base. Thus, a justified policy intervention should help stimulate stronger demand on
owner-occupied properties and consequently generate better appreciation of residential
property values in the affected city. 
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The key impact measure used in this study is house price appreciation rates or
market value changes in residential properties, which may be independently caused by the
targeted tax credit interventions. House price movement essentially reflects the changing
balances between housing supply and demand. The theory of housing market adjustments
emphasizes the equilibrium values for the stock of housing and the price per unit.
Depending upon the elasticity of supply and demand in a local market, changes in
equilibrium values generally reflect shocks on either demand or supply from exogenous
variables. In the case of Washington, D.C., the targeted homeownership tax credit
constitutes an exogenous policy shock on the demand side. If the owner-occupied housing
stock is increased insignificantly or disproportionately or lags behind in response to the
strong demand stimulated by the policy shock (i.e., the homebuyer tax credit
interventions), the impacts of these interventions on the housing market dynamics should
be capitalized in a significant price appreciation of residential properties as well as a
decrease in vacancy rates. 
On the other hand, house price appreciation can also be used to measure the
impact of the tax credit interventions on local tax revenues and wealth creation for
individual homeowners. An increase in the market values of residential properties would
no doubt lead to an increase in the tax base for local governments because their major
source of revenues comes from residential and commercial property taxes. Moreover, a
significant growth of house prices would also build home equity wealth for homeowners
substantially. It is a conventional wisdom that the most important path to build individual
wealth for the vast majority of average Americans is through homeownership. However,
only a steady increase in the housing value, rather than a decline, would legitimize the
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homeownership and policy intervention enough to promote it as a real wealth-building
tool for individuals. 
Therefore, house price appreciation captures the economic impacts on housing
market dynamics and local fiscal conditions, as well as individual homeowners’ wealth
creation. Accordingly, the analytic focus of this research is to determine whether, and to
what extent, the tax credit interventions (“policy shocks”) have independently caused the
upward movements in housing prices after the interventions went into effect. The
methodological challenges rest clearly on (1) obtaining accurate rates of amenity-adjusted
house price appreciation and (2) separating out the impact of the targeted tax credit
programs on price appreciation from the possible impacts of other price determinants,
market forces, and alternative historical events, and neighborhood developments.
2. Distributional Effects on Lower-Priced Residential Properties, Low/Moderate-
Income and High-Minority Neighborhoods 
To assess the impact on equity, this research will seek to address the research
question “What are the distributional effects of the targeted tax credit interventions on the
housing outcomes of the disadvantaged groups?” In other words, the research objective is
to determine the distributional effects on the housing outcomes of various income and
racial groups, especially whether, and to what extent, the low- and moderate-income and
minority families are primary beneficiaries of the tax credit interventions in the city’s
housing markets. However, because the household tax and income records with detailed
property addresses that can directly answer these questions are not permitted by law to be
disclosed to the general public due to confidentiality concerns, the following proxy
measure was developed to examine the program’s distributional effects on the housing
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markets:  the differential impacts on house price appreciation in various sub-markets,
especially where residential properties are more likely purchased and owned by low- and
moderate-income and minority families. 
The literature has thoroughly documented that the housing market is generally
segmented by several sub-markets. A major indicator of housing market segmentation is
location or neighborhood. The key findings from this line of the research (Can 1990,
Goodman and Thibodeau 1998, Quercia et al. 2000, and Macpherson and Sirmans 2001)
are that neighborhood dynamics or spatial structure account for house price variations and
that racial and income compositions have significant effects on price movement at the
neighborhood level. Another critical indicator of the market segmentation is structure
type (condominium, townhouse, and single-family detached unit), according to recent
studies by Tong and Glascock (2000) and Skaburskis (1999). They found that, on
average, condos and townhouses are less spacious and more affordable and exhibit
different patterns of price appreciation than single-family detached houses.  
In relation to this research, the following two kinds of sub-markets are included: 
(1). By location, the sub-markets used to gauge the impact on equity are
low/moderate-income and minority neighborhoods. The following cut-off points are used
to categorize census tracts by income and racial composition: A census tract is defined as
a low-income neighborhood if it has a tract median income below 80 percent of the area
median income. A tract with median income between 80-120 percent of the area median
income is defined as a moderate/middle-income neighborhood. A tract with median
income greater than 120 percent of area median income is treated as a high-income
neighborhood. The cut-off points for grouping census tracts by race are 30 percent and 50
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percent. A low-minority tract is a tract with a nonwhite population less than 30 percent of
the total. A moderate-minority tract has a nonwhite population between 30 and 50 percent
of the total. And a high-minority tract has a nonwhite population greater than 50 percent
of the total.  
(2). By structure type, the sub-markets of most concern are condominiums and
townhouses since they are more affordable and more likely to be purchased by low-
income families. Therefore, the research question to be addressed is whether, and to what
extent, the market values of owner-occupied residential properties in the low/moderate-
income and predominantly minority neighborhoods as well as the lower-priced
townhouse/condo sub-markets are increased as a result of the homebuyer credit
interventions. 
It is expected that while a tax credit of up to $5,000 may not be a big incentive for
purchasing an expensive house in Washington, D.C., this homebuyer credit may serve as
a strong incentive for purchasing moderately priced and inexpensive houses in the city.
Also, given the fact that this program is targeted at lower-income households, the eligible
homebuyers are expected to be those more likely facing financial and credit constraints to
purchase expensive houses. Therefore, the tax credit program in the District is expected
to generate more significant impact on condo and townhouse sub-markets than on the
higher-priced detached house sub-market, and also more impact on housing values in
low- and moderate-income and minority neighborhoods where houses are generally
cheaper and vacancy rates are higher. 
Data and Sample
Data used to carry out this research design for the key indicators (house price
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appreciation rates and volatility) is from a unique database that merges information from
a transaction-assessment database, 1990 Census data, historical events, and neighborhood
developments. The transaction-assessment database called Win2Data was purchased from
First American Real Estate Solutions (FARES) of Anaheim, California. The Win2Data
can be subscribed to online and/or on a CD-ROM. This data set was successfully used in
various house price studies, including a recent study on house price differentials among
structure types by Tong and Glascock (2000). It was also frequently used by some major
newspapers such as the Real Estate section of the Washington Post for tracing trends on
median prices in local real estate markets. 
The Win2Data has information on real estate transactions for all properties in a
county or city, including their sale prices and dates, assessed value, and tax information.
It also provides detailed physical characteristics of housing units, thus allowing me to
generate explanatory variables in controlling for variations in quality and amenity among
different housing units. Moreover, the database contains the 1990 census tract
designations for every property, which allows me to link each transaction of a residential
property with the 1990 Census information. Some other information is also included in
this database, such as location of the property (municipality, school district, and street
address), name of the owner, telephone number, and mortgages.
FARES claims to be the largest broker of real estate data in the country, and its
archives currently contain some 70 percent of real estate properties in the United States.
With respect to the reliability and completeness of the Win2Data, FARES obtains data
daily from county/city assessors' offices and recorders of deeds and then packages them
into the standardized database—Win2Data. It is therefore claimed as a reliable reflection
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of the property and transaction information collected by county/city agencies. In fact, in
the process of using the Win2Data (formerly Metroscan) for another house price study
(Tong and Glascock 2000) a few years ago, we visited selected properties listed in the
database and confirmed that the property characteristics were indeed identical to those
contained in the database. Moreover, the Win2Data is also the most complete data set
available on the market. FARES claims it to be the world’s most extensive (and the
nation’s most comprehensive) database of property information covering property owner
names, sales transactions, property characteristics, and tax assessor maps. In relation to
this study, my investigation of its completeness leads to the following three conclusions: 
First, its full coverage of all residential properties in the counties and cities studied
seems unquestionable. Its full coverage of properties makes it distinctive from other
databases used to create publicly accessible house price indices. For example, the
repeated-sales House Price Index published by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight covers properties only with conforming loans backed by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. The median house price index published by the National Association of
Realtors covers only existing housing units. The house price index produced by the U.S.
Department of Commerce applies only to newly constructed houses.  
Second, information on transactions contained in the Win2Data is more complete
in recent years than earlier years. This is caused primarily by the way the Win2Data is
standardized: It keeps only the most recent two records of transactions for a property. If a
property were sold more than twice in the period of 1987-2002, the most recent two
records on sales transactions would be available in the database while the earlier ones
82
would be deleted24. 
The third observation of the data completeness is that, using a different data
source, I have verified the completeness of the transactions as recorded in the Win2Data
for recent years. The District of Columbia’s Office of Tax and Revenue maintains official
records on home sales indicating that, for instance, 5,280 single-family and condominium
units were sold in the District in 1999. My calculation of the records from the Win2Data
indicates that there were 5,786 single family detached houses, townhouses/rowhouses,
and condos sold in the same year25. The differential between the District government’s
official record and the Win2Data is almost exclusively caused by the agency’s exclusion
of sales deemed as not “arm’s length.” Arm’s length sales are those sales made between a
willing buyer and a willing seller with no known extraneous factors affecting the sale.   
Another important data set is the 1990 Census data at tract level. The 1990 Census
data are extracted through the Urban Institute’s Neighborhood Change Database, formerly
Underclass Database, and are formatted for use in SAS. The census tract information is
included in the analysis to capture the influence of location accessibility and
neighborhood (census tract) traits on house price appreciation. The reasons to use the
1990 Census information, rather than 2000 Census data, are twofold: the transaction-
assessment database does not contain the 2000 Census tract designations for each
property, and more importantly, the 1990 Census information is more suitable than the
                                                
24 However, despite the incompleteness of sales for some properties in earlier years, it is not a concern for
this study because the program’s impact on house prices is assessed or estimated using a very large sample
after all (as discussed later in this section).
25 Note that because of data cleaning, the size of the analytic sample used for estimating the impact on the
District’s house prices in this paper is 4,978 sales in 1999.
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2000 Census in controlling for neighborhood characteristics in the proposed hedonic
regressions. Since the hedonic pricing is based on transactions that took place from 1987
through 2002, using the 2000 census tract information would suffer from the “after-the-
fact” problems, making the causality analysis as proposed in this study unfeasible to
implement.  
Historical information on neighborhood-based developments, which may also
influence the urban housing markets (and sub-markets), is collected from administrative
sources including the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and District
of Columbia. These sources include project information on Empowerment
Zone/Enterprise Community, Low Income Housing Tax Credit, and HOPE VI.
Information on such historical events as the election of Anthony Williams as new mayor
of Washington, D.C., is obtained from newspapers and websites. 
The analytic sample used to examine the house price key indicators is based on
the transactions (“base sample”) that took place in a 16-year period from January 1, 1987,
through December 1, 2002. The database (or base sample) contains 66,369 transactions
for Washington, D.C.; 198,725 for Montgomery County, Maryland; 137,824 for Prince
George’s County, Maryland; 30,214 for Alexandria City, Virginia; 35,705 for Arlington
County, Virginia; and 286,871 for Fairfax County, Virginia. These base samples are used
for describing the dependent variable—house prices—to provide a context in which the
research questions are addressed. 
To describe explanatory variables and run regression analyses, these base samples
are transformed into analytic samples through a series of data-cleaning procedures and
steps: A transaction is excluded if it has a missing value for any explanatory variable,
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involved a substantial home improvement after the sale, has a sales price deemed not as a
reasonable market price but likely a “gift” price, or has more than one unit in the
structure. All outliners are also excluded to avoid possible heteroscedasticity. These
procedures yield the following: 
The analytic sample for Washington, D.C., has 56,936 observations or
transactions, among which 23,509 sales come from single-family detached houses,
18,180 from townhouse/ rowhouses, and 15,247 from condominiums. In terms of housing
sub-markets by neighborhoods, the analytic sample for Washington, D.C., contains
17,064 transactions of properties in high-income census tracts, 10,884 in
moderate/middle-income tracts, and 28,988 in low-income tracts. In another
categorization, the D.C. sample has 20,073 transactions that took place in low-minority
census tracts, 4,652 in moderate-minority tracts, and 32,211 in high-minority tracts. In
comparison, the analytic samples for Washington, D.C.’s surrounding markets contain
198,725 transactions in Montgomery, 137,824 in Prince George’s, 30,214 in Alexandria,
35,705 in Arlington, and 263,615 in Fairfax. 
Additionally, there are also a number of supplemental indicators examined in the
paper. I used the 1990 Census information from the Under Class Database and 2000
Census information from the Bureau of Census to examine these supplemental indicators,
including changes in housing units by tenure, homeownership rates, and vacant units in
the 1990s. The information on housing units authorized by building permits is obtained
from the Census Bureau’s Residential Building Branch, which sells a CD-ROM
containing pre-2000 building permit information at place, county, state, and MSA level. It
also maintains a website on permit information for the most recent years. Moreover, the
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potential adverse effect on housing affordability is examined using data from the 1993
and 1998 American Housing Survey for the Washington Metropolitan area.  
Methodology: A Three-Stage Intervention Analysis
The primary methodology of assessing the impact and effects on house price
appreciation is a three-stage intervention analysis in the framework of the difference-in-
differences approach and hedonic pricing models26. The basic form of intervention
analysis (also called “impact analysis” or “interrupted time series analysis”) is the before-
after approach or pretest-posttest experimental design (Bonate 2000). However, this
approach is often criticized as unreliable and inaccurate in that it fails to partial out the
impact of the intervention (input series) from effects of other significant important
historical events and forces that may also affect the response series at about the same
time. This basic approach is thus vulnerable to the common threat to internal validity that
precludes confirmation of a causal relationship between input (intervention) and response
(impact) in a time series quasi-experiment (Cook and Campbell 1979). Therefore,
establishing sufficient protection against possible alternative historical impacts on the
process to ensure internal validity is often the most important and most challenging task
for almost any intervention or impact analysis (Yeffee 2000).   
                                                
26 I have considered using an alternative to the three-stage intervention analysis. The alternative is to pool
the data from all counties/cities in question into one giant data set. A regression analysis can then be
conducted in only one step to detect the impact of the tax credit intervention dummy variable and its
interaction terms (interacting with time and location) on the District’s house prices. However, this
alternative methodology is not feasible to implement because the variables describing physical
characteristics of housing units (used for hedonic pricing) have different specifications and structures across
the District of Columbia and its comparison suburban counties/cities. The reason is simple: The assessor’s
offices in different jurisdictions and different states (DC, MD and VA) collect their assessment data for
residential units with dramatically disparate formats. Moreover, pooling data across heterogeneous housing
markets would likely suffer from an aggregation bias in hedonic regression analysis. Therefore, this
alternative methodology has to be precluded from this study.     
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This research uses a three-stage estimation strategy to carry out the methodology
of intervention analysis with ensured internal validity. The first stage uses hedonic pricing
models to create rates of amenity-adjusted house price appreciation (or “constant-quality
house price indices”) for Washington, D.C., and its housing sub-markets (by structure
type, neighborhood income, and neighborhood racial composition), for the years 1987
through 2002. The hedonic regressions are also performed for the five comparison
housing markets that immediately surround the District: Montgomery County, Prince
George’s County, Alexandria City, Arlington County, and Fairfax County. The estimation
at this stage will also contain controls for, or concurrent isolation of, possible alternative
historical impacts on real estate price movement. These observed concurrent important
historical events include major neighborhood-level events, such as demolition and
revitalization of public housing projects (HOPE VI), establishment of Empowerment
Zone/Enterprise communities, and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit projects. The
important historical events such as the election of Mayor Anthony Williams are also
included in the sensitivity analysis. 
The second stage will use information estimated from the first stage to create a
time series with a one-year interval that measures the geographic difference in house price
appreciation rates between Washington, D.C. (treatment group) and its surrounding
markets (comparison group). Consequently, this procedure establishes a “difference”
series that will effectively partial out other (unobserved) concurrent historical impacts. It
also rules out the alternative explanations to the net impact and distributional effects
caused by the targeted homebuyer tax credit program. 
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Finally, based on the “difference” of price appreciation rate series, the study will
use an interrupted time series model (ARIMA) with an intervention indicator to detect
inter-temporal differences in annual house price appreciation between pre-intervention
and post-intervention series for the District’ housing market and sub-markets. Only until
this stage can it be conclusively demonstrated whether, and to what extent, the
“difference” trend in price appreciation during the interruption (intervention) period in
Washington, D.C. is caused independently by the first-time homebuyer tax credit
intervention.
Based on a recent study of housing price dynamics by Tong and Glascock (2000),
Yaffee (2000) and McDowell et al. (1980), mathematically, the three-stage modeling
strategy is expressed as follows:
The 1st stage:      ln(P) =   + 1(HS) +2 (NL) + 3 (OH) + 4 (T) +              (1).
ln(P) is the log of house sales price, HS represents a vector of housing unit and
structural traits, NL is a vector of neighborhood characteristics and locational
accessibility, OH denotes dummy variables measuring impact of observed historical
events and neighborhood developments (other than the homebuyer credit intervention),
and T or dummy variable “time” (year) shows the value of time or cumulative rate of
house price appreciation. 
Explanatory variables are specified as follows:
Housing unit and structural characteristics (HS) is measured by the following
variables: lot size (square footage), unit size or living space (sf), number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms (full and half bathrooms), total rooms, number of stories in unit of
structure, housing unit age (years) and age squared, owner- or renter-occupied, presence
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of fireplace, presence (or type) of basement, presence of porch, presence of patio and
deck, structure type (single-family detached, townhouse, or condominium), type of
parking, type of exterior wall material, type of heating system, type of air conditioning
system, and type of roof materials. 
Neighborhood characteristics and locational accessibility (NL) are measured by the
following variables at the census tract level:  median family income, percent of population
who are nonwhites, poverty rate, affordability (percentage of households paying more than
35 percent of their income for housing), percent of the population who are foreign-born,
percent of the population aged 65 or older, homeownership rate, average household size
(number of people per housing unit), turnover rate (percent of owner-occupied households
who moved since 1985), and accessibility (percent of the working population whose travel
time to work is less than 25 minutes, as well as percent of the working population whose
travel time to work is in 25-45 minutes). These data were obtained from the 1990 Census
using the Urban Institute’s Underclass Database (UDB).27
Observed neighborhood development and historical events (OH) include HOPE
VI projects through which public housing projects are demolished either as vacant lots or
for redevelopment, designation of empowerment zone/enterprise community (Engberg
and Greenbaum 1999), and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit projects. The major events
deemed as possible alternative forces are the election of Anthony Williams as mayor and
the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.
                                                
27 Unlike the standard census files, tract-level variables for the entire nation can be extracted readily from
the UDB (Tobin 1993).
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Time (t) is a dummy for the year of sales with 1987 as the base line. Coefficients
on time dummy variables are interpreted as cumulative price appreciation rates since the
base line.
The 2nd stage:         YDt = YWt  – YCt                         (2).
Equation (2) means that YDt or difference of house price appreciation rate between
Washington, D.C., and its comparison markets at time t equals to the appreciation rate in
each comparison group at time t (YCt)) subtracted from YWt or the price appreciation rate
in Washington, D.C., at time t. In this equation, the treatment group is Washington, D.C.,
while the comparison groups are Washington’s five surrounding suburban markets.
The 3rd stage:       YDt  =  + i(B)Ii,t + nt (3).
          i                                   
Where YDt denotes the response series or a difference in appreciation rate at time
t,  is the mean term, i(B) is the transfer function weights for the ith input series, Ii,t is
the ith input time series at time t, a deterministic (dummy) intervention indicator for the
homebuyer tax credit program that measures difference between pre- and post-
intervention in this research, nt is the noise series. This equation is actually a special case
of an ARIMA model with input series.  With the intervention indicator as the input
variable, the ARIMA model becomes the so-called “interrupted time series analysis”
model, “dynamic regression,” or simply “intervention model.”  This model expresses the
response series (difference in price appreciation rate between Washington, D.C., and its
comparison markets) as a combination of past values of the random shocks and past
values of input series (homebuyer credit intervention series in this case).
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 Obviously, it is this intervention variable (Ii,t ) we care about the most because it
represents the net impact of the tax credit intervention. Note that the intervention
indicator (Ii,t), a step function (or continuing variable), has a value of 1 if the appreciation
rate is recorded in the intervention period and 0 if otherwise. The intervention or impact
period is determined in this study as 1998 through 2002 in that 1998 was the first full year
after the District of Columbia First-time Homebuyer Credit program took effect in late
1997. 
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VII. Empirical Evidence from the Internal Revenue Services
Program’s Overall Effectiveness: Claims and Participation Rates by Homebuyer
Status and Previous Residence
Table 5 documents important information on Forms 8859 obtained from the
Individual Master File through the IRS Statistics of Income Division. These statistics
indicate that the D.C. homebuyer credit program is indeed very successful and popular as
measured by both number and amount of claims. There were 21,821 tax returns in total or
4,643 returns per year claiming for the D.C. First-Time Homebuyer Credit during the
1997-2001 tax years. These tax returns were generally processed in the year immediately
after each of these tax years. As also illustrated in Figure 4, there were 995 claims for the
credit based on residential properties purchased between August 5 and December 31,
1997. Tax year 1998 witnessed a dramatic jump in number of claims for the credit
(4,071). It further increased to 5,541 in 1999, peaked at 5,797 in 2000, and reached 5,417
claims in 2001—the last tax year for which data were obtainable from the IRS. 
The amount of D.C. homebuyer credit claimed during the 1997-2001 period was
$76.7 million in total or about $16.3 million per year. (The total amount of the credit
during the 1998-2002 period was estimated at $89.5 million28). On average, about $3,507
of the credit was claimed for each return per year. As also shown in Figure 5, the total
amount of claims in 1997 was about $3.5 million, representing claimants who bought
housing units between August 5 and December 31. The claims grew explosively to about
$14 million in 1998, increased to $18.9 million in 1999, reached as high as $24 million in
                                                
28 It was estimated as follows: the total amount during the 1997-2001 period ($76,696,000) – the amount in
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Figure 4. The District of Columbia First-Time Homebuyer Credit: 
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Figure 5. The District of Columbia First-Time Homebuyer Credit: 
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2000, and were $16.4 million in 2001. The average amount per claim is in the
neighborhood of $3,029 (in 2001) and $4,135 (in 2000). 
However, the number or amount of claims itself may not be indicative of whether
the program is truly effective in meeting its intended policy objectives without putting
them in a context. Moreover, the claims filed for tax years 1998 through 2001 include not
only those from new claimants for that year but also those with the credit carrying
forward from prior years. Therefore, to test research hypothesis 1 as proposed earlier in
the paper, I have developed a number of estimates, including the highest possible number
of claims with credit carrying forward each year, lowest possible number of new
claimants (initial claims), rate of initial claims, and percentage of D.C. homebuyers who
were new claimants of the credit and had never owned a home before (“first-time
homeownership rate”). I have also estimated the program participation rates for new
claimants with previous addresses in the District and for those with previous addresses in
the suburbs, both of which are expressed as percent of all home purchasers in D.C. each
year. The estimates are made through integrating the IRS data with the home sales
information calculated from the transaction-assessment database (Win2Data) and the
D.C. homebuyer credit survey data (appendix Table 1) compiled by the Greater
Washington Research Center. The results are also displayed in Table 5 and depicted in
figures 6, 7 and 8.
The findings suggest that there were an estimated total of 19,799 homebuyers, or
4,238 new claimants per year, who claimed the D.C. homebuyer credits during 1997-
2001. As also shown in Figure 6, there were 995 homebuyers (or 2,388 annualized) who
claimed the credit for the first time in 1997, 3,782 in 1998, 4,629 in 1999, 5,228 in 2000,
95
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and 5,165 in 2001. Clearly, the number of new claimants experienced an explosive
growth in the first full year and reached the climax in 2000. The 58.4-percent growth in
the number of new claimants from 1997 to 1998 indicates that the immediate impact of
the targeted homebuyer credit intervention on attracting homebuyers was unmistakably
substantial. Moreover, the overall trend in new homebuyers claiming the credit featured a
generally continuous growth, although with a diminishing rate of increase over time: The
growth rate was 58.4 percent in 1998, 22.4 percent in 1999, 12.9 percent in 2000, and –
1.2 percent in 2001. 
The estimated rate of initial claims (or new claims) was about 77.2 percent per
year during the 1997-2001 period. This means that, after excluding those who may have
carried over the credits from the prior year, homebuyers who made their initial claims for
the tax credit still accounted for about 77.2 percent of all home purchasers in D.C. each
year. Moreover, the rate of initial claims exhibits a rising trend over time (Figure 7).
During the initial months of the program in 1997, only about 62.7 percent of all D.C.
home purchasers were new claimants of the credit. That number jumped to 76.9 percent
in its first full year—1998—and continued its steady growth in subsequent years: 80
percent in 1999, 82.8 percent in 2000, and 83.8 percent in 2001.  
Similar patterns are also found in the estimates of new claimants’ first-time
homeownership rate, as well as participation rates of D.C. residents and those previously
residing in the District’s suburbs. Although the rate of initial claims is equivalent to the
rate of first-time homebuyers as defined by the program’s requirements, it is different
from the first-time homeownership rate as commonly understood. As noted earlier, a
first-time homebuyer eligible for the D.C. homebuyer credit is defined as one who did not
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own any other main home in the District of Columbia during the one-year period ending
on the date of purchase. This definition does not preclude those who owned or still own
homes outside the District from qualifying for the D.C. homebuyer credit. In contrast, the
common definition of a first-time homebuyer refers to the purchaser of the first home
ever owned by that person. Therefore, I have developed estimates of the first-time
homeownership rate based on the commonly understandable definition. As shown in
Table 5 and Figure 7, the results suggest that first-time homebuyers claiming the credit
accounted for about 67.1 percent of all D.C. home purchasers each year. Over time, rate
of first-time homebuyers participating in the program (as a share of all home purchasers
in D.C.) has been steadily rising in the District: about 54.5 percent in 1997, 66.7 percent
in 1998, 69.4 percent in 1999, 71.9 percent in 2000, and 72.7 percent in 2001.  
It is also evident that the tax credit has been effective in stabilizing the District’s
population base by encouraging both existing city residents and those with previous
addresses in the suburbs to buy homes in the District. The results, as also reported in
Table 5, suggest that new claimants of the credit who previously resided in the District
accounted for about 47.5 percent of D.C.’s home purchasers each year in the 1997-2001
period. In the same period, some 14 percent of D.C.’s home purchasers each year were
first-time credit claimants whose previous addresses were in the District’s suburbs. 
The active program participation by existing D.C. residents and homebuyers
previously residing in the suburbs also exhibits a trend of steady growth over time. As
illustrated in Figure 8, the program’s new claimants who were existing D.C. residents
accounted for merely 38.6 percent of all District home purchases settled between August
5 and December 31, 1997. However, this participation rate (as a share of all home
98
purchasers) increased substantially to 47.3 percent in 1998, 49.2 percent in 1999, 50.9
percent in 2000, and 51.5 percent in 2001.  The previous suburban residents were also
increasingly attracted by the D.C. homebuyer tax credits as well: An estimated 11.5
percent of D.C. home purchasers in the last five months of 1997 were previous suburban
residents who claimed the credit, increasing to 14.1 percent in 1998, 14.6 percent in 1999,
15.2 percent in 2000, and 15.3 percent in 2001.
However, caution should be exercised in interpreting these estimates. They are
developed in part by using recalculations of the D.C. homebuyer credit survey data
released by the Greater Washington Research Center (Dearborn and Richardson 1999).
Although the center’s key survey result—rate of credit use was estimated at 70.1 percent
in 1998—is very close to the rate of new claims (76.9 percent in 1998) as reported in this
paper using IRS data, a gap still exists between the two. Thus, it is also likely that my
estimates on first-time homeownership rates and D.C. existing resident and previous
suburban resident participation rates, which stem partially from the center’s survey
information for these categories, might have understated (or overstated) what they are in
reality. Moreover, the center’s survey results are only applicable to tax year 1998.
Because there is no information available from any sources relating to other years, I had
to combine the IRS data and home sales information with the center’s 1998 estimates to
derive the first-time homeownership and D.C./suburban resident participation rates
throughout all the impact period, assuming that the 1998 estimates have not changed
substantially over time.     
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Distributional Effect: Income Profile of D.C. Homebuyer Credit Claimants 
To further test hypothesis 1 on the ground of equity concerns, I also obtained data
from the IRS for claims classified by each tax filer’s adjusted gross income. The results
are reported in tables 6 and 7. They clearly indicate that the vast majority of D.C. First-
Time Homebuyer Credit claimants were those earning adjusted gross incomes under
$75,000. The top three income clusters, as measured by both number and amount of
claims, are within the income range of $20,000 to $75,000. The single largest income
cluster claimed for the credits is found to be the one with annual incomes between
$30,000 and $50,000. 
What do these numbers mean in the context of distributional effect? According to
the 2000 Census, median family income in the Washington metro area in 1999 was
$72,247. The adjusted gross incomes (AGI) of $20,000 and $75,000 are equivalent to
about 28 and 104 percent of the area median family income, respectively29. And the
income range of $30,000 to $50,000 is only about 42 to 69 percent of the area median
income. Therefore, it is safe to say that the primary beneficiaries of the D.C. homebuyer
credits in the 1997-2001 tax years were very low-, low- and moderate-income families30.
The single largest homebuyer cluster that benefited most from the credits was found to be
                                                
29 Note that adjusted gross income (AGI) is not exactly the same as family income. For instance, some
incomes such as municipal bond interest are included in family income but excluded from AGI. However,
for the purpose of providing a context or reference, I treat them roughly comparable here given that the
income data I received from IRS concerning Forms 8859 is available only in the form of AGI.
30 I use the following commonly acceptable criteria to categorize the income groups in this section: A family
income below 30 percent of the area median income is deemed as very low income. A family income
between 30 and 80 percent of the area median income is deemed as low income. An income between 80 and
120 percent is categorized as moderate and middle income. Above 120 percent of the area median income
is classified as high income. Note that, however, as discussed in the earlier section, the income
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low-income families, or those with adjusted gross incomes ranging from 42 to 69 percent
of the area median income.     
This key information is also depicted in figures 9, 10, and 11. These charts show
that, between 1997 and 2001, about 83 percent of the program’s participants or credit
claimants were those with adjusted gross incomes under $75,000 (or below 104 percent
of the area median income), compared to only about 17 percent for those earning more
than $75,000. Homebuyers with incomes between $20,000 and $50,000 accounted for
roughly half of the program participants. The identical distributional effect is also found
in comparing their total amounts of the credit claims. 
These charts also show that both number of claims and amount of claims are
pyramid-shaped (Figure 11). They were centered on the homebuyers who reported their
adjusted gross incomes in the neighborhood of $30,000-$50,000. This income group filed
a total of 8,104 tax returns claiming the D.C. homebuyer credits in the amount of $26.3
million during the 1997-2001 period. This largest group was followed by 5,751
homebuyers with incomes between $50,000 and $75,000, who claimed for $25.1 million
of the credits in the same period. The third largest income group claiming the credit was
found in an income range of $20,000 to $30,000, representing 2,532 claims for $10.8
million. Moreover, it is striking that at the bottom of the pyramid are those earning under
$10,000 on the one hand and those earning above $150,000 on the other. During the
1997-2001 period, only 136 claims of the credit were made from homebuyers with
                                                                                                                                                
tracts has clustered very low-income and low-income homebuyers together for simplicity purposes, with all
other cut-off points remaining the same.
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Figure 9. Share in Number of Claims of the District of Columbia First-Time Homebuyer 










Figure 10. Share in Total Amount of Claims of the District of Columbia First-Time 









Figure 11. Number and Total Amount of Claims for the District of Columbia 





























      $10,000 -
$20,000
      $20,000 -
$30,000
      $30,000 -
$50,000
      $50,000 -
$75,000
     $75,000 -
$100,000
     $100,000
- $150,000
     $150,000
- $200,000
     $200,000
- $500,000
     $500,000
and Over


















































Total Amount Number of Returns
104
adjusted gross income under $10,000, compared to merely 266 claims from homebuyers
earning more than $150,00031.
The pyramid-shaped distribution by claimant’s income over 1997-2001 is
generally consistent with the year-to-year trend as graphed in figures 12 and 13. Two
exceptions or special features should be noted, however. The pyramid-shaped distribution
in number of claims was more evident in recent years (1999-2001) than early years (1997-
1998) of the program. This indicates that more and more low-income homebuyers (with
incomes between $30,000 and $50,000 or 42 to 69 percent of area median income) were
attracted by the D.C. homebuyer credit over time. Furthermore, while the homebuyer
cluster earning between $30,000 and $50,000 was the largest one claiming the credit in
terms of amount in three out of five tax years since 1997, the $50,000 to $75,000 income
cluster surpassed it in two other years (1998 and 1999). This suggests that despite the fact
that moderate-income homebuyers (with incomes of $50,000 to $75,000) filed fewer tax
returns for the credit than low-income homebuyers (earning $30,000 to $50,000), most of
the moderate-income claimants appeared to be able to claim for relatively more, or even
                                                
31 There are some unusual data observed in Figures 11 through 14 concerning claimants earning more than
$150,000.  Since the income threshold of the program eligibility is no more than $130,000 in adjusted gross
income, why could these claimants have incomes higher than $150,000? Moreover, looking at Figure 14,
one may ask, “Why were some of the average amounts even higher than the maximum allowable amount of
$5,000 for these high-income claimants?” According to my conversations with the data provider, Charles
Hicks of the IRS, the following three factors may have contributed to the unusual aspects of these data.
First, the law does NOT require that a claimant have to meet the program’s income eligibility when
claiming for the unused credits carried over from prior years. Through marriage, job change, promotion,
and so forth, some homeowners claiming for unused credits may have increased their family incomes
significantly beyond $130,000 (if married) or $90,000 (if single). Second, some high-income homebuyers
might have mistakenly made claims for the credit they were actually not qualified for. Third, some
homebuyers might have carelessly or unknowingly claimed for an incorrect amount of the credit so that the
amount claimed may be higher than the maximum allowable amount of $5,000. Also, other errors such as
typos are not uncommon in tax filings, including Forms 8859.
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full, homebuyer credits against their income tax liability for the tax year when their
properties were purchased.  
The dynamic interplay between number of claims and amount of claims can be
seen more clearly by analyzing the average amount of claims by income. Figure 14 shows
that, in general, the higher the income, the higher amount per claim each year. This
pattern is especially evident for homebuyers earning under $75,000 and is also generally
held for claimants with incomes between $75,000 and $150,000. It implies that,  since
higher-income homebuyers usually have more tax liabilities than lower-income
homebuyers, the former were more likely to claim for the qualified full amount of the
credit for the year when their properties were purchased. In contrast, the lower-income
homebuyers were less likely to be able to claim for the qualified full amount for the tax
year when their properties were purchased and therefore were more likely to carry
forward the unused credits to the next year.
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Figure 13. Total Amount of DC First-Time Homebuyer Credits 
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Figure 12. Number of Claims of DC First-Time Homebuyer Credit 
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Figure 14. Average Amount of DC First-Time Homebuyer Credits 
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VIII. Empirical Evidence from the Housing Markets in Washington, D.C.
As reported in the above section, the analyses of the IRS data combined with other
information show that the District of Columbia First-Time Homebuyer Credit program
has been extremely successful since being enacted in late 1997 (and especially since
1998) by all of the following measures:  number and amount of tax returns claiming for
the credit, estimated number and growth rate of new claimants, initial claim and first-time
homeownership rates (as share of all home purchasers in the District), as well as rates of
participation by both District and suburban residents. In sum, these outcomes indicate that
the tax credit program did indeed create an extraordinary, continuously rising, and
exogenous shock on the demand for owner-occupied housing units in the District. In turn,
the impact of such a demand shock should be, one way or another, capitalized in the
District’s house price appreciation, as well as other indicators (neighborhood stability,
housing supply, homeownership rate, and so forth) during the impact period. This section
reports the empirical results on the program’s impact and distributional effect on house
prices (hypothesis 2), with the subsequent sections discussing the findings for the impact
on other indicators.  
Descriptive Analysis: A Housing Profile of Washington, D.C. and Surrounding Markets
Trends in Median Sale Prices (Dependent Variable)
As shown in Table 8 (and appendix tables 2a through 2e), a number of important
patterns emerged about the median house prices in Washington, D.C., and surrounding
markets between 1987 and 2002. 
First, along with Prince George’s County, the District of Columbia had the lowest









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(the base year of this study) were only $93,000 in Washington, D.C., and $90,000 in
Prince George’s County, as compared to $155,000 in Alexandria, $145,000 in Fairfax,
$139,000 in Montgomery, and $129,000 in Arlington. Ten years later when the D.C. first-
time homebuyer credit program was launched, this pattern largely remained: The median
sales prices in Washington, D.C., and Prince George’s in 1997 both were $130,000, the
lowest in the region. Surprisingly, however, by the end of 2002—the fifth year of the tax
credit program—Washington, D.C., experienced an explosive growth in house prices.
The median price in D.C. reached an astonishing $226,000, $69,000 (44 percent) higher
than its long-standing price partner Prince George’s County and merely $28,000 (11
percent) short of what is sold in Fairfax County. 
Second, consistent with previous findings and expectations discussed earlier,
condominium and townhouse/rowhouses are indeed priced substantially less than single-
family detached houses and therefore more likely owned by low-income and minority
households. Overall, in the Washington metro area, condominiums have the lowest
median sales price, detached house the highest, and townhouses fall somewhere in
between. There is one exception in the District where condos and townhouses were priced
very close to each other (with condo slightly higher), and their prices also moved nearly
in tandem until 1997. In the last five years when the homebuyer credit was in place,
however, the condo market in D.C. had unprecedented growth compared to any other
structure type or to rates anywhere in this region.
Third, the sales of residential properties in the Washington, D.C., region have a
much lower price level in low- and moderate-income census tracts than those in high-
income tracts. In particular, the median housing prices of low-income neighborhoods in
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D.C. were consistently only about one-third of the house prices of high-income
neighborhoods during the pre-intervention period before 1998 (for example, $74,000 vs.
$225,000 in 1987, $95,000 vs. $295,000 in 1997). This pattern, or the existence of
substantial price differentials between low/moderate- and high-income tracts, has
resonated in Washington’s surrounding counties throughout the last 16 years, worsening
recently. However, the low- and moderate-income neighborhood housing markets in
Washington, D.C., broke away from this pattern starting in 1998. Consequently, the
median price in low-income tracts reached $175,000 in the District in 2002, which
accounted for more than 35 percent of the median price ($499,000) of the properties sold
in high-income tracts in the same year. It apparently presents a strong signal that the D.C.
homebuyer credit program seems to be having a greater impact on low/moderate-income
neighborhoods than high-income neighborhoods.
The fourth pattern emerging in the median housing prices involves minority
neighborhoods. Although it is not a surprise that homes in moderate- and high-minority
census tracts were sold for lower prices than homes in low-minority or white
neighborhoods throughout the region, the price differentials have been dramatically
decreasing for the moderate-minority neighborhoods in Washington, D.C., and
Alexandria City. The median sale prices in Washington’s moderate-minority
neighborhoods accounted for merely 48 and 45 percent of the prices of homes sold in its
white neighborhoods in 1987 ($88,000 vs. $185,000) and in 1997, respectively, but
jumped to 56 percent by the end of 2002 ($253,000 vs. $449,000). This increase is not
seen elsewhere in Washington’s surrounding markets, except for Alexandria City; the
price differentials remained essentially constant in Montgomery and Fairfax counties and
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became even larger in Prince George’s and Arlington in the last 16 years. 
In contrast, home sales in high-minority neighborhoods have a different, mixed
picture. From 1987 to 2002, the median transaction prices in high-minority
neighborhoods (as percent of prices in white neighborhoods) rose in Montgomery,
dropped in Alexandria and Prince George’s substantially, and experienced little change in
Washington, Arlington, and Fairfax. However, an important V-shape was observed in
Washington: The median price in high-minority tracts was $76,000 or about 41 percent of
home price ($185,000) in low-minority tracts in 1987, went down to only 36 percent in
1997, and back up to 39 percent in 2002. These results suggest that the D.C. homebuyer
credit program initiated in late 1997 may have had an important effect on changing the
trend of house price movements in Washington’s high- and especially moderate-minority
neighborhoods.     
Supplemental tables 1 and 2 report the median sale prices by Zip codes and
neighborhoods of Washington, D.C. Although much more specific, these results indicate
house price trends consistent with those discussed above. For instance, all the top 5 fast-
growth Zip codes have an average income accounting for only 53 to 83 percent of area
median income (AMI), and their population is predominately non-whites. Of the top 10
fast-growth neighborhoods, six are located in low-income and high-minority tracts. In
terms of price level, the 10 most affordable (inexpensive) neighborhoods in Washington,
D.C. are either low- or moderate-income, and their rates of minority concentration ranged
from 89 to as high as 100 percent. 
Housing Characteristics, locational accessibility and neighborhood traits (explanatory
variables)
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Table 9 (and appendix Table 3) shows the descriptive statistics for regression
explanatory variables. As expected, Washington, D.C., has the smallest lots and units per
house in the metropolitan area, the fewest rooms, the oldest housing stock (i.e., the
average age of unit when sold is 63.4 years old), the lowest owner-occupation rate (79
percent), and the fewest amenities (fireplace, porch, deck.) However, the District has the
best balance of housing structures in its stock (detached 41 percent, townhouse 32
percent, and condo 27 percent), in contrary to its surrounding suburban counties where
detached houses and townhouses (to a lesser extent) generally dominate the markets.
Housing is mostly made by concrete for its exterior wall in D.C. while suburban housing
is dominated with aluminum siding, frame, and brick. Housing units are usually heated
through radiant and warm air in Washington, D.C., compared to hot air and forced air that
are the most prevailing heat systems in surrounding areas.    
The homes sold in D.C. are located in the census tracts more easily accessible to
work. This locational accessibility is similar to D.C.’s two closest surrounding areas—
Arlington and Alexandria—but differs from Montgomery, Prince George’s, and Fairfax,
which require a much longer commute to work. In terms of neighborhood demographic
characteristics, the homes sold in Washington, D.C., during the 1987-2002 period are
located in the census tracts that on average have the highest concentration of non-white
population in the metro area, the highest poverty rates, the oldest population, the lowest
homeownership rates, the lowest rate of housing turnover, and the highest vacancy rates.   
Table 9 also summarizes physical and neighborhood traits of housing units sold























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
















































   

















































   



























































































































































































































































































































































































   








































































































































































































































































single-family detached houses, high-density houses (condos and townhouses) have
substantially smaller lots and units, fewer rooms (bedroom, bath, and total rooms) and
fireplaces, lower owner-occupation rates, and a smaller garage and basement (if any).
Condos and townhouses are also more likely to be located in neighborhoods with a
younger population and a lower homeownership rate. There are other unique features
about condos and townhouses. Compared to two other structure types, the condominium
units sold in the last 16 years are substantially newer and located in neighborhoods with a
much shorter commute to work, a lower proportion of nonwhites, a higher share of
foreign-borns, a smaller household size, and a substantially higher rate of housing
turnover. In contrast, townhouses have a substantially older housing stock and are more
likely to be located in neighborhoods with lower household incomes, a higher proportion
of nonwhites, a higher poverty rate, a higher percentage of households unable to afford
housing, a larger household size, and a higher vacancy rate.  
On average, the homes sold in the low/moderate-income and minority
neighborhoods are older and have smaller lots and units, fewer rooms, smaller basements
(if any), fewer garages and fireplaces (if any), and a lower owner-occupation rate. These
neighborhoods are also more likely to have a higher proportion of condominium units and
townhouses, as compared to high-income and low-minority neighborhoods that are
dominated with single-family detached houses and, to a lesser extent, some
condominiums.    
Neighborhood-based developments and historical events (explanatory variables)
In December 1994, the Clinton administration designated 72 urban and 33 rural
communities as the first Empowerment Zones or Enterprise Communities (EZ/EC) that
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use a number of tax incentive entitlements to spur economic development and promote
financial independence in some of these communities’ most depressed neighborhoods.
Although Washington, D.C. lost its bid to become an Empowerment Zone, for which a
winner such as Baltimore received as much as $100 million in federal grants over 10
years, the District did win the designation of an Enterprise Community for a lower tier,
one-time grant of $3 million. By 1997, the D.C. Enterprise Zones consisted primarily of
all census tracts with 20 percent and higher poverty rates, as defined by the 1990 Census.
These tracts represent more than one-third (65) of the District’s 193 census tracts and
cover about half of the District’s developable land area, including Anacostia, Congress
Heights, Marshall Heights, Shaw, Mt. Vernon Square, North Capital, Buzzard’s Point,
Chinatown-Gallery Place, and Columbia Heights. The EZ/EC businesses were entitled to
claim more than $1.2 billion of federal tax credits, deductions, exemptions and exclusions
in Washington, D.C. between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2002.
Perhaps more directly affecting the housing market dynamics in a central city
setting—such as Washington, D.C. and Baltimore—are two other neighborhood-based
government housing programs: the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and the
HOPE VI program. Initiated in 1986, the LIHTC projects (for new construction or
rehabilitation) are widely credited as the “only new housing developments” ever
happened in many of the most distressed center-city neighborhoods32. In addition, there
were 11 HOPE VI projects aimed at demolition and/or revitalization in Washington, D.C.
between 1996 and 2001.      
                                                
32 For a comprehensive review and analysis of the LIHTC program and its effects, please see a working
paper by Tong, Bogdon and Mengel (2003) on this topic.
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As a result, as shown in Table 9, the transactions of residential units that took
place in the District EZ/EC tracts and were completed after these EC initiatives became
effective account for 8.1 percent of all home sales in the District in the 1987-2002 period.
Sales of homes located in a census tract with at least one Low Income Housing Tax
Credit project in place account for 3.1 percent of the District’s total sales at the same
period, as compared to 0.1-0.2 percent in suburban Maryland and Virginia. The home
sales that might be affected by the Hope VI demolition or revitalization projects are about
0.7 percent of the total sales in the District. More specifically, the EZ/EC, LIHTC, and
HOPE VI projects in the District are mostly located in the low-income and high-minority
neighborhoods and in the places where townhouse/rowhouse is disproportionately over-
represented. 
Three-Stage Intervention Analysis of the District Homebuyer Credit Program
This section reports the empirical results from the three-stage intervention
analysis of the impact of the District first-time homebuyer credit program on amenity-
adjusted house prices (hypothesis 2). At the first stage, the hedonic regression generates
the cumulative price appreciation rates for Washington, D.C. and its comparison
surrounding markets. Then, their cumulative appreciation rates are converted into annual
rates so that the differences in the annual rates of price appreciation between the District
and its comparison markets can be calculated. Lastly, based on this geographic difference
series in annual appreciation rates, an interrupted time series analysis (ARIMA with an
input series) is performed to identify the inter-temporal difference between the pre-
intervention period and the tax credit intervention period. 
The results show that the income-targeted homeownership tax credit program, as
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implemented in Washington, D.C. does have a statistically significant, positive, and very
large net economic impact both on the District as a whole and across structure types and
neighborhoods. The tax credit intervention also has a large distributional effect. Holding
all else equal and also compared to surrounding housing markets, the District homebuyer
credit program has independently and consistently caused an explosive growth of
amenity-adjusted house prices in both townhouse and especially condominium sub-
markets. It is also responsible for a substantial house price appreciation observed in the
moderate-minority neighborhoods, as well as low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.
However, a relatively smaller effect on house price movements is observed in the high-
minority neighborhood sub-market, which is somewhat unexpected. These results are
verified with a number of robustness checks. 
Stage 1: Hedonic regressions and cumulative price appreciation rates
Table 10 (and appendix tables 4 and 5) report the empirical results from hedonic
regression analyses (the 1st stage estimation or equation 1). These results show that the
regression models fit very well for Washington, D.C., its housing sub-markets, and the
District’s comparison markets in suburban Maryland and Virginia. As indicated by the
adjusted R2, the pooled model for the District can explain about 71.9 percent of variations
in the log of amenity-adjusted sales price. For Washington, D.C.’s housing sub-markets,
the regression models can explain about 80.6 percent of the price variations for single-
family detached, 69.1 percent for townhouse/rowhouse, and 63.4 percent for
condominium markets. The model’s explanatory powers for the District’s neighborhood
sub-markets, by income and race, are ranged from 42.6 to 74.4 percent. Similarly, overall,
the regression pricing models for the suburban housing markets also perform very well.
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Table 10a. Hedonic Regressions for Washington, DC and Housing Sub-Markets by Structure Type
(Dependent Variable: Log of Nominal Transaction Price )
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T
Intercept 9.651 *** 157.9 10.434 *** 109.9 10.409 *** 91.9 7.403 *** 34.8
Housing Unit Characteristics
   Lot Size (1,000 S. F.) 0.014 *** 13.4 0.015 *** 13.9 0.070 *** 11.6
   Living Space (1,000 S. F.) 0.177 *** 40.6 0.124 *** 22.1 0.120 *** 14.2 0.458 *** 38.9
   Number of Bedroom 0.053 *** 19.6 0.023 *** 6.5 0.002 0.5 0.049 *** 5.9
   Number of Bathroom 0.076 *** 29.3 0.055 *** 16.7 0.047 *** 10.3 0.056 *** 7.9
   Total Rooms 0.001 ** 3.0 0.000 0.5 0.011 *** 3.4 0.099 *** 21.9
   Number of Story 0.029 *** 12.5 0.083 *** 11.9 0.048 *** 4.5 0.033 *** 13.2
   Age of Unit When Sold (years) -0.004 *** -17.0 -0.003 *** -7.6 -0.001 ** -2.6 -0.008 *** -18.0
   Unit Age Squared 0.00004 *** 23.5 0.00003 *** 10.0 0.00002 *** 4.6 0.00009 *** 24.7
   Owner-occuiped1 0.129 *** 29.3 0.107 *** 16.4 0.153 *** 20.5 0.065 *** 8.4
   Presence of Fireplace2 0.144 *** 30.4 0.124 *** 17.6 0.073 *** 8.9 0.092 *** 9.8
   Basement Area (S. F.) 0.000 *** 13.2 0.000 *** 18.3 0.000 *** 17.9 0.000 -0.8
   Presence of Porch2 -0.034 *** -6.5 -0.020 ** -3.0 -0.013 -1.5
   Presence of Deck2 -0.009 -0.9 0.002 0.2 -0.010 -0.7
Parking Type2
   Garage (detached or attached) 0.043 *** 9.8 0.039 *** 6.6 0.033 *** 4.6 -0.019 -1.5
   Basement 0.037 *** 5.4 0.027 ** 3.1 -0.005 -0.4 0.099 *** 4.4
   Build-In -0.072 *** -4.5 -0.027 -1.4 0.027 1.0
   Carport 0.069 *** 3.8 0.084 *** 4.3 0.015 0.4 0.129 0.8
Structure Type3
   Townhouse 0.010 + 1.9
   Condo 0.123 *** 5.3
Quality/Condition4
   Excellent 0.221 *** 13.5 0.025 1.0 0.034 0.8 0.279 *** 10.6
   Good 0.031 *** 6.1 0.036 *** 5.2 0.036 *** 3.4 0.040 *** 4.5
   Fair -0.068 *** -8.3 -0.098 *** -8.9 -0.079 *** -5.9 0.008 0.4
   Poor -0.242 *** -8.7 -0.235 *** -6.1 -0.228 *** -5.8 -0.532 *** -6.1
   Other -0.046 -1.2 0.042 0.2 0.121 ** 2.9
Exterior Wall Material5
   Shingle -0.047 * -2.0 -0.013 -0.6 -0.179 ** -2.8
   Brick/stone or brick/stone veneer 0.099 *** 5.2 0.128 *** 5.5 0.003 0.1 0.355 * 2.3
   Concrete 0.132 *** 7.7 0.123 *** 6.4 0.003 0.1 0.354 * 2.3
   Stucco 0.098 *** 4.9 0.102 *** 4.7 -0.030 -0.8 0.509 ** 3.1
   Wood or wood siding 0.072 *** 3.9 0.088 *** 4.3 -0.085 * -2.1
   Other 0.193 *** 3.8 0.133 * 2.1 0.032 0.4
Heat System6
   Hot Air -0.040 -0.9 0.190 1.1 0.150 0.6 0.489 *** 6.0
   Hot water 0.306 *** 7.2 0.033 0.5 -0.075 -0.8 1.260 *** 16.6
   Radiant 0.335 *** 8.6 0.136 * 2.2 0.109 1.5
   Forced Air 0.343 *** 8.8 0.142 * 2.3 0.077 1.0 0.791 *** 11.7
   Gravity 0.229 *** 4.1 0.195 * 2.2 0.001 0.0
   Wall/wall furnace 0.316 *** 6.4 0.172 * 2.2 0.088 1.1
   Warm Air 0.411 *** 10.5 0.206 ** 3.3 0.203 ** 2.7
   Other -0.127 ** -3.2 0.079 1.0 0.106 1.1 0.757 *** 10.1
Roof Materials7
   Composition shingle/roll composition 0.026 *** 3.7 0.018 * 2.2 -0.017 -1.0 -0.581 *** -10.1
   Metal 0.131 *** 12.2 0.175 *** 5.2 0.397 + 1.7 -0.618 *** -11.1
   Tile 0.076 *** 3.6 0.091 *** 4.2 0.000 0.0 -0.358 *** -4.0
   Slate 0.065 *** 8.5 0.078 *** 8.2 0.022 1.1 -0.619 *** -11.0
   Wood shake -0.040 ** -3.0 0.030 + 1.9 0.038 1.1 -0.759 *** -12.6
   Other -0.014 * -2.4 0.026 ** 2.9 0.006 0.8 -0.814 *** -14.0
Locational Accessibility
   Workers whose travel time
        to work <25 minutes (%) 0.009 *** 21.1 0.004 *** 6.7 0.008 *** 10.0 0.025 *** 17.4
   Workers whose travel time
        to work 25-45 minutes (%) 0.011 *** 21.4 0.004 *** 5.5 0.008 *** 8.3 0.032 *** 18.9
Neighborhood Characteristics
Washington, DC Single Family Detached Townhouse/Rowhouse Condominium
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   Median family income ($1,000) 0.003 *** 19.4 0.005 *** 19.8 0.002 *** 5.1 0.001 *** 4.4
   Share of nonwhite population (%) -0.004 *** -27.4 -0.005 *** -23.7 -0.007 *** -18.4 -0.003 *** -6.7
   Poverty rate (%) -0.003 *** -9.2 -0.005 *** -9.4 -0.002 ** -2.7 -0.001 -1.6
   Affordability -0.001 -1.5 -0.005 *** -7.5 -0.003 *** -4.1 0.004 *** 4.3
   Foreign-borns (%) 0.012 *** 46.1 0.010 *** 18.3 0.011 *** 23.1 0.011 *** 22.9
   Population aged 65 or older (%) -0.005 *** -12.5 -0.001 + -1.8 -0.005 *** -6.3 -0.007 *** -13.3
   Homeownership rate (%) -0.001 *** -4.4 -0.001 *** -4.5 0.001 *** 4.4 -0.004 *** -9.4
   Household size -0.048 *** -9.1 -0.076 *** -10.0 -0.080 *** -8.6 0.006 0.4
   Turnover (% owner households
      moved since 1985) 0.002 *** 7.6 0.003 *** 7.7 0.002 *** 5.3 0.001 ** 3.0
   Vacancy rate (%) -0.005 *** -10.5 -0.006 *** -10.0 -0.002 * -2.4 -0.001 -0.8
Events & Neighborhood Developments
   Enterprise Community/Empowerment Zone2 0.003 0.3 -0.004 -0.3 0.007 0.5 -0.079 *** -4.2
   Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects 2 0.000 0.0 0.076 *** 4.5 0.008 0.7 -0.103 *** -3.7
   HOPE VI Projects2 -0.002 -0.1 0.028 1.4 -0.008 -0.2 -0.218 *** -4.6
   September 11 Terrorist Attack 8 0.057 *** 3.7 0.061 ** 2.7 0.029 1.1 0.055 + 1.9
Transaction Date9
1988 0.174 *** 17.8 0.193 *** 13.9 0.153 *** 8.6 0.142 *** 8.5
1989 0.288 *** 29.4 0.323 *** 22.8 0.310 *** 17.4 0.207 *** 12.6
1990 0.304 *** 29.2 0.349 *** 23.7 0.327 *** 17.4 0.215 *** 12.0
1991 0.287 *** 27.1 0.318 *** 21.7 0.306 *** 15.9 0.213 *** 11.6
1992 0.281 *** 26.9 0.290 *** 19.9 0.274 *** 14.3 0.201 *** 11.2
1993 0.251 *** 23.7 0.275 *** 18.9 0.233 *** 12.0 0.164 *** 8.8
1994 0.235 *** 22.9 0.294 *** 20.9 0.199 *** 10.7 0.128 *** 6.9
1995 0.205 *** 19.2 0.248 *** 16.7 0.189 *** 10.1 0.135 *** 7.0
1996 0.179 *** 17.0 0.238 *** 16.3 0.203 *** 10.9 0.052 ** 2.6
1997 0.187 *** 18.9 0.254 *** 18.5 0.176 *** 10.0 0.067 *** 3.7
1998 0.279 *** 29.7 0.333 *** 25.6 0.290 *** 17.2 0.155 *** 9.3
1999 0.388 *** 42.5 0.448 *** 34.4 0.446 *** 27.3 0.238 *** 14.9
2000 0.550 *** 60.6 0.598 *** 45.9 0.605 *** 37.6 0.429 *** 27.0
2001 0.698 *** 73.9 0.695 *** 51.5 0.762 *** 45.7 0.642 *** 38.4
2002 0.909 *** 98.0 0.869 *** 65.5 0.997 *** 61.1 0.881 *** 53.0
Adjusted R2 0.719 0.806 0.691 0.634
Number of Observations 56,936 23,509 18,180 15,247
Note: 1. Omitted variable is renter-occupied. 2. Omitted variable is "none." 3. Omitted variable is single family detached. 4. Omitted variable is "average."
          5. Omitted variable is "aluminum siding/vinyl." 6. Omitted variable is "heat pump". 7. Omitted variable is "built-up." 8. The 9/11 dummy variable has a value  
          of 1 if the sales took place in Oct. and Nov. of 2001, 0 otherwise. 9. Omitted variable is "1987". 
         *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1.
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Table 10b. Hedonic Regressions for Washington, DC Neighborhoods by Income
(Dependent Variable: Log of Nominal Transaction Price )
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T
Intercept 13.605 *** 45.3 10.336 *** 43.2 9.865 *** 117.1
Housing Unit Characteristics
   Lot Size (1,000 S. F.) 0.016 *** 12.5 0.011 *** 5.8 0.013 *** 5.4
   Living Space (1,000 S. F.) 0.172 *** 31.0 0.226 *** 22.0 0.178 *** 23.4
   Number of Bedroom 0.056 *** 13.4 0.050 *** 7.6 0.031 *** 7.5
   Number of Bathroom 0.060 *** 17.4 0.043 *** 7.8 0.076 *** 17.4
   Total Rooms 0.014 *** 6.8 0.037 *** 9.3 0.001 1.2
   Number of Story 0.028 *** 8.2 0.005 1.0 0.034 *** 7.6
   Age of Unit When Sold (years) -0.002 *** -8.2 -0.004 *** -7.4 -0.007 *** -15.1
   Unit Age Squared 0.00003 *** 12.9 0.00004 *** 8.9 0.00006 *** 16.5
   Owner-occuiped1 0.031 *** 4.3 0.115 *** 12.9 0.155 *** 24.4
   Presence of Fireplace2 0.117 *** 13.5 0.129 *** 14.9 0.114 *** 15.6
   Basement Area (S. F.) 0.000 + 1.7 0.000 0.7 0.000 *** 15.2
   Presence of Porch2 -0.023 * -2.3 0.013 0.8 -0.050 *** -6.6
   Presence of Deck2 -0.007 -0.5 0.101 *** 3.6 -0.024 + -1.7
Parking Type2
   Garage (detached or attached) 0.031 *** 4.4 0.045 *** 5.0 0.049 *** 7.2
   Basement 0.049 *** 5.4 0.043 ** 2.7 0.015 1.2
   Build-In -0.025 -1.4 -0.158 ** -3.2 -0.049 -1.6
   Carport 0.070 * 2.4 0.071 * 2.6 0.037 1.2
Structure Type3
   Townhouse -0.030 ** -2.9 -0.027 + -1.8 0.029 *** 3.7
   Condo 0.478 *** 6.5 -0.113 -1.6 0.256 *** 8.5
Quality/Condition4
   Excellent 0.029 1.4 -0.033 -0.6 0.302 *** 11.4
   Good 0.043 *** 6.7 -0.010 -1.0 0.092 *** 9.5
   Fair -0.094 ** -2.7 -0.067 *** -4.0 -0.057 *** -5.4
   Poor -0.154 * -2.0 -0.176 * -2.1 -0.203 *** -6.0
   Other -0.313 ** -3.0 0.153 * 2.6 -0.244 *** -4.2
Exterior Wall Material5
   Shingle 0.034 0.6 0.052 0.8 -0.124 *** -3.9
   Brick/stone or brick/stone veneer -0.014 -0.3 0.077 1.2 0.102 *** 4.1
   Concrete -0.006 -0.1 0.156 * 2.6 0.148 *** 7.2
   Stucco 0.029 0.6 0.123 + 1.9 0.031 1.1
   Wood or wood siding 0.037 0.7 0.099 1.6 -0.067 ** -2.6
   Other 0.118 0.9 0.000 . 0.190 ** 3.2
Heat System6
   Hot Air 0.000 . -0.319 + -1.7 0.540 ** 3.0
   Hot water 0.120 0.7 -0.228 -1.3 0.429 *** 8.4
   Radiant 0.029 0.2 -0.073 -0.4 0.396 *** 8.7
   Forced Air 0.029 0.2 -0.027 -0.2 0.396 *** 8.6
   Gravity 0.000 . 0.103 0.3 0.293 *** 4.6
   Wall/wall furnace 0.056 0.3 0.059 0.3 0.358 *** 6.1
   Warm Air 0.070 0.4 0.005 0.0 0.478 *** 10.4
   Other -0.909 *** -5.1 -0.199 -1.1 -0.001 0.0
Roof Materials7
   Composition shingle/roll composition 0.033 * 2.5 0.009 0.7 0.042 *** 3.7
   Metal -0.008 -0.4 0.101 *** 4.8 0.072 *** 3.9
   Tile 0.031 1.2 -0.007 -0.1 0.109 ** 2.7
   Slate 0.087 *** 6.8 0.052 ** 3.2 -0.034 * -2.4
   Wood shake 0.036 + 1.9 -0.214 *** -7.7 -0.043 + -1.8
   Other -0.042 ** -3.2 0.013 1.0 0.006 0.7
Locational Accessibility
   Workers whose travel time
        to work <25 minutes (%) -0.013 *** -6.0 0.012 *** 9.3 0.008 *** 12.1
   Workers whose travel time
        to work 25-45 minutes (%) -0.016 *** -6.6 0.010 *** 5.4 0.014 *** 17.7
Neighborhood Characteristics
   Median family income ($1,000) 0.004 *** 14.9 -0.002 + -1.7 -0.002 ** -3.2
   Share of nonwhite population (%) -0.004 *** -13.0 -0.004 *** -7.3 -0.006 *** -14.6
   Poverty rate (%) -0.012 *** -9.9 0.010 *** 4.0 -0.006 *** -11.0
   Affordability 0.014 *** 13.1 -0.006 ** -3.1 -0.004 *** -7.3
   Foreign-borns (%) 0.002 + 1.9 0.014 *** 9.4 0.010 *** 26.2
   Population aged 65 or older (%) -0.009 *** -8.3 -0.013 *** -7.3 -0.001 + -2.0
   Homeownership rate (%) -0.004 *** -10.4 0.002 *** 4.2 -0.001 * -2.2
   Household size -0.433 *** -15.7 -0.190 *** -7.9 -0.010 -1.5
   Turnover (% owner households
      moved since 1985) 0.001 1.6 -0.002 + -1.7 0.001 *** 4.7
High-Income Neighborhoods Moderate/Middle-Income Neighborhoods Low-Income Neighborhoods
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   Vacancy rate (%) -0.010 *** -4.7 0.004 1.5 -0.004 *** -5.8
Events & Neighborhood Developments
   Enterprise Community/Empowerment Zone2 0.000 5.5 0.000 . -0.015 -1.4
   Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects2 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.024 * 2.3
   HOPE VI Projects2 0.000 . 0.000 . -0.009 -0.4
   September 11 Terrorist Attack8 0.082 ** 3.2 0.013 0.4 0.072 ** 3.2
Transaction Date9
1988 0.215 *** 15.3 0.153 *** 8.5 0.157 *** 10.1
1989 0.344 *** 24.5 0.262 *** 14.7 0.267 *** 17.0
1990 0.316 *** 20.6 0.285 *** 15.6 0.302 *** 18.2
1991 0.261 *** 17.6 0.287 *** 15.2 0.307 *** 17.9
1992 0.255 *** 17.6 0.277 *** 14.4 0.288 *** 17.1
1993 0.244 *** 16.8 0.282 *** 14.5 0.235 *** 13.5
1994 0.245 *** 16.9 0.239 *** 13.1 0.209 *** 12.5
1995 0.202 *** 13.4 0.202 *** 10.7 0.210 *** 12.2
1996 0.196 *** 13.1 0.161 *** 8.3 0.184 *** 10.9
1997 0.221 *** 16.0 0.163 *** 8.9 0.176 *** 10.9
1998 0.304 *** 23.6 0.231 *** 13.3 0.275 *** 17.9
1999 0.422 *** 32.4 0.341 *** 20.7 0.388 *** 26.3
2000 0.595 *** 44.9 0.505 *** 30.7 0.551 *** 38.0
2001 0.703 *** 50.8 0.680 *** 39.7 0.709 *** 47.1
2002 0.855 *** 62.2 0.828 *** 48.2 0.961 *** 65.6
Adjusted R2 0.694 0.573 0.426
Number of Observations 17,064 10,884 28,988
Note: 1. Omitted variable is renter-occupied. 2. Omitted variable is "none." 3. Omitted variable is single family detached. 4. Omitted variable is "average."
          5. Omitted variable is "aluminum siding/vinyl." 6. Omitted variable is "heat pump". 7. Omitted variable is "built-up." 8. The 9/11 dummy variable has a value  
          of 1 if the sales took place in Oct. and Nov. of 2001, 0 otherwise. 9. Omitted variable is "1987". 
         *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1.
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Table 10c. Hedonic Regressions for Washington, DC Neighborhoods by Race
(Dependent Variable: Log of Nominal Transaction Price )
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T
Intercept 10.862 *** 36.9 365.932 *** 1.8 10.698 *** 123.7
Housing Unit Characteristics
   Lot Size (1,000 S. F.) 0.014 *** 11.1 0.037 + 1.8 0.018 *** 10.1
   Living Space (1,000 S. F.) 0.193 *** 35.5 0.319 *** 16.5 0.143 *** 21.0
   Number of Bedroom 0.073 *** 18.0 -0.016 -1.3 0.031 *** 8.4
   Number of Bathroom 0.050 *** 14.7 0.066 *** 5.5 0.065 *** 17.5
   Total Rooms 0.020 *** 10.2 0.119 *** 16.9 0.000 0.3
   Number of Story 0.018 *** 6.5 0.020 ** 2.9 -0.007 -1.4
   Age of Unit When Sold (years) -0.002 *** -7.9 -0.009 *** -10.4 -0.007 *** -16.1
   Unit Age Squared 0.00003 *** 13.4 0.00009 *** 11.6 0.00005 *** 15.9
   Owner-occuiped1 0.036 *** 5.4 0.135 *** 9.4 0.147 *** 25.0
   Presence of Fireplace2 0.135 *** 17.4 0.130 *** 8.6 0.087 *** 13.3
   Basement Area (S. F.) 0.000 ** -3.0 0.000 ** -3.1 0.000 *** 21.0
   Presence of Porch2 -0.013 -1.3 -0.133 * -2.2 -0.018 ** -2.7
   Presence of Deck2 -0.006 -0.5 -0.341 *** -4.2 -0.001 -0.1
Parking Type2
   Garage (detached or attached) 0.050 *** 7.4 0.075 *** 4.1 0.040 *** 6.9
   Basement 0.063 *** 6.9 -0.098 + -2.0 0.023 * 2.3
   Build-In -0.031 -1.6 -0.426 * -2.0 0.021 0.9
   Carport 0.080 * 2.5 0.313 ** 2.6 0.030 1.4
Structure Type3
   Townhouse -0.027 ** -2.7 0.026 0.8 0.030 *** 4.4
   Condo 0.447 *** 6.6 0.434 *** 5.8 0.199 *** 6.7
Quality/Condition4
   Excellent 0.028 1.4 -0.018 -0.4 0.154 *** 5.4
   Good 0.030 *** 5.0 0.054 ** 3.3 0.044 *** 5.3
   Fair -0.032 -1.1 -0.050 + -1.8 -0.053 *** -5.6
   Poor -0.007 -0.1 -0.020 -0.2 -0.200 *** -6.4
   Other 0.030 0.5 -0.086 -1.2 -0.150 + -1.9
Exterior Wall Material5
   Shingle 0.055 0.9 0.733 + 1.8 -0.097 *** -3.7
   Brick/stone or brick/stone veneer -0.016 -0.3 0.610 ** 3.2 0.009 0.4
   Concrete 0.038 0.7 0.607 ** 3.2 0.119 *** 6.3
   Stucco 0.066 1.2 0.528 ** 2.7 0.032 1.4
   Wood or wood siding 0.074 1.3 0.857 *** 3.8 -0.028 -1.3
   Other -0.008 -0.1 0.000 . 0.186 ** 3.3
Heat System6
   Hot Air 0.000 . -0.156 -1.3 -0.126 * -2.3
   Hot water 0.095 0.4 -0.191 -1.6 0.336 *** 6.8
   Radiant 0.008 0.0 0.238 * 2.0 0.266 *** 6.0
   Forced Air -0.001 0.0 0.378 *** 3.3 0.261 *** 5.8
   Gravity 0.000 . -0.007 0.0 0.216 *** 3.5
   Wall/wall furnace 0.059 0.2 0.598 * 2.5 0.254 *** 4.6
   Warm Air 0.041 0.2 0.299 * 2.5 0.336 *** 7.5
   Other -0.879 *** -3.6 -0.136 -1.3 -0.080 + -1.7
Roof Materials7
   Composition shingle/roll composition 0.037 ** 2.8 0.318 *** 5.9 0.017 + 1.8
   Metal 0.041 * 2.5 0.281 *** 5.5 0.050 ** 2.7
   Tile 0.056 * 2.1 0.227 ** 2.6 0.037 1.1
   Slate 0.084 *** 6.5 0.139 ** 2.8 0.073 *** 6.3
   Wood shake 0.031 1.6 0.154 ** 2.7 -0.136 *** -7.0
   Other -0.009 -0.7 0.132 *** 4.1 0.004 0.6
Locational Accessibility
   Workers whose travel time
        to work <25 minutes (%) -0.005 *** -3.4 -9.296 + -1.8 0.006 *** 10.8
   Workers whose travel time
        to work 25-45 minutes (%) -0.005 ** -2.8 -7.438 + -1.8 0.007 *** 9.2
Low-Minority Neighborhoods Moderate-Minority Neighborhoods High-Minority Neighborhoods
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Neighborhood Characteristics
   Median family income ($1,000) 0.005 *** 18.1 7.172 + 1.8 0.003 *** 7.9
   Share of nonwhite population (%) 0.017 *** 14.1 5.078 + 1.8 -0.011 *** -22.9
   Poverty rate (%) -0.008 *** -11.0 -5.190 + -1.8 -0.002 ** -3.1
   Affordability 0.024 *** 28.6 3.973 + 1.8 -0.003 *** -5.7
   Foreign-borns (%) 0.006 *** 7.0 5.587 + 1.8 0.010 *** 26.8
   Population aged 65 or older (%) 0.002 ** 2.7 -1.823 + -1.8 0.002 * 2.5
   Homeownership rate (%) -0.003 *** -10.7 -3.816 + -1.8 0.000 -1.4
   Household size -0.142 *** -8.7 0.000 -0.020 ** -2.7
   Turnover (% owner households
      moved since 1985) 0.005 *** 10.2 0.000 0.001 *** 4.3
   Vacancy rate (%) 0.017 *** 11.2 0.000 -0.004 *** -7.3
Events & Neighborhood Developments
   Enterprise Community/Empowerment Zone2 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.5
   Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects2 0.000 0.000 0.036 *** 3.6
   HOPE VI Projects2 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.4
   September 11 Terrorist Attack8 0.046 * 2.0 0.017 0.4 0.063 ** 3.1
Transaction Date9
1988 0.196 *** 15.2 0.118 *** 3.9 0.165 *** 11.9
1989 0.312 *** 24.3 0.224 *** 7.4 0.279 *** 19.9
1990 0.285 *** 20.5 0.230 *** 7.2 0.330 *** 22.4
1991 0.243 *** 18.0 0.168 *** 4.9 0.340 *** 22.3
1992 0.237 *** 17.7 0.172 *** 5.1 0.302 *** 20.1
1993 0.229 *** 17.0 0.174 *** 5.0 0.255 *** 16.7
1994 0.229 *** 17.2 0.117 *** 3.5 0.247 *** 16.8
1995 0.189 *** 13.5 0.048 1.4 0.239 *** 15.9
1996 0.165 *** 11.8 0.106 ** 3.1 0.207 *** 13.9
1997 0.195 *** 15.1 0.062 + 2.0 0.202 *** 14.2
1998 0.278 *** 23.2 0.161 *** 5.4 0.292 *** 21.4
1999 0.385 *** 32.4 0.250 *** 8.9 0.419 *** 31.8
2000 0.572 *** 47.2 0.487 *** 17.2 0.565 *** 43.7
2001 0.710 *** 56.4 0.717 *** 24.5 0.707 *** 52.5
2002 0.860 *** 67.8 0.965 *** 33.5 0.941 *** 71.9
Adjusted R2 0.744 0.579 0.477
Number of Observations 20,073 4,652 32,211
Note: 1. Omitted variable is renter-occupied. 2. Omitted variable is "none." 3. Omitted variable is single family detached. 4. Omitted variable is "average."
          5. Omitted variable is "aluminum siding/vinyl." 6. Omitted variable is "heat pump". 7. Omitted variable is "built-up." 8. The 9/11 dummy variable has a value
          of 1 if the sales took place in Oct. and Nov. of 2001, 0 otherwise. 9. Omitted variable is "1987". 
         *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1.
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The adjusted R2 are 71.3 percent in Montgomery, 46.6 percent in Prince George’s, 70.4
percent in Alexandria, 69.1 percent in Arlington, and 81.1 percent in Fairfax33.       
I also ran several procedures for regression diagnostics. During the early phase of
the modeling for trial and error, multicollearity problems are detected for several
explanatory variables as indicated by the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). One problem
comes from the unit age variable, which seems strongly correlated with the unit age
square variable, as well as the age of the housing stock at the census tract level. As a
solution to this problem, while the unit age and age square variables have to be kept in the
equations because of their well-documented importance according to the literature, the
census tract housing age variable is removed from the current regressions. Other
collearity problems come from dummy variables for structure type with heating systems
and roof materials. The heating and roof variables are therefore regrouped or aggregated
to avoid their multicollearity in the current regressions. Moreover, because the housing
markets are notoriously heterogeneous, I implemented several procedures to preempt the
heteroscedasticity problems. The most important step was to delete the outliners—the
major source of heteroscedasticity—during the sampling phase34. 
With respect to independent variables, virtually all of them are statistically
significant, except some of the dummy variables for heating systems and exterior wall
materials in the neighborhood sub-market equations and for neighborhood-based
                                                
33 The goodness-of-fit measures for sub-markets by structure type and neighborhoods in DC’s surrounding
areas have similar results to those reported here. These results are available from the author, upon request.
34 The following transactions are deemed as outliners and therefore excluded from the analytic sample: if
the property has a living space greater than 15,000 or less than 100 square feet; if the number of bathrooms
is more than 10; if story in a unit is more than 6; if the sales price is greater than $1 million or less than
$5,000; and if the property was built before 1750.
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development programs. The vast majority of the explanatory variables have the expected
signs. For example, on net, the lot size, living space, and room variables are strongly and
positively associated with the sales price of the properties. A typical owner-occupied
house has a higher transaction price than a typical renter-occupied property. The unit age
variable has a negative sign indicating that, holding all else equal, the older a home the
lower it is priced. In contrast, the unit age square variable has a positive sign, suggesting
that the declining trend on the value of older homes is diminishing over time.  
Moreover, there are two variables describing historical events and neighborhood-
based development that are worth noting. One is the 9/11 terrorist attack variable that
measures the immediate impact of 9/11 (in the following two months of 2001) on house
prices. This variable has a statistically significant and consistently positive effect on home
prices in Washington, D.C., its sub-markets, and all other suburban housing markets. This
indicates that, although the September 11 attack on New York and the Pentagon did make
substantial and immediate damages to the U.S. economy including the stock markets, it
did not stop the high-speed gear of the housing markets, at least in the Washington metro
area. The other is the dummy variable specifying the number of Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit projects in a census tract. LIHTC has a statistically significant and positive
effect on sales prices of the homes located in the low-income and high-minority
neighborhoods, as well as single-family detached house prices. This effect is not,
however, detected from the two other government programs (EZ/EC and Hope VI) also
featuring neighborhood developments in the District.  
The main purpose of hedonic regressions is to produce the cumulative price
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appreciation rates accurately by adjusting for physical characteristics of housing units,
locational accessibility and neighborhood traits, and also controlling for the observed
neighborhood developments and historical events. The cumulative appreciation rates are
essentially the percentage change in the average amenity-adjusted price of transactions
since 1987 (the base year used in this study). They are calculated directly from the
coefficients of time (year) variables in the hedonic regressions35.  
The cumulative appreciation rates are reported in Table 11 (and appendix tables 6
through 10) and illustrated in figures 15a through 16c. They show that prior to 1992 the
upward trend on adjusted house price appreciation in Washington, D.C. was similar to
those in its comparison markets in suburban Maryland (i.e., Montgomery and Prince
George’s counties). Between 1993 and 1997, while these suburban Maryland markets
were essentially flat in their adjusted price movements, Washington, D.C. took a steadily
downward path. Consequently, the cumulative appreciation rate in Washington was
merely 20.6 percent in 1997, compared to 33.1 percent in Montgomery and 35.3 in Prince
George’s in the same year. 
In 1998 (the first full year of the homebuyer credit program), however, the house
price movements in Washington, D.C., as a whole and in its sub-markets (by structure
type and neighborhood) had a surprising and unprecedented spike. Since 1998, although
house prices have experienced a substantial growth in all markets, Washington’s amenity-
adjusted house prices appreciated at a consistently higher rate than its comparison
                                                
35 The cumulative (adjusted) price appreciation rate is calculated as the antilog of the coefficient of the time
(year) dummy minus 1 (i.e., antilog (coeff)-1). For instance, the cumulative appreciation rate in
Washington, D.C. in 2002 is antilog of 0.90933 from Table 10a (2.4826) minus 1, or 1.483 (148.3 percent).
This is consistent with the work of Havorson and Palmquist (1980), explained in Gujarati (1995, 525), and
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Figure 15a. Cumulative Price Appreciation






































































Figure 15b. Cumulative Price Appreciation
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Figure 16a. Cumulative Price Appreciation in Washington, DC: 



































































Single Family Detached Townhouse Condo
Figure 16b. Cumulative Price Appreciation in Washington, DC:












































































Figure 16c. Cumulative Price Appreciation in Washington, DC:














































































markets in Maryland every year in the 1998-2002 period. As a result, the cumulative
appreciation rate in Washington, D.C., reached an astonishing 148.3 percent in 2002,
compared to 121.7 percent in Montgomery and only 86.5 percent in Prince George’s. 
A nearly identical pattern is also detected in comparing the District’s cumulative
price appreciation rates with those in the three suburban Virginia markets between 1987
and 2002.
With respect to the District’s housing sub-markets, 1998 once again marked a
turning point across structure types and neighborhoods (census tracts), which is
particularly evident in lower-priced condo/townhouse markets, low/moderate-income
neighborhoods, and moderate/high-minority neighborhoods. As shown in Table 11 and
Figure 16, single-family detached houses had a cumulative adjusted price appreciation
rate of 28.9 percent from 1987 to 1997, which significantly outpaced the price
appreciation of townhouses (19.3 percent) and condominiums (merely 7 percent) in the
same period. However, the opposite is true since 1998. With a consistently steeper price
increase each year over the last five years (1998-2002), the cumulative appreciation rates
reached 170.9 percent for townhouses and 141.4 percent for condominiums in 2002, as
compared to 138.4 percent for detached houses. 
Similarly, house price growth in low/moderate-income neighborhoods and
moderate/high-minority neighborhoods had generally lower starting points than in high-
income and low-minority neighborhoods in 1987 and 1997. By 2002, the cumulative rates
in low/moderate-income and minority neighborhoods generally outpaced (or were close
to) the rates in high-income and white neighborhoods. In particular, the District’s
moderate-minority neighborhoods and low-income tracts experienced a rapid growth of
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adjusted house prices since 1998, leading to gains as high as 162.5 and 161.5 percent,
respectively, over the last 16 years.     
Stage 2: Geographic differences in annual price appreciation
In an effort to control for unobserved effects on the District’s house price growth,
I first converted the cumulative appreciation rates into the annual appreciation rates and
then calculated the geographic differences, in terms of the annual rates of amenity-
adjusted price appreciation, between the District and its comparison markets. 
Table 12 (and appendix tables 11 through 15) summarizes the annual appreciation
rates for Washington, D.C, and its five surrounding housing markets in suburban
Maryland and Virginia.  Although taking a different angle, the findings are consistent
with those discussed in the above subsection on the cumulative appreciation rates. In
brief, during the pre-intervention period (1987-1997), the annual appreciation rates in the
District and its sub-markets were somewhat lower than those in every comparison
housing market in the District’s suburban area. For instance, the average annual
appreciation rate for Washington, D.C. as a whole in this period was 2.1 percent, as
compared to 3.1 percent in Montgomery, 3.2 percent in Prince George’s, 2.9 percent in
Alexandria, 2.6 percent in Arlington, and 2.5 percent in Fairfax. The average annual rates
of house appreciation in the District’s townhouse/condominium, low/moderate-income,
and moderate-minority neighborhood sub-markets are particularly striking: They ranged
from only 0.8 to 2 percent during this pre-intervention period.  
In a sharp contrast, compared to the surrounding markets, the District’s housing
market dynamics experienced a dramatic change during the impact period of 1998-2002.
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Montgomery had an average annual rate of 10.9 percent, Prince George’s 6.7 percent,
Alexandria 12.1 percent, Arlington 13.8 percent, and Fairfax 10.4 percent during the
same period. The gaps in some of the sub-markets were even larger, especially the
townhouse/condo markets, low/moderate-income neighborhoods, and moderate-minority
neighborhoods.  
As shown in tables 13 through 15 and also illustrated in figures 17a through 20c, a
number of important patterns have emerged from the geographic differences in the annual
price appreciation rates between the District and the comparison markets. First, except for
1988 and to a less extent 1991, nearly all the geographic differences were negative under
any comparison categories during the pre-intervention period of 1987-1997. Second, with
just one exception (Washington, D.C., vs. Arlington in 2002), the differences between the
District as a whole and the five comparison markets were dramatically turned into the
positive territory and they were also substantial every year during the 1998-2002 impact
period. In particular, the dramatic U-turn in the geographic differences was observed in
1998, suggesting an enormous, immediate impact of the D.C. homebuyer credit program
in its first full year. And the vast majority of the differences reached their climaxes in
2000. (Note that this information is consistent with the findings reported earlier using the
IRS data.) Third, the differences during the impact period for all the housing sub-markets
were generally positive and large. This pattern is particularly evident for the
townhouse/condominium sub-markets, low/moderate-income neighborhoods, and
moderate-minority neighborhoods. There are, however, some inconsistencies (or
“noises”) observed for single-family detached housing and in high-income census tracts























































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   

































































1988 2.0 10.8 5.7 2.3 1.5
1989 -1.9 3.2 1.4 -2.3 2.9
1990 2.6 -4.1 -1.5 1.4 5.0
1991 0.6 -2.3 2.3 0.7 1.2
1992 -2.3 -5.2 -4.6 -3.7 -2.5
1993 -2.8 -2.1 0.4 -2.1 -2.9
1994 0.6 0.5 -0.4 2.7 -1.7
1995 -2.1 -4.4 -2.7 -5.5 -3.3
1996 0.3 -1.9 1.2 -1.4 -0.7
1997 0.5 2.7 -0.9 -1.4 0.5
1998* 4.0 6.5 0.2 0.6 2.6
1999* 3.5 3.7 5.4 -0.3 1.9
2000* 4.9 13.8 2.9 2.0 1.3
2001* -4.6 3.0 -1.5 -2.5 -3.6
2002* 0.2 3.3 -2.1 -3.6 8.8
Townhouse/Rowhouse
1988 4.8 7.3 -9.6 1.4 0.1
1989 0.3 6.6 6.1 -0.2 4.4
1990 -3.4 -5.7 -0.1 1.1 1.0
1991 -0.4 -4.2 4.1 2.5 0.5
1992 -6.2 -6.1 -1.9 0.7 -2.0
1993 -1.6 -9.1 -3.3 -16.6 -2.3
1994 -2.9 2.3 -5.3 1.4 -5.2
1995 -1.6 -7.0 -2.2 10.5 -1.0
1996 2.0 0.8 3.7 -4.9 2.0
1997 -5.0 -2.3 -2.1 -15.3 -3.0
1998* 10.7 11.4 10.6 19.2 10.6
1999* 11.2 17.1 10.8 3.8 10.8
2000* 7.4 12.1 3.9 7.3 4.3
2001* 2.9 11.3 3.3 -2.0 0.7
2002* 7.9 12.6 3.3 6.3 11.7
Condominium
1988 8.3 3.2 -8.6 7.2 2.6
1989 -9.0 -13.8 3.3 -8.5 -6.2
1990 -6.0 -0.9 -12.6 1.0 -3.5
1991 -3.1 -1.5 0.8 1.4 2.7
1992 -1.0 -1.8 -1.7 -2.3 0.6
1993 -1.4 -3.4 2.4 -3.0 0.6
1994 -11.6 -7.7 -9.3 2.3 -3.1
1995 6.3 10.0 5.3 4.1 1.6
1996 -6.7 -12.3 -2.4 -12.4 -7.2
1997 5.8 7.0 3.0 5.5 3.0
1998* 8.4 16.0 7.7 5.3 8.3
1999* 3.0 -2.0 3.8 1.0 3.7
2000* 13.5 24.0 19.2 6.6 8.3
2001* 3.2 17.7 12.9 4.0 4.5
2002* 13.4 12.5 4.0 0.4 10.0
 *   This period of time is deemed as the "impact period" in Washington, DC. 
Table 14. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rates between Washington, DC and 
Surrounding Markets: By Structure Type




1988 4.1 16.6 -0.2 0.5 5.0
1989 -2.5 2.0 -1.2 -0.5 2.8
1990 -2.1 -10.4 1.4 0.5 -1.1
1991 -0.3 4.8 -3.3 -1.4 -1.9
1992 -1.2 -4.2 -2.0 -1.1 0.4
1993 -2.6 -1.8 -0.9 -6.5 -1.1
1994 -0.6 1.3 -4.8 0.8 -3.5
1995 -2.2 -4.7 -1.1 -5.6 -3.4
1996 1.9 0.6 1.5 -2.2 -0.1
1997 -1.0 2.8 -1.4 1.3 1.5
1998* 4.7 6.3 3.9 1.0 3.9
1999* 4.2 4.7 3.4 3.8 3.9
2000* 6.1 13.7 8.8 3.3 4.7
2001* -3.4 0.3 -1.9 -2.0 -2.6
2002* -0.2 3.7 -0.8 -3.7 4.7
Moderate/Middle-Income
1988 2.1 4.1 -3.3 6.6 0.0
1989 -3.1 0.7 1.2 -1.5 -1.4
1990 -1.6 -3.9 -4.5 0.8 1.5
1991 1.7 1.0 4.0 2.6 3.4
1992 -0.8 -3.4 2.6 -2.5 0.3
1993 1.9 -0.9 -0.2 -1.0 0.7
1994 -5.8 -4.8 -3.5 1.0 -5.0
1995 -1.2 -5.0 -7.3 -3.5 -2.7
1996 -4.0 -4.6 0.2 -4.8 -4.0
1997 1.2 1.3 2.0 -1.1 0.6
1998* 4.2 5.6 -1.6 2.1 4.2
1999* 4.0 4.1 6.1 0.4 5.0
2000* 10.3 15.2 4.5 7.7 5.9
2001* 4.2 12.4 6.6 2.9 3.2
2002* -3.2 1.1 -8.7 -7.6 1.3
Low-Income Neighborhoods
1988 1.7 11.4 10.5 5.0 1.5
1989 -6.8 2.7 3.0 -4.9 0.9
1990 3.0 -3.6 -4.1 -0.6 -3.1
1991 -1.3 -2.9 21.1 4.4 3.4
1992 -4.7 -4.8 -20.2 0.7 2.1
1993 -5.9 -5.8 2.5 -1.1 0.3
1994 -0.6 -1.7 -13.4 -1.6 -3.3
1995 -0.3 0.3 8.8 6.6 2.7
1996 -3.2 -4.5 -5.1 -6.3 0.8
1997 1.6 0.0 -9.1 0.4 1.6
1998* 9.1 9.5 14.3 6.5 13.5
1999* 3.9 5.5 -3.9 5.9 2.6
2000* 6.7 15.5 2.8 -1.0 9.7
2001* 5.2 11.5 3.6 2.2 -3.3
2002* 5.1 12.8 6.7 -6.3 16.2
 *   This period of time is deemed as the "impact period" in Washington, DC. 
Table 15a. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rates between Washington, DC and 
Surrounding Markets: By Neighborhood Income




1988 4.7 7.1 1.0 6.1 4.0
1989 -3.7 -1.2 -2.2 0.2 0.3
1990 -4.5 -8.1 -6.3 -2.6 -2.1
1991 -0.4 0.2 2.5 -1.1 -0.9
1992 -0.6 -2.5 -1.5 -2.1 0.7
1993 -0.9 0.2 -0.1 -3.8 -0.7
1994 -1.4 -2.9 -3.5 3.2 -2.4
1995 -1.5 -4.9 -2.4 -3.4 -3.1
1996 -0.9 -0.5 -0.9 -4.5 -1.9
1997 0.9 3.4 -0.2 3.9 2.6
1998* 5.4 7.9 4.6 2.1 4.8
1999* 4.0 1.7 2.4 1.7 3.7
2000* 10.0 18.2 10.2 7.8 7.4
2001* -0.6 4.7 3.0 0.9 0.0
2002* -1.3 1.4 -3.6 -8.5 3.0
Moderate-Minority Neighborhoods
1988 -6.1 2.8 -11.4 5.7 -5.6
1989 -3.1 -0.3 2.6 -6.5 -0.9
1990 -0.4 -5.9 -2.1 -2.3 -2.8
1991 -4.8 -3.8 -6.0 -2.0 -2.0
1992 -1.6 -2.5 3.9 0.7 1.8
1993 -0.7 -0.8 0.7 3.2 2.3
1994 -5.5 -5.2 -6.4 -2.6 -6.1
1995 -5.9 -6.5 -10.6 -6.1 -4.6
1996 6.8 4.3 10.3 7.4 5.1
1997 -3.8 -3.2 -6.9 -8.5 -1.4
1998* 7.3 9.3 8.8 6.8 8.2
1999* 0.6 0.1 2.2 -3.0 3.8
2000* 16.1 22.4 12.7 18.6 16.6
2001* 14.0 20.2 12.4 9.4 8.8
2002* 8.2 13.0 5.7 -0.4 16.4
High-Minority Neighborhoods
1988 0.3 9.1 9.7 4.6 6.0
1989 -4.2 3.2 0.3 -6.0 3.4
1990 0.9 -2.2 0.9 -1.0 -2.2
1991 1.2 -0.8 18.6 6.7 5.3
1992 -0.9 -6.8 -17.9 -1.0 -1.6
1993 -5.6 -6.6 -0.6 -2.5 0.8
1994 0.9 -0.1 -4.7 7.5 -1.7
1995 0.9 -1.5 9.8 0.8 0.2
1996 -3.9 -4.7 -3.9 -9.1 2.3
1997 3.6 0.7 4.6 -4.4 0.0
1998* 5.0 7.1 -15.7 5.8 12.2
1999* 1.2 8.2 12.7 12.0 3.6
2000* 6.6 13.6 -3.9 -7.3 7.1
2001* 0.2 9.0 1.1 -9.3 -5.9
2002* 4.3 11.9 1.7 3.8 12.6
 *   This period of time is deemed as the "impact period" in Washington, DC. 
Table 15b. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rates between Washington, DC and Surrounding 
Markets: By Neighborhood Racial Composition
DC - Montgomery DC - Prince Georges DC - Alexandria DC - Arlington DC - Fairfax
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Figure 17a. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rates:
































































DC - Montgomery DC - Prince Georges
Figure 17b. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rates:
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Figure 18a. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:





































































DC - Montgomery DC - Prince Georges DC - Alexandria
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Figure 18b. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:








































































DC - Montgomery DC - Prince Georges DC - Alexandria
DC - Arlington DC - Fairfax
Figure 18c. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:
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Figure 19a. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:






































































DC - Montgomery DC - Prince Georges DC - Alexandria
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Figure 19b. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:





































































DC - Montgomery DC - Prince Georges DC - Alexandria
DC - Arlington DC - Fairfax
Figure 19c. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:
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Figure 20a. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:





































































DC - Montgomery DC - Prince Georges DC - Alexandria
DC - Arlington DC - Fairfax
Figure 20b. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:








































































DC - Montgomery DC - Prince Georges DC - Alexandria
DC - Arlington DC - Fairfax
Figure 20c. Differences in Annual Price Appreciation Rate:
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Although these results provide important information about the magnitude and
sign of the geographic differences in annual rates of appreciation, it is still unclear if the
difference is statistically significant during the pre-intervention or impact period. Next, I
used a simple 2-tailed t-test to test a null hypothesis that the two paired samples have the
same underlying population, that is, the mean difference in amenity-adjusted annual price
appreciation rates between Washington, D.C. and its comparison markets equals zero.
The tests generate p value (probability value or exact significance level) that indicates the
lowest significance level at which the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
As shown in table 16 (column 1), the null hypothesis that the mean differences
between D.C. and its comparison markets during the pre-intervention period are zero
cannot be rejected for all paired samples at 10 percent significance level and for 4 out of 5
pairs at 5 percent significance level. (The exception is D.C. vs. Montgomery, which has a
p value of 0.09. It means that there is a 9% chance for the mean annual rates of
appreciation in D.C. to be equal to those in Montgomery during the pre-intervention
period.) In contrast, except for the D.C./Arlington pair, annual appreciation rates in all
other paired samples during the impact period have very low p values (ranging from 0.01
to 0.03). They indicate that there is only a 1-3% chance for the average appreciation rates
being the same between the pairs. In other words, at both 10% and 5% significance levels,
the mean differences between D.C. and its suburban markets (except for Arlington) are
statistically significantly different from zero during the impact period.
By the same token, I also cannot reject the null hypothesis for all paired samples
during the pre-intervention period when comparing their mean differences for nearly all

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































impact period, the null hypothesis can be rejected for the vast majority of sub-markets
and neighborhoods at the 10% or 5% significance level. (That is, about 31 out of 36 pairs
by sub-market comparisons have a p value of below/at 0.1, and 27 out of 36 pairs have a
probability value below/at 0.05). Even for D.C. vs. Arlington, there are 3 out of 9 pairs by
sub-markets whose mean differences are significantly different from zero at the 10%
level. 
This information provides both the context and solid foundation for a more
rigorous econometric analysis of determining whether the differences are statistically
significant and, more importantly, the extent to which the (positive) geographic
differences in the annual appreciation rates are attributable to the inter-temporal
interruption, i.e., the District first-time homebuyer credit intervention.   
Stage 3: Difference in differences: interrupted time series analysis (ARIMA)
After separating out the potential effects of the observed variables (at the 1st stage)
and unobserved factors (at the 2nd stage) on house prices, the stage is set for the
interrupted time series model (equation 3). This model, also named “intervention model,”
“impact analysis model,” “dynamic regressions,” or “ARIMA model with input series,” is
designed to examine the causality of the District homebuyer credit program (“policy
shock”) for the inter-temporal differences between the pre-1998 series and the post-1998
series of the geographic differences in the annual rates of adjusted price appreciation.    
Table 17 summarizes the results from the interrupted time series analyses of
Washington, D.C., as compared to its five comparison markets, which will serve as the
measure of the overall economic impact of the targeted homebuyer credit program in the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































interrupted time series analysis is also performed for each structure type and also by
neighborhood income and racial composition. Tables 18 through 26 report the results for
the distributional effects. All the interrupted time series models (1,1,1) are carried out
through the conditional least squares estimation method. Chi-square statistics are
generated for the purpose of diagnostics or autocorrelation check for white noise. 
As shown in Table 17, interrupted time series models yield several important
outcomes. First, the parameters of the intervention/input variable are statistically
significant in all the models at 10 percent significance level, with just one exception
(D.C. vs. Arlington). These results indicate that there is indeed a significant impact of the
intervention variable, or the homebuyer credit program, on the house price appreciation in
the District as a whole, even controlling for the effects of both observed price
determinants (such as housing amenities, locations, and neighborhood
developments/events) and unobserved factors. 
Second, these parameters are positive and generally large. Note that the
intervention dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the annual house price difference is
observed in the 1998-2002 period and 0 if observed in the pre-intervention period (1987-
1997). The parameter estimate is therefore interpreted as the net impact of the
intervention on the District’s house prices after comparing both the inter-temporal and
geographic differences in price movements. For example, the parameter of 5.767 means
that, in reference to Montgomery County, the District’s house prices during the impact
period (1998-2002) appreciated at an annual rate of 5.8 percentage points higher than the
house prices during the District’s pre-intervention period. The net impact was an annual

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.1 to Arlington, and 5.6 to Fairfax. 
Third, the chi-square statistics and p values (for the first 6 and 12 lags) indicate
that we cannot reject the no-autocorrelation hypothesis at a 10 percent significance level
in four out of five models (except for the model for D.C. vs. Arlington). This means that
the residuals generally have a white noise (that is, they are uncorrelated) and therefore the
ARIMA models are fully adequate for the difference-in-differences series.         
Tables 18 through 26 show that, in general, the interrupted time series models are
also fully adequate for the difference-in-differences series observed in all nine housing
sub-markets. (Note that five models are performed for each of the nine sub-markets in
question, resulting in a total of 45 models reported in these tables.)  Similar to the overall
net impact as discussed earlier, the net effects or parameter estimates of the homebuyer
credit intervention are positive in nearly all the housing sub-markets examined (i.e., 44
out of 45 models have a positive parameter of the input variable). It means that the policy
shock from the first-time homebuyer credit program has lifted all boats in the District’s
housing markets, no matter what type of the house or where the house is located. 
These positive net effects are NOT, however, uniform across the District’s
housing sub-markets once their magnitude and statistical significance are considered. The
first tier constitutes four types of sub-markets. The District’s moderate-income
neighborhoods and townhouses stand out as the sub-markets that had the strongest
impacts from the District homebuyer credit intervention at 10 percent significance level.
Their intervention parameters are estimated mostly above or around 10 percentage points
(per year), respectively, and are statistically significant in 5 or 4 out of all 5 models
performed. Condominium units and low-income neighborhoods also had a large and
158
generally significant net effect of the intervention, with their parameters either mostly
above 10 or averaged around 6 percentage points, respectively.  
The second-tier sub-markets, in terms of the net effect of the homebuyer credit
“shock,” are the District’s moderate/middle-income neighborhoods and low-minority
(predominately white) neighborhoods. Although significant for most of their interrupted
times series models, their net impacts (parameter estimates) are modest and averaged
about 4-5 percentage points per year.  
The third-tier sub-markets had largely insignificant and relatively small net
effects. They include the single-family detached housing sub-market, high-income
neighborhoods, and to a certain extent high-minority neighborhoods. Their net impacts
averaged about 3 percentage points or so per year.
In summary, by calculating a weighted average of the intervention variable’s
parameter estimates for each category36, Figure 21 illustrates the net economic impact and
distributional effect of the District first-time homebuyer credit program. Clearly, the
income-targeted homeownership tax credit program had a significant and substantial net
impact on the District’s housing market. The overall net impact was 4.9 percentage points
per year in its adjusted price appreciation, relative to its comparison surrounding markets,
over the 1998-2002 impact period. Recall that the annual rate of adjusted price
appreciation in Washington, D.C. was 15.6 percent during the 1998-2002 period, as
shown in Table 12. The overall economic impact of 4.9 percentage points per year means
that, on net, nearly one-third (31.4 percent or 4.9 out of 15.6 percentage points) of the
                                                
36 The weighted average is calculated using the following formula: (W1*M1 + W2*M2 + W3*M3 …) /
(W1 + W2 + W3 …), where W1 and M1 are the weight and estimated mean of the observation 1,
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annual house price appreciation in the District since 1998 is independently caused by the
targeted first-time homebuyer credit program. In the absence of the homebuyer
intervention, the District would have grown at a rate of 10.7 percentage points per year,
due to the market forces and other factors, a rate consistent with the overall trend in other
parts of the Washington metropolitan area over the last five years,37 as well as historical
differences between Washington, D.C. and its surrounding markets prior to 1998. 
On the other hand, the targeted homeownership credit program as implemented in
the District of Columbia had a positive, largely significant, but differing effect on various
housing sub-markets and neighborhoods. The biggest winners are the moderate-minority
neighborhoods, townhouse and condominium sub-markets, as well as low-income
neighborhoods. Their house prices’ net gains attributed solely to the intervention reached
astonishing 11.3, 9.2, 7.3, and 5.7 percentage points each year, respectively, over the last
five years. A modest net gain of about 4.4 percentage points per year was also seen in the
moderate-income and low-minority neighborhoods. The smallest winners (not “losers”)
are single-family detached housing sub-market, high-income neighborhoods, and
somewhat unexpectedly high-minority neighborhoods. Their net gains in the adjusted
house price appreciation were 1.7, 3.1, and 4 percentage points per year, respectively,
during the impact period. 
In short, both the overall impact and distributional effects on house prices have
met all the prior expectations as discussed in the earlier parts of the paper, with an
exception of the high-minority neighborhoods. Nevertheless, it may not be too surprising
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that the high-minority neighborhoods turn out not to be a big beneficiary of the
intervention. After all, the District first-time homebuyer credit program directly targets
incomes, rather than race or neighborhood. 
Verification, Robustness Check, and Uniqueness of the D.C. Targeted Homebuyer
Tax Credit
As reported above, the D.C. homebuyer credit program had a substantial impact
and distributional effect on amenity-adjusted house prices: The intervention could explain
as much as 4.9 percentage points per year in house price appreciation in the District, or
roughly $7,000 a year after 1997. Larger effects of the intervention on house prices are
observed in low/moderate-income and moderate-income neighborhoods, as compared to
high-income and predominantly white neighborhoods. The lower-priced townhouses/
condos also experienced a better appreciation than single-family detached units.
Nevertheless, a critical issue remains. The substantial impact on house prices appears to
be unexplainable by a standard theory of public economics. Simply speaking, the theory
states that the value (effect) of a public subsidy has to be bounded by the cost of the
subsidy itself. In the case of the D.C. homebuyer tax credit, the impact is supposed to be
no more than the tax credit of up to $5,000 provided per unit. Addressing this issue
requires three types of additional information:
(1) Because the three-stage econometric analyses as reported in the above
subsections rely on the coefficient of time (year dummies) to come up with the rates of
house price appreciation, a verification of such a substantial impact on house prices using
                                                                                                                                                
37 Over the 1998-2002 period, the annual appreciation rate was 10.9 percent in Montgomery County, 6.7
percent in Prince George’s, 12.1 percent in Alexandria, 13.8 percent in Arlington, 10.4 percent in Fairfax.
See appendix tables 11 through 15. 
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a different research methodology is critical and warranted. (2) Even though I have
controlled for as many as possible of both observed and unobserved factors in the house
price analyses, there still might be other factors contributing to the enormous house price
growth in the District around or during the impact period of 1998-2002. Thus, a
robustness check and analysis is necessary to determine the conclusiveness of the
reported key results. (3) If the empirical results are largely verified and proven to be at
least mainly attributable to the D.C. homebuyer tax credit, how could the inconsistency
between such a substantial impact and the standard economic theory be explained? This
subsection provides the research outcomes from my investigations of these concerns.
Verifications: Median house price movements in the District and comparison markets 
The principal methodology of verifications is to compare the annual appreciation
rates of median house price, as well as median house price per square foot, observed in
the District with those observed in its comparison markets. Since the median house prices
are notable for their lack of controls for sample variations that may be caused by different
unit size, housing age, and other housing characteristics in different samples (or different
times), I used not only the median house price but also the median house price per square
foot in the comparisons. Obviously, the median price per square foot is preferable in that
it at least contains controls for one of the most important physical characteristics of
housing units, namely, median unit size. 
I used three geographic samples to carry out these comparisons for verification
purposes. To be consistent with the geographic sample used in the above subsections for
the three-stage estimations, the first comparison for verifications is made between the
District and its five surrounding suburban counties/cities. 
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The second comparison for verifications is made between the District and
Baltimore City, Maryland. In addition to the two price measures—appreciation rates of
median house prices and median price per square foot—I also added amenity-adjusted
house price appreciation rates for this comparison. The purpose of this central city
comparison is to verify that the District’s extraordinary house price performance during
the impact period of 1998-2002 was indeed attributable mainly, if not solely, to the D.C.
homebuyer tax credit, rather than other central-city-related factors. Since there seemed to
be a development of the so-called “going back to the city” movement in the United States
starting in the mid-1990s, one may suspect that the relatively explosive house price
growth during 1998-2002 was not unique to Washington, D.C., but to other similar
central cities as well. Baltimore was selected for the central city comparison because it is
the only other major central city that has similar demographic and housing market
characteristics to the District and is also geographically close. Moreover, the District’s
housing and labor markets are much more closely connected with Baltimore than with
any other central cities in the country. In fact, the District of Columbia and Baltimore are
often clustered together by the Census Bureau as “Baltimore-Washington, DC CMSA.”
The third type of comparison for verifications is carried out through comparing
annual appreciation rates of both the median house price and median price per square foot
for the census tracts located at both sides of the D.C.-Maryland border. In other words,
median house prices (and median price per square foot) observed in the D.C. tracts
neighboring Montgomery County are compared to the median prices in Montgomery's
tracts neighboring D.C. to see whether and to what extent they are different before and
after the D.C. homebuyer tax credit took effect. The same comparison is also done for the
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tracts located on the District side and Princes George’s County side. Comparing the
neighboring areas across a state, county, or city border is a popular and well-documented
research method among labor economists, although it is rarely seen in the housing
literature38. In relation to this study, the cross-D.C./Maryland-border comparison method
is used in conjunction with the difference-in-differences approach so that the substantial
impact and distributional effect as reported from the three-stage estimations (using
county/city level data) may be verified. There are three major rationales for my use of this
method at the census tract level. 
First, although the tracts are located in different jurisdictions, being adjacent to
each other means that they are usually homogenous or similar in terms of neighborhood
demographics, as well as economic, environmental, and housing characteristics39. The
homogeneity or similarity in turn exhausts, or at least substantially isolates, the potential
influences of these factors on house price appreciation differentials for these
neighborhoods. In fact, many neighboring tracts across the D.C.-Maryland border are in
integral neighborhoods that are nearly undistinguishable even to a typical native, except
perhaps for the boundary and somewhat older units on the D.C. side. For instance, the
                                                
38 This method (for verifications) was suggested to this author by Dr. Robert Schwab of the University of
Maryland, and later by Anthony Pennington-Cross of the Office of Federal housing Enterprise Oversight
and Charles Capone of the Congressional Budget Office at the American Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association Mid-Year Policy Conference on May 28, 2003. Coincidentally, at the conference was a paper
presented by Andreas Lehnert of the Federal Reserve Board (co-authored with Karen Pence) that used a
similar method to estimate the impact of foreclosure laws on mortgage foreclosures and house prices among
different states. This paper represents an exception for a housing-related study to employ such a cross-
border comparison approach.
39 The traits of their housing stocks may vary to some extent, however, if some of them belong to a central
city while others are located in suburbs. In particular, one would expect that houses in a central city are
older than those in its suburban areas. However, the literature has well documented that, holding other
factors constant, older homes generally appreciate at smaller rates than the newer ones. Therefore, this
variation, if true in this case, would not have any adverse effect on the cross-border approach employed in
this subsection.
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areas on the D.C. side of Western Avenue between Wisconsin and Connecticut avenues is
called Chevy Chase (Washington, DC) while the Maryland side is also called Chevy
Chase (Maryland). In contrast, the comparisons in house prices between neighboring
counties/cities as a whole are more likely to encounter the heterogeneity and thus
aggregation problems, especially if these counties or cities are large and vastly diverse. 
The second rationale of using the cross-border tract comparison approach is that
neighboring each other eliminates all possible impact of locational factors on house price
movements over time for these tracts. In general, location has three features that may
influence house prices: (1) Locational accessibility to work, transportation systems,
shopping and recreation centers, and other locational amenities, (2) location- and/or
jurisdiction-based public services such as schools and police, and (3) jurisdiction-specific
events or the exogenous shocks that affect house prices in the tracts affiliated with one
jurisdiction but not those belonging to another jurisdiction. Obviously, comparing the
neighboring tracts on two sides of the D.C.-Maryland border should exhaust any potential
impact of locational accessibility on house prices for these tracts. And this comparison as
measured by the inter-temporal difference in geographic differences would also partial
out the effect of location/jurisdiction-based public services on house prices over time.
Therefore, what remains would be only the impact of the exogenous shocks, if any, that
are unique to just one (or some) jurisdiction and not to others. Over the period of 1998-
2002, the D.C. First-Time Homebuyer Credit is deemed as a large shock; this shock
could, of course, affect house prices in the census tracts only on the D.C. side and not on
the Maryland side.
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The third reason of comparing the tracts across the D.C./Maryland border, rather
than the D.C./Virginia border, is that a river is widely recognized as an important divider
of the economic and social integration for the areas neighboring it. While Maryland
suburbs (Montgomery and Princes George’s counties) are separated from the District only
through streets (such as Western and Eastern avenues), Virginia suburbs and the District
are divided by the Potomac River.
Now, I turn to the empirical research results from these verifications. Using the
transaction-assessment database (Win2Data), my calculations yield a number of
important outcomes. Table 27 shows that the annual appreciation rates of median house
prices were not much different between the District and its five surrounding markets prior
to the D.C. homebuyer credit intervention: 3.6 percent per year in the District versus 3.3
percent (by weighted average) in the District’s five surrounding suburban markets.
During the impact period of 1998-2002, however, median house prices rose by 12 percent
per year in the District, compared to merely 6.4 percent in the surrounding markets. Thus,
based on these geographic differences, the inter-temporal difference between the impact
and pre-intervention periods is found to be 5.3 percentage points per year. When adjusted
to the median unit size, the house prices exhibit similar patterns overall but rose slightly
higher in both D.C. and surrounding markets during the impact period. These led to a
downward adjustment for the program’s net impact or difference in differences in median
house price per square foot to about 4.5 percentage point per year. These key results are
also depicted in Figure 22.
Table 28 reports the verification results from the comparisons made between














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that, between 1988 and 1997, District homes appreciated at a rate of 3.6 percent in
median sales price, 3.2 percent in median price per square foot, and 2.1 percent in
amenity-adjusted price, all of which were considerably higher than those for Baltimore
(with 1.9 percent, 2 percent, and 2 percent, respectively). In contrast, during the impact
period (1998-2002), house prices in the District increased at a substantially and
consistently higher rate than those in Baltimore, no matter which price measure is
employed. The annual appreciation rates for the District were at 12 percent in terms of
median house price, 13.6 percent in median price per square foot, and 15.6 percent in
amenity-adjusted price; at the same time, they were only 6.9 percent, 6.9 percent, and
10.2 percent for Baltimore, respectively. The inter-temporal difference in these
geographic differences is therefore found to be 3.4 percentage points per year as measured
by median house price and 5.5 percentage points in median price per square foot. It is
further estimated at 5.3 percentage points per year, using an amenity-adjusted house price
approach (which is consistent with the method reported in the earlier subsections). Again,
these important results are also illustrated in a chart as well (Figure 23).  
Before reporting the empirical results from house price comparisons made
between the census tracts adjacent to each other on the D.C./Maryland border, I first
examined the 1990 Census data to determine the homogeneity or similarity of these
neighborhoods. The data show that these tracts are indeed similar to each other as
measured by their income and racial compositions (see appendix Table 16). On average
(or by median), both census tracts neighboring the border for D.C./Prince George’s
County (Maryland) are occupied predominately by low-income families (below 80





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































both sides of the D.C./Montgomery County border, the neighborhoods feature high
incomes (over 120 percent of the area median income) and few minorities (about or
below 30 percent). As for housing traits, consistent with earlier expectations, houses on
the D.C. side are somewhat older than the houses on the Maryland side. The implication
is clear: Under normal market conditions or without significant shocks on housing
demand/supply, houses on the D.C. side of the border should exhibit a somewhat smaller
pace of price appreciation than houses on the other side.  
The findings from the cross-border tract comparisons are reported in tables 29 and
30, with key information depicted in figures 24a and 24b. These findings indicate that,
during the pre-intervention period of 1988-1997, the median house prices of the D.C.
tracts adjacent to the Prince George’s border appreciated at a rate of 1.7 percent per year,
or 1.5 percentage points less than the appreciation rate (3.2 percent) observed in
neighboring Prince George’s tracts. Since the first full year (1998) of the D.C. homebuyer
credit program, the trend was reversed substantially: The D.C. tracts rose at a rate of 7.3
percent per year, or 2.5 percentage points higher than the appreciation rate (4.8 percent)
observed on the other side of the border. The difference in differences (as measured by
median house price appreciation) was therefore 4 percentage points per year, which
should attribute to the exogenous shock from the D.C. homeownership tax credit.
Adjusting to the size of housing units sold, the difference in differences of price
appreciation (as measured by the median house price per square foot) was found to be 5.3
percentage points per year. This upward adjustment reflects the fact that the homes sold
on the D.C. side of the border since 1998 were generally smaller in size than the homes

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   






















   
   

































   
   






















   
   


































   






















   















































   
   























   
   


















   
   


































   
   

















   
   













   
   





































































































































































































































































Figure 24a. Annual Rates of Median House Price Appreciation in the Neighboring
Census Tracts: Washington, DC vs. Neighboring Maryland Suburbs


























































Figure 24b. Annual Appreciation Rates of Median House Price Per Square Foot in
the Neighboring Census Tracts: DC vs. Neighboring Maryland Suburbs
Pre-Intervention (1988 - 1997) Impact Period (1998-2002)
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The results also show that, although the homes neighboring the D.C./Montgomery
County border experienced better appreciation than their counterparts neighboring the
D.C./Prince George’s border, the observed geographic differences in appreciation rates
for the former were somewhat smaller than the latter. The appreciation rate of median
house prices on the D.C. side of the D.C./Montgomery border was 1.4 percentage points
per year less than those on the Montgomery side over the pre-intervention period (2.9
percent on the D.C. side vs. 4.3 percent on Montgomery side). It was 2.3 percentage
points higher during the impact period (12.1 vs. 9.9 percent). This led to the difference in
differences, in terms of median price appreciation, of 3.6 percentage points per year.
When adjusted to unit size, the tax credit program’s net impact on the homes sold on the
D.C. side of the D.C./Montgomery border (or difference in differences as expressed by
median price per square foot) was found to be 3 percentage points per year.
Are these results from the cross-border comparisons statistically significant? A 2-
tailed t-test is therefore performed to identify if the mean difference in median price
appreciation rates (per square foot) between the census tracts on the D.C. side and those
on the Maryland side is significantly different from zero. The t-test results indicate that
there is only a 2% probability (p value=0.02) that the median price appreciation rates
would, on average, be the same across the D.C./P.G. border during the impact period. In
contrast, this paired sample has a p value of 0.6 during the pre-intervention period. These
test results suggest that the average appreciation rate of median house prices (per square
foot) on the D.C. side was not significantly different from those on the PG side during the
pre-intervention period but was statistically different during the impact period at both
10% and 5% significance levels. On the other hand, according to the t-test, the probability
177
values for the paired samples across the D.C./Montgomery border are found to be 0.55
and 0.51 for the pre-intervention and impact periods, respectively. Thus, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the mean difference in median price appreciation rates was
statistically insignificant across the D.C./Montgomery border, regardless of pre-
intervention or impact period. Given the fact that the census tracts are low-income across
the D.C./P.G. border and high-income across the D.C./Montgomery border, the above test
results are therefore consistent with the outcomes from the 3-stage estimations in terms of
statistical significance. 
To recap, using the appreciation rates of median house price, median price per
square foot, and amenity-adjusted price, I have compared the District of Columbia with
its five surrounding suburbs and Baltimore City for the pre-intervention and impact
periods. The results indicate that the difference in differences for all these price measures
was concentrated in a range of 4.5 to 5.5 percentage points per year40. Moreover, I have
compared the census tracts across the D.C./Maryland border, finding that, for homes
located in the low-income and high-minority census tracts along the D.C./Prince George’s
border, the D.C. homebuyer credit program significantly raised the median sales price per
square foot by 5.3 percentage points per year for those on the D.C. side. For D.C. homes
in the wealthy and predominately white neighborhoods adjacent to the D.C./Montgomery
border, the tax credit’s net impact on their median prices per square foot was also positive
but smaller and statistically insignificant, namely, 3 percentage points per year. In
summary, no matter what price measures or geographic samples were employed, these
                                                
40 The exception was found when comparing D.C. with Baltimore in terms of the median house price
differential, which is observed at a slightly lower rate or 3.4 percentage points per year.
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findings point to the same conclusion: they are consistent with and nearly identical to the
empirical outcomes obtained through the three-stage intervention analyses reported in
previous subsections. In other words, I have indeed verified that the overall impact on
amenity-adjusted house prices for Washington, D.C. was about 4.9 percentage points per
year and the larger distributional effects were found in townhouse/condo sub-markets and
distressed neighborhoods (particularly 5.7 percentage points per year for low-income
tracts compared to 3.1 points for high-income tracts). 
Robustness check: Were there still other factors in play?
Although I have controlled for many observed and unobserved factors affecting
house prices, a critical question still must be investigated further: Was the substantial
price increase during the impact period (1998-2002) caused exclusively by the D.C.
homebuyer credit program? This subsection seeks to address this question by discussing
other potential factors that might be perceived as contributing to the substantial impact on
house prices. 
The “Williams graduate effect.” Possible contributing factors to house price
growth during the impact period include a political event that took place in the late 1990s.
After a decade of government mismanagement and financial bankruptcy in the District,
Anthony Williams won a mayoral election and took office in early 1999. The new mayor
and his manager-type administration are perceived by many as a positive force for
consumer/investor confidence and thereby the District’s real estate markets. The potential
impact of this political event might be two-fold: One is an immediate impact on house
prices in late 1998 and 1999, while the other is a gradual effect that is more likely to
affect house prices in more recent years. Although this study concludes that the
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immediate impact of Williams’ election has to be ruled out empirically (as discussed later
in this subsection), it is very likely that its gradual effect may have played a role in the
District’s housing boom in most recent years.  
Indeed, on one hand, the Williams administration remained untested in its early
years (1999 or so), so that any immediate impact on such long-term investment assets as
housing is likely to be minimal and insignificant. On the other hand, the new mayor and
his city government have gradually but visibly improved government services and
financial stability over time, with the accomplishments more visible in most recent years
(after 2000). While no concrete evidence can be gathered to determine what, if any, effect
this political change had on the market, the fact that Williams was easily re-elected in
2002 is certainly indicative of D.C. residents’ approval of and investors’ confidence in his
administration and thus an overall improvement of the city’s image. This suggests that the
gradual effect of the Williams administration on house prices cannot be completely ruled
out 41.  
Public-private investments and DC Financial Control Board. A number of other unique
factors are also likely to have somehow contributed to District house price growth since
the homebuyer credit became available. They include large-scale investments undertaken
by private-public partnerships and other federal government interventions, in particular,
the establishment of the D.C. Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance
Authority (“Financial Control Board”) that was chaired by Andrew F. Brimmer and later
Alice M. Rivlin. Established in the summer of 1995, the D.C. Financial Control Board
                                                
41 The “Williams (gradual) effect” was first suggested by Robert Lang of the Metropolitan Research
Institute at Virginia Tech, Robert Nelson and Steve Fetter of the University of Maryland at College Park.
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finally accomplished all its goals pre-set by Congress and thus suspended its operations
on September 30, 2001. The work done by this board may have had a positive impact on
the city’s image, overall livability, and hence real estate investment activities.  
The most important large-scale investment by private-public partnerships that may
have affected the District housing market when the homebuyer credit was in effect is
perhaps the “Howard University/LeDroit Park Homeownership Initiative.” This large-
scale community revitalization initiative was launched by Howard University and Fannie
Mae/Fannie Mae Foundation in 1997, in partnership with the city government, a number
of banks, and other private companies. With an investment of $25 million from Fannie
Mae (and concept design by the Fannie Mae Foundation), the partnership leveraged the
initial investment amount to over $100 million by December 2000. The initiative
completed a series of well-designed and comprehensive residential and commercial
rehabilitation, new construction, streetscape improvements, development financing,
mortgage loan assistance, and other revitalization and investment activities in a distressed
low-income neighborhood, LeDroit Park. Such a large-scale place-based investment
made an important difference in house price performance: median house prices in the
LeDroit Park neighborhood increased by 249 percent from $68,000 in 1987 to $239,000
in 2002. Therefore, LeDroit Park is ranked as one of the top three neighborhoods in best
price appreciation in the District of Columbia (see supplemental Table 2b in this paper).   
Factors deemed less significant for the uniqueness of D.C. price appreciation. These
factors include a potential immediate impact of new Mayor Anthony Williams, the role of
market forces, the maturity of the D.C. housing market, and the “speculators.”
181
Although there is a strong likelihood of a “Williams gradual effect” as discussed
earlier,  the empirical evidence from my robustness check largely rules out the possibility
that, instead of the homebuyer credit program, the new-mayor phenomenon might be a
major contributor to the significantly higher rates of price appreciation in the District than
in its surrounding markets since 1998. 
First, if the new mayor were the real reason, one should expect a substantial
immediate impact on District house price appreciation relative to comparison markets in
1999. However, the findings from this study indicate otherwise. As shown in Table 23
and figures 6a and 6b, precisely in 1999, the difference in the annual price appreciation
rate between Washington, D.C., and surrounding markets reached the lowest level,
though positive, among the last five years (1998-2002). In contrast, a spike occurred not
in 1999 but in 1998, the first full year of the homebuyer credit intervention but the year
before the new mayor took office.
Second, I ran a sensitivity analysis that includes the new mayor as another “input”
variable, in addition to the homebuyer credit intervention, in the ARIMA models (or the
third stage estimations) to verify the sensitivity of the impact of the homebuyer credit
program after controlling for the new mayor’s potential effects, or vice versa. The results
indicate that an addition of a dummy variable for the election of Anthony Williams to the
ARIMA models increases the parameter estimates for the homebuyer credit intervention.
Moreover, the new D.C. mayor dummy is statistically insignificant in all models that
compare the District with its five surrounding markets. Therefore, I conclude that the
political event is not a statistically significant factor that may explain the District’s faster
growth of house price appreciation than the price growth in its comparison surrounding
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markets from 1998 through 2002. 
Third, one may argue that even if Anthony Williams officially took office in early
1999, the anticipation of his election might have already developed in 1998 and therefore
excited the housing market in that year. A careful news search leads me to conclude that
the potential impact of this anticipation could not have materialized for about three-
quarters of 1998. The timetable of Williams’ election is as follows: In February 1998,
Williams announced that he would not run for mayor. In June he made a last-minute entry
into the race soon after then-Mayor Marion Barry announced his intention not to seek re-
election. On September 15, Williams won the Democratic primary. On November 3,
1998, he defeated Republican candidate Carol Schwartz in the general mayoral election.
He then took office in January 1999. 
It is clear that, even if an anticipation of his election developed in 1998, it would
have to trace back to either November 3 or September 15 at the earliest. Between his
announcement in June and his victory in the primary on September 15, his chance to win
was extremely unclear to the general public and in fact was regarded by commentators as
very low. His disadvantages included the fact that he had never run for political office in
the city. He was also a relative newcomer to the city. Further, the three leading candidates
(Kevin Chavous, Harold Brazil, and especially Jack Evans) had already set a District
record for fund-raising in June when Williams was just starting his fund-raising from the
ground (Woodlee 1998). More deadly, perhaps, was the fact that Williams was a
completely new face to most residents. His low name recognition compared to several
leading candidates was evident in a Washington Post poll conducted in late May and early
June, which showed that “about 70 percent of District resident do not know much about
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Anthony Williams or have no opinion about him” (Vise 1998).    
In an effort to make sure whether the possible anticipation effect of Williams was
true or not, I conducted another sensitivity analysis assuming that the anticipation of his
election started in June/July 1998. The analysis uses a 6-month interval instead of a 12-
month. I found that the semiannual rate of house price appreciation was 8.14 percent and
–0.06 percent for the first half of 1998 and second half of 1998, respectively. Therefore, I
conclude that, despite a possible gradual effect, a potential immediate effect and
anticipation effect of Anthony Williams on the District’s house prices appear to be less
significant. In other words, the overall Williams effect is very likely a long-term factor for
D.C. prices but was not a major contributor to the relatively higher rate of price
appreciation observed during the 1998-2002 period when the D.C. homebuyer credit
program was in effect.  
One may suspect that the house price increase in Washington, D.C., since 1998 is
due largely to the same market forces of the housing boom as seen elsewhere, such as low
unemployment rates and a strong economy in the late 1990s, as well as historically low
interest rates in the early 2000s. The problem with this argument is that it fails to explain
the relative rapidness or sudden explosiveness of the adjusted house price appreciation in
Washington, D.C., and not elsewhere in the same metro area. If those market forces were
the major reason behind the explosive growth in District house price appreciation, one
should expect to see an upward but similar trend on house prices in both the District and
its surrounding areas. However, this is not the case as shown by the empirical results
reported in this paper. Because the post-1998 differences in house price appreciation rates
between the District and its surrounding markets are consistently and substantially larger
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than their pre-1998 differences, one has to conclude that there must be something in the
District beyond the “usual suspects” that is responsible for these differences. Put
differently, it is something unique, not the normal market forces, that has directly
impacted the District’s housing demand and fundamentally changed the dynamics there
more so than other markets since 1998. Therefore, the D.C. homebuyer credit has to be
the main answer. 
Moreover, the low mortgage rates affect the housing markets in all the parts of the
region and the entire country. And such potential factors as a booming local economy,
increasing income, and declining unemployment rates were even more evident in the
suburban areas than in the District in the late 1990s and at present. For example, Fairfax
County (along with Loudon County) has recently emerged as one of the new centers of
the so-called “new economy” featuring information technology. Montgomery County is
one of the indisputable biotech centers in the country. As a result, these two counties had
incredibly lower unemployment rates and a faster growth of household income than
Washington, D.C., throughout the 1998-2002 period. Hence, if these market forces were
the real factors that may lead to a relatively higher rate of house price appreciation in one
jurisdiction than another, these two suburban markets should have outpaced the District
in their house price appreciation in the 1998-2002 period, an outcome certainly not
supported by any empirical evidence.
One may also attribute the relatively rapid growth in the District’s house prices to
the maturity of the District housing market itself, which may stem from such market traits
as the land use constraints and distorted market value of the houses (especially condos) in
the District prior to 1998. However, this line of thinking fails to explain the
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unprecedented movements in District house prices since 1998. Since these market traits
are always there and not suddenly coming to life in recent years, why do they become so
powerful starting in 1998? Even if these market traits might have helped the maturity of
the District housing market, they still cannot explain away the critical roles of the
homebuyer credit intervention as the catalyst and continuing force of the District’s
housing boom. Simply put, it cannot be a coincidence that 1998 marked the turning point
for Washington, D.C., just by chance, at and after which the District’s house prices
dramatically changed their pattern from under-performing to substantially outperforming
all the surrounding markets. In addition, the land use constraints as well as the distorted
condo values prior to 1998 are not unique to Washington, D.C. They can be seen almost
everywhere in the metropolitan area, such as in Montgomery County and Alexandria City.
Why, then, didn’t they also drive the post-1998 house prices in these markets with a pace
of appreciation similar to the District?
One may even suspect that the “speculators” who buy houses and then rent them
out in order to take advantage of the tax credits might have played a role in the house
price run-up in the District after the homebuyer credit program took effect. My
assessment is that the impact of the speculators, if any, is insignificant. The reasons are
simple: First, these activities are illegal and constitute tax fraud. Second, a rational
investor could easily realize that the potential costs (both legal and financial) of engaging
in these types of illegal transactions substantially outweigh the tax benefits of up to
$5,000 from the IRS in the form of first-time homebuyer credits and even the potential
price appreciation of the property. Third, these speculators are more likely to be high-
income individuals or those who are financially capable of investing assets in addition to
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maintaining their own houses. However, the IRS data indicate that the vast majority of
the credit claimants were low/moderate-income households rather than wealthy ones.
Therefore, even if there were some wealthy investors acting as speculators, the number of
such opportunists should be too small to have a significant impact.  
In summary, there are a number of perceived factors that actually cannot be
deemed responsible for the uniqueness of D.C. price movement between 1998 and 2002.
However, there appeared to be some valid contributors other than the D.C. homebuyer
credit. This information suggests that, on one hand, the D.C. First-Time Homebuyer
Credit program may not be the exclusive or sole force that caused the District’s
substantially higher growth rate of house prices than its comparison suburban markets
(e.g., 4.9 percentage points higher than the comparison suburban markets). On the other
hand, the impacts of other contributors (including “Williams gradual effect,” large-scale
investments by private-public partnerships, and the D.C. Financial Control Board)
appeared to be limited in scope, duration, magnitude, or direct connection to
homeownership and housing demand. Therefore, it is perhaps safe to conclude that the
relatively higher rates of price appreciation for the District as a whole and larger price
effects on distressed neighborhoods and condo/townhouse sub-markets should be largely,
but not exclusively, attributable to the D.C. homebuyer credit program. 
Unique features of the D.C. first-time homebuyer credit: explaining the inconsistency
with the standard economic theory
A standard theory of public economics concerning subsidies states that the actual
value of a government subsidy of consumption of various commodities is worth no more
than the cost of the subsidy itself. This theory is widely recognized and discussed in the
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literature of microeconomics, public finance, and urban economics. For instance, in the
context of equivalent variation, Katz and Rosen (1994) provide an excellent illustration of
this theory using housing subsidy as the example. For simplicity, consider Peter, who has
a fixed income that he spends on housing and a composite of all other goods. Peter’s
housing consumption is measured on the horizontal axis and the consumption of all other
goods on the vertical, as shown in the diagram below. His budget constraint is line B1
(distance between the point d and y) and he maximizes his utility at the point e1. Suppose
that the government provides a subsidy on housing at a certain percentage rate, the
subsidy changes his budget constraint to line B2 (distance between d and g) and his most
preferred bundle (of consuming housing and other goods) at e2.  Thus, the associated
distance between budget constraints B1 and B2 is the line connecting point e2 and y,
representing the actual outlay or cost of the public subsidy. Clearly, with the housing
subsidy Peter is better off at e2 than he was at e1. 
Nevertheless, if the subsidy takes the form of direct income transfer (rather than
in-kind housing subsidy), it would shift B1 outward in a parallel fashion to the budget
constraint B3 or the line connecting f and z, which is tangent to indifference curve U2 such
that Peter could still enjoy the same level of utilities as with the housing subsidy. In this
case, however, the actual cost of the income transfer—the so-called “equivalent
variation” —is only the distance between budget constraints B1 and B3, or the line
connecting the point r and y. Therefore, the value or effect of the housing subsidy to the
recipient (measured by the dollars of equivalent variation or distance between r and y) is
less than the cost of the subsidy (measured by the actual outlay of the government’s
housing subsidy or distance between e2 and y).   
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the homebuyer credit program explains as much as a 4.9-percent house price increase, or
roughly $7,000, per year per unit during the impact period. An inconsistency apparently
exists between the standard economic model and what was actually observed and
estimated in the case of the D.C. homebuyer tax credit. 
A careful analysis of the credit program’s dynamics shows that the inconsistency
is largely caused by a number of unique features of the D.C. homebuyer tax credit that
were either built in the design or emerged from the practice. Many of these features are
not captured in the standard theory of public economics. In other words, a number of
assumptions, which are the underlying foundations of the standard subsidy theory, are no
longer held in the case of the D.C. First-Time Homebuyer Credit program. At least two
important assumptions matter a great deal for comparing the D.C. homebuyer credit with
the standard theory. First, the standard subsidy theory assumes that a public subsidy is
typically provided to subsidize consumption of a commodity (rental housing, food, etc.).
Not surprisingly, the most cited examples in the case of housing subsidies concern the
effect of public housing (for producer subsidy) or Section 8 vouchers (for tenant subsidy).
Second, the standard subsidy model also explicitly assumes that there are no market
“imperfections,” that is, the market is operating efficiently. For instance, individuals or
firms are all price-takers rather than price-makers. There are no externalities or
asymmetric information. And there is a market (or sub-market) for each and every
commodity (or segment of the commodity), and the entry into the market is not blocked.
However, these two assumptions are not held in the case of D.C. homebuyer credit
program. 
Investment subsidy vs. consumption subsidy. Regardless of whether they are place-based
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subsidies (such as public housing) or tenant-based subsidies (such as Section 8 vouchers),
recipients of these public subsidies are subsidized only for their renting or housing
consumption. In contrast, a homebuyer or homeowner receiving a public subsidy in the
form of a homeownership tax credit or tax deduction is actually subsidized for not only
housing consumption but more importantly housing investment or wealth creation. In
other words, the critical difference between a rental housing subsidy and homeownership
subsidy is that the former only subsidizes consumption with an effect explainable by the
above-mentioned subsidy theory. However, subsidizing purchase of owner-occupied
housing units has a dramatically different dynamic and effect: It, in fact, helps jump-start
the investment of the most important vehicle of wealth creation in the United States—
homeownership. Owner-occupied housing is both a commodity for consumption and a
capital asset that can appreciate over time to build home equity wealth. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the consumption-based standard subsidy model may not explain the
substantial effect observed from the D.C. homebuyer tax credit, which involves wealth
creation or investment subsidization.
There are several specific reasons why an investment in homeownership, using
one’s own funds or through public subsidies, may have an extraordinary return that could
be larger than the cost of the subsidies or own funds themselves: (1) The return to an
investment on homeownership (subsidized or otherwise) can be more than the return to
the funds invested out of pocket or from subsidy. For instance, a homebuyer who puts
down 5 percent or $5,000 (from homebuyer subsidy, savings, or gifts) for a $100,000
home typically enjoys the return that would come from appreciation of the entire
$100,000 home, rather than just a portion (5 percent) of the home. The ability of
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leveraging small initial funds for a large amount of private funds (in the form of  a
mortgage) is one of the key distinctive features of investing and returning in housing,
compared to other financial instruments such as stocks and bonds or mere housing
consumption. (2) The return to investment on an owner-occupied housing unit is partly
determined by the present discounted value of replacement costs for producing an
identical or similar unit. In the U.S., the key components of replacement costs including
labor, land, and building materials have generally seen a substantial rise over time. 
(3) The owner-occupied housing demand has been fueled by income growth and
population growth (especially rapid immigration) in the last few decades. The housing
market is, however, widely recognized for its slow adjustment in supply in general, in the
central cities in particular. New construction, rehabilitation, and even conversion of rental
units to owner units are typically expensive and take a long time to bring the housing to
market. Also, the existing dwellings are well known for their slow deterioration over
time. As a result, housing supply is inelastic for relatively long periods of time
(O’Sullivan 2000). Thus, the increasing demand met with usually lagging supply drives
up house prices or the return to homeownership. (4) Inflation is another factor explaining
the larger return to a relatively smaller investment on owner-occupied housing. Rising
inflation rates push up interest rates, including homeowner’s mortgage interest costs, and
lead to large nominal capital gains on the houses (Poterba 1984). Therefore, the
combination of all or some of these factors makes possible, at least theoretically, a larger
return to homeownership realized through a smaller fund of public subsidy and/or own
investment.    
Plenty of empirical evidence supports this concept. In Section I, which discusses
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homeownership as the best investment vehicle of wealth creation, I cited recent data
indicating that a family that put $10,000 down on a $100,000 home in 1990 would clear
about $67,000 (or 6.7 times the initial funds) in equity wealth today if the home
appreciated at the national rate. My personal experience is another perfect example:
Using about $4,000 from savings and $7,000 from a subsidy provided by the Fannie Mae
Foundation (through an “employer-assisted-housing” program), I purchased a one-
bedroom condo priced at  $116,000 in North Bethesda, Maryland, in September 2001 for
homeownership. As of July 2003, the condo has a market value of about $190,000. Thus,
in less than two years, the $7,000 subsidy from my employer has generated a return of
about $47,000 (i.e., seven-elevenths of the $74,000 in home equity growth). 
Furthermore, I would like to highlight an important empirical work in the case of
mortgage interest deductions to illustrate that tax subsidies for owner-occupied housing
can have returns or effects on house prices that are larger than the cost of the subsidies,
even on an annual basis. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that there were
about 17.4 million tax returns claiming $7 billion in home mortgage interest deductions
in the United States in 1979. Thus, the cost of the homeownership subsidy, in the form of
mortgage interest tax deductions, was only about $405 per tax filer in 1979 (the earliest
year one can trace back in the Committee’s database). On the other hand, in his classic
essay titled “Tax Subsidies to Owner-Occupied Housing: An Asset-Market Approach”
(Poterba 1984), James Poterba estimates that the tax subsidy for mortgage interest
deductibility, in tandem with rising inflation rates, could explain most of the 30-percent
increase in real prices of housing structures during the 1970s. My calculations indicate
that the 30-percent increase in real terms is equivalent to an annual price increase of about
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$1,392 and $1,368 (in 1979 dollars) per year for new and existing single-family homes,
respectively, during the 1970s42.  Clearly, the effect of the tax subsidy for mortgage
interest tax deduction on house prices ($1,368 to $1,392 per unit) was more than three
times the cost of the subsidy itself ($405 per tax filer) in 1979 or any other year of the
1970s. 
Therefore, from both empirical and theoretic perspectives, it wouldn’t be a
surprise to see that the D.C. First-Time Homebuyer Credit (up to $5,000) was the major
contributor to the 4.9-percent (roughly $7,000) increase in house prices per year during
the impact period. A main reason is that this tax subsidy helps not only housing
consumption but also, more importantly, housing investment or wealth creation through
homeownership. Subsidizing wealth creation or investment makes substantial differences
in its return or effect and explains why the tax credit’s effect seems inconsistent with the
standard subsidy theory, given that the latter is built upon the assumption that a public
subsidy is a subsidy of consumption of a commodity. 
Homeownership market “imperfections.” There is another important, unique feature of
the D.C. homebuyer tax credit that may have also contributed to its extraordinary effect
on house prices that the standard model of public subsidies fails to explain. The tax credit
is able to correct a number of market imperfections, thus fostering an unprecedented
attractiveness and accessibility to the District’s homeowner housing market for two sorts
of the perspective homebuyers: low/moderate-income renters and suburban residents. As
                                                
42 According to U.S. Housing Market Conditions, the median value was $23,400 for new single-family
homes and $23,000 for the existing single-family homes in the United States in 1970. Adjusted to inflation,
they were about $46,389 and $45,596 in 1979 dollars, respectively. A 30-percent real price increase means
an arithmetic (average) return of $1,392 and $1,368 per year (in 1979 dollars), respectively.
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a result, an unprecedented huge demand on owner-occupied housing (especially less
expensive housing units) has been created in the District of Columbia, which leads to the
fact that in aggregate these new or unconventional homebuyers appeared to have acted as
price-makers in these untapped sub-markets. The key point here is that the standard
subsidy theory assumes that there are no market “imperfections.” However, for the
homeownership markets in general and urban markets in particular, some important
“imperfections” or failures do exist, and the D.C. homebuyer tax credit precisely
addresses these market failures. Hence, one should not expect that the standard model of
public subsidy could explain the dynamics and price effect of the D.C. homebuyer tax
credit program.
What are the homeownership market “imperfections” or inefficiencies addressed
by the D.C. homebuyer tax credit? The most significant imperfection is that the entry into
the first-time homeownership market is actually not free but blocked for many renters in
this country. Renters (or any other perspective homebuyers) face three barriers or lender-
imposed constraints to becoming a homeowner: insufficient wealth (savings) for down
payment and closing cost; insufficient incomes for purchasing properties above certain
price levels; relatively poor credit history or low credit scores for obtaining a mortgage
and at a favorable rate. Although the D.C. homebuyer credit has no effect on lender-
imposed credit constraint, the homeownership tax credit and its enhancements do have
the efficacy of eliminating or reducing a perspective homebuyer’s wealth constraint
and/or income constraints. For those with little personal wealth (such as savings and other
liquid assets) to draw from, the D.C. homebuyer credit of $5,000 may in practice be used
for basic down payment and closing costs to jump-start their home purchases. For those
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facing income constraints, the D.C. credit may actually help buy down the amount of the
mortgages (by as much as $5,000), thus lowering (or reaching) the level of current
incomes required by the lender.  
Obviously, such an elimination/reduction effect on wealth and income constraints
is not an explicit built-in feature of the D.C. program because the tax credit could be
claimed only after the home purchase and on the year-end federal income tax return.
However, these efficacy or wealth/income constraint removal effects could have been
realized through some other channels and enhancement products. For example, a
homebuyer could, in practice, use the tax credit as the de facto “collateral” to borrow as
much as $5,000 from relatives and friends in the form of gifts, which are acceptable to all
mortgage lenders as legitimate personal funds.  The other channel of using the tax credit
directly toward the home purchase is that an important enhancement product has become
available since 2000. The product was designed specifically to enable first-time
homebuyers to convert the D.C. tax credit into cash, allowing them to use those funds
toward the down payment or closing costs upfront. Backed by the secondary mortgage
industry, Congresswoman Norton, and Mayor Williams, Crestar Bank (later merged into
SunTrust Bank) and Chevy Chase Bank started in 2000 offering the two-year $5,000 tax
credit loans to eligible mortgage customers. In short, the D.C. first-time homebuyer
credit, combined with the private-sector and individual innovative enhancements, is able
to provide a substantial help for low/moderate-income renters to overcome the traditional
homeownership barriers of wealth and income. 
The D.C. homebuyer tax credit also serves as a remedy for another type of market
imperfection, that is, the market distortions caused by the existing tax treatments to
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homeownership. As discussed earlier, the existing homeownership tax regime (such as
mortgage interest and real estate tax deductions) offers substantially fewer economic
benefits and weak incentives for lower-income households while it primarily benefits
wealthy homeowners. These differential tax incentives can have important implications
for the long-term housing market equilibrium: They could have helped distort the market
dynamics such that there may have been an over-investment and thus relatively strong
price appreciation in the high-end housing market (larger properties, single-family units,
etc.), compared to an under-investment and hence slow value growth in the low-end
market (smaller properties, condos/townhouses, etc.). Now, with the D.C. homebuyer tax
credit program in place, an eligible homebuyer could claim for the full tax credit of as
much as $5,000, no matter whether the income tax return is itemized or how small the
purchased property is. Thus, a low/moderate-income renter could have a much stronger
incentive to participate in homeownership in the District than ever before. 
The third type of homeownership market imperfection concerns the attractiveness
of urban housing markets. The joint effect of urban decay, the suburbanization
movement, and “spatial mismatch” (new jobs are located in suburbs while
population/housing is in the cities) is that the central cities have increasingly lost their
population and thus housing attractiveness to the suburbs. Typically, although a central
city is still the primary location to work within a metro area, its suburbs are where most
of the population chooses to live. The D.C. homebuyer tax credit program is designed in
part to reverse such population exodus, providing that an eligible “first-time” homebuyer
is one who did not own a main residence in the District in the past 12 months. In other
words, anyone who owned or is still owning a house in the suburbs can also claim for the
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tax credit by becoming a homeowner in D.C..      
In summary, the D.C. homebuyer credit program seems capable of correcting
three types of homeownership market “imperfections” that are usually assumed away
from the standard subsidy theory: The tax credit helps remove the market entry barriers of
wealth and income, provides a remedy to the market distortions caused by the existing tax
treatments to homeownership, and enhances the homeownership attractiveness in a
central city setting. Consequently, one may ask if there is any empirical evidence to prove
that the D.C. homeownership tax credit has indeed caused an unprecedented accessibility
and attractiveness to the District’s homeowner market.  If so, have these unique features
been reflected in the owner-occupied housing demand in the District?
Indeed, the empirical evidence shows that the D.C. homebuyer tax credit has been
extremely successful in attracting renters to access homeownership for the first time, with
a rate unparalleled to any known data. As reported in the section discussing the IRS data,
the tax credit claimants who are first-time homebuyers were estimated at 67.1 percent of
all home purchasers in the District during the 1997-2001 period. This first-time
homebuyer rate should be viewed in the following context: As shown in Table 31, which
reports data from the 1997-1999 national samples of the American Housing Survey, the
first-time buyer households accounted for 40 percent of all homebuyers in the United
States. Among the central city homebuyers, 51 percent were first-time buyers.  Therefore,
the 67.1 percent first-time homebuyer rate (attributable to the D.C. homeownership tax
credit) was about 27 percentage points higher than the national average and was 16
percentage points higher than the central city average! This finding is consistent with the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































for young households by 10 to 20 percentage points (Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter
1997). 
The D.C. homeownership tax credit was also extremely successful in increasingly
attracting individuals and families who previously resided in the suburbs to purchase their
homes in the District. As developed in the IRS data analyses section, my estimations
indicate that during the 1997-2001 period, about 14 percent of D.C.’s home purchasers
each year were initial claimants of the tax credit whose previous addresses were in the
suburbs. The 14-percent home purchase rate by previous suburban residents (as percent of
all D.C. home purchasers) is indeed very high when compared to what was observed in
the District in 1993 (prior to the tax credit intervention). According to the 1993 American
Housing Survey, in Washington, D.C., there were 4,900 owner-occupied housing units
where householders moved during the past year, of which only 400 units had records
showing that householders moved from the same MSA but not in the central city. Thus,
these data yield a 8-percent home purchase rate by previous suburban residents in 1993,
or 6 percentage points lower than the rate estimated from the D.C. homeownership credit
program data.  
Not surprisingly, fueled by these two sorts of new/unconventional homebuyers
(first-time buyers and suburban residents), the demand (as measured by sales volume) on
owner-occupied housing in the District has grown tremendously over the impact period.
As shown in Figure 25, the volume of home sales in the District barely exceeded a half of
the average sales volume observed in its five surrounding suburban markets before 1991.
Between 1992 and 1996, the volume was nearly flat, around the level of only about 36


























































































substantially to 42 percent in 1997 when the D.C. homebuyer credit program took effect
in August. The volume of home sales in D.C. soared to 50 percent (of the average
suburban volume) in 1998—the first full year of the program—continued the explosive
growth to about 58 percent in 1999, and stabilized at this high level in the subsequent
years. 
One may recall that this growth pattern of home sales volume mirrors the number
and amount of the homebuyer credit claims, as well as rates of initial claims, first-time
homeownership, and suburban residents’ participation rates during the 1997-2001 period,
as reported in the section for the IRS data analyses. It clearly suggests that the explosive
growth of housing demand or sales volume in the District since 1997 did not appear just
by chance. Rather, it was largely attributable to the D.C. homebuyer credit program’s
ability to attack the homeowner market “imperfections” successfully, thus bringing in
new homebuyers who were previously either unable or unwilling to enter the District’s
homeownership market. This is a critical difference in practice and assumption that
matters greatly in understanding why the substantial impact of the D.C. homebuyer credit
program is not explainable by the standard theory of public subsidies but has been
observed and verified empirically in this paper.
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IX. The Impact on Home Equity Wealth, Local Tax Revenues and Neighborhood
Stability 
As mentioned earlier, house price appreciation is used as the most important
indicator in part because it can also be directly translated into the impacts on wealth
creation for homebuyers/owners and tax revenues for the District government. It also
captures the potential impacts of the policy intervention on neighborhood stability and
housing demand-supply dynamics, as well as homeownership. The following two sections
seek to quantify these impacts based on house price appreciation and on four
supplemental indicators obtained from other data sources.
The Impact on Home Equity Wealth and Tax Revenues
In the beginning of this study, I hypothesized that the District homebuyer credit
intervention is effective in increasing urban housing values, thereby creating wealth for
individuals and generating tax revenues for the government. With the amenity-adjusted
house price appreciation rates already estimated from the previous two sections, I was
able to complete this hypothesis testing by converting the house price appreciation rates
into the growth of home equity wealth and residential real estate tax revenues.   
Table 32 summarizes how the net impact of the homebuyer credit program on
house prices is converted into the impact on home equity growth in Washington, D.C.
during the 1998-2002 period. It shows that by the end of 2002 the home equity wealth
grew by $35.2 thousand dollars per unit (or household) due to the effect of targeted













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aggregated home equity wealth created by the intervention was found to be more than $2
billion in Washington, D.C43. This key information is illustrated in Figure 26. 
However, it also shows that the net impact on home equity growth is not uniform
across structure types and neighborhoods. On the one hand, the homebuyer credit
intervention was effective in creating a large amount of home equity wealth for
buyers/owners of townhouses and condos, as well as for low/moderate-income and
minority neighborhoods in the District. The aggregate amounts of home equity growth
were estimated at $1 billion for owners of townhouses/condos, $1.1 billion for
low/moderate-income neighborhoods, and $1 billion for predominately minority
neighborhoods. On the other hand, a disturbing finding has emerged regarding the impact
on more advantaged population groups and neighborhoods, for the sake of equity. The
buyers or existing owners of single-family detached houses in Washington, D.C. reaped
an estimated $1.2 billion in aggregated home equity wealth due to the policy intervention
by 2002, which is more than the gains by townhouse and condo owners combined at the
same period. A similarly disturbing pattern is also shown by neighborhoods. The
aggregate equity wealth created by the intervention alone was nearly $1.4 billion and $1.5
billion for high-income and predominately white neighborhoods, respectively, both of
which are substantially higher than those for the low/moderate-income neighborhoods
combined or high/moderate-minority neighborhoods combined. 
                                                
43 This is a very conservative estimate because I use the number of total owner units from the data set
obtained from Win2Data, which is lower than the number produced by the census bureau. The primary
reason of using this number is that this data set also allows generating numbers of total units by structure
type, which are not available in the census.  If using the number of total owner units from the 2000 Census,
however, the overall impact on home equity wealth creation would be nearly $3.67 billion in Washington,
D.C. by 2002. By the same token, the impact on property tax revenues in the District (as discussed later) is
also a conservative estimate as well.    
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The primary reason behind this disturbing phenomenon is simple: The wealthy,
white neighborhoods and single-family detached houses alike had substantially higher
house prices to begin with when the homebuyer credit intervention took effect. For
instance, in 1997 the median house price in a typical high-income or white neighborhood
was nearly 2-3 times the price in a typical low/moderate-income or minority
neighborhood (see Table 8). Therefore, in terms of money amount of appreciation, the
compounding effects on house price and home equity growth for the wealthy and white
neighborhoods (and single family detached housing sub-market) would be still substantial
substantially larger than those for the low/moderate-income and minority neighborhoods
and townhouse/condo sub-markets, even though the policy intervention in the District had
a larger impact on rates of price appreciation for the latter. 
The impact on District tax revenues is also very large. As shown in Table 33 and
Figure 27, aggregate residential real estate tax revenues due to the homebuyer credit
effect was estimated at $50.2 million in Washington, D.C., for 1998 through 2002 (or
roughly $44 million for the period of August 1997 to December 2001). While owners of
single-family detached houses and those in wealthy, white neighborhoods contributed the
most, the District government appeared to have benefited from the homebuyer credit
program by also collecting a substantial amount of taxes from those owning
townhouses/condos or from homeowners in low/moderate-income and minority
neighborhoods. For instance, residential property tax revenues were estimated at $18.6
million from low-income neighborhoods and $21.8 million from high-minority






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 27. The Overall Impact on Residential Real Estate Tax Revenues































































































































growth into assessed value and then multiplying it by the District tax rate of $0.96 per
$100 assessed value (for class 1 property) 44 45. 
Caution should be excised in interpreting these numbers, however. On one hand,
these are only rough estimates without taking into account of various tax credits and
rebates offered by the District government. On the other hand, these estimates are solely
based on the impact on residential real estate taxes and thus they are merely part of the
tax revenues that the District government could have collected due to the intervention
effects. By attracting more people into the city for homeownership, the first-time
homebuyer credit program is expected to also have impacts on the other two main sources
of tax revenues, namely, sales and state income taxes46. 
The Impact on Neighborhood Stability
With amenity-adjusted house price appreciation rates estimated from the previous
sections, they also allow me to extract this information to create statistical measures to
assess the changes in the volatility of house price movements in the city and by
neighborhoods between the pre-intervention and impact periods. The volatility of house
prices, as measured by coefficient of variation in annual price appreciation, is used to test
hypothesis 3 that the policy intervention in the form of first-time homebuyer credit in the
                                                
44 The overall real property assessment/sales ratio in the District was 89.8% in tax year 2001, with the ratio
of 86.1% for condominium. Assuming that on average these ratios were largely unchanged, they are used to
convert house price growth into assessed value increase throughout the 1998-2002 period.
45 Since the District of Columbia uses an annual assessment cycle, all real property is valued for property
tax purposes annually. However, the city is divided into three groups that have approximately the same
number of parcels and assessable base. One group of properties is physically inspected each year while the
other two-thirds is valued via mass appraisal models. In sum, these net gains in tax revenues from the
increased residential values due to the homebuyer credit intervention should be expected to have already
realized on an annual basis in the District of Columbia. 
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District is effective in stabilizing the central city and especially distressed communities.
The coefficient of variation (CV), also known as coefficient of dispersion, is able to
gauge the fluctuation of house price movements from time to time, thereby providing
conclusive evidence on the stability of a housing market at the city or neighborhood level.  
 In the case of Washington, D.C., if the targeted homebuyer credit program that
took effect in late 1997 did have a significant impact on city and neighborhood stability,
one would expect to see that the intervention, or interruption in a time series starting
1998, would have dramatically changed the dynamics of house price movements in the
form of volatility. This is essentially the same concept as the previous sections that
discuss the empirical research design for estimating the impact on rates of price
appreciation. Therefore, the assessment of the program’s impact on house price volatility
or market stability is similarly carried out through a simplified three-stage procedure
under the difference-in-differences framework.  
First, based on the annual rates of house price appreciation for Washington, D.C.
and its comparison markets as reported earlier, I calculated their coefficients of
variation47 for each of these markets by county/city and sub-markets for two time periods:
the pre-intervention period of 1987-1997 and the impact period of 1998-2002. These
results are documented in Table 34.  
                                                                                                                                                
46 These estimates are not developed in this paper because of data availability and also the fact that they are
largely beyond the scope of this study.
47 Coefficient of variation, also known as coefficient of dispersion, is calculated as follows: CV = standard





















































































































































   
   


























   
   































   
   















































   
   


























   
   































   
   



















































   
   


























   
   































   
   







































   
   


























   
   































   
   




















































   
   


























   
   































   
   







































   
   


























   
   































   
   































































































































































































































































































   
   


























   
   































   
   







































   
   


























   
   































   
   


















































   
   


























   
   































   
   







































   
   


























   
   































   
   
















































   
   


























   
   































   
   







































   
   


























   
   































   
   




















































































































































Second, I calculated the geographic difference in house price volatility between
Washington, D.C. (treatment group) and each of its surrounding suburban markets
(comparison groups) for the two time periods respectively. The difference is expressed as
CV ratio, or ratio of coefficient of house price variation observed in Washington, D.C. to
coefficient of variation observed in its comparison markets. A ratio of 1 indicates equality
of price volatility between the pair. As shown in Table 35, the geographic differences in
CV ratios were mostly above 1 during the 1987-1997 period, indicating that the house
price movement was more volatile in Washington, D.C. than in its suburbs prior to the
homebuyer credit intervention. In contrast, during the 1998-2002 period these differences
were substantially below 1 in nearly all comparison categories, an unmistakable sign of
consistently smaller house price volatility in the District at this impact period.  
Third, on the basis of the geographic differences, I further calculated the inter-
temporal difference or difference in differences. The difference in differences is also
expressed by CV ratio, or ratio of the geographic difference observed during the impact
period to the geographic differences observed during the pre-intervention period. As also
illustrated in Figure 28, the difference in differences was 0.43 for Washington, D.C.,
meaning that the homebuyer credit intervention was so successful and effective that, on
average, the house price movements observed during the impact period was 43 percent as
volatile as those observed during the pre-intervention period. 
The impact on the District’s neighborhood stability, or house price volatility at the
neighborhood level, is also substantial and almost across the board. Except for the high-
minority neighborhoods, all other types of neighborhoods had a value of difference in

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Difference in Difference: Coefficient of Variation (CV) Ratio 
in Housing Price Movements
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observed during the impact period. In particular, the moderate-minority and moderate-
income neighborhoods stood out as bigger winners than the white and high-income
neighborhoods. House prices in the moderate-minority neighborhoods during the impact
period were only 22 percent as volatile as those prior to the intervention. And the
moderate-income neighborhoods exhibited a post-intervention volatility that accounted
for only about 38 percent of what was observed before the intervention. With an average
difference in differences of 1.12, the District's predominately minority neighborhoods
apparently did not receive many benefits of neighborhood stability from the homebuyer
credit program. Although it is caused largely by comparing to an exceptional stability
performance in the high-minority neighborhoods of Alexandria City, still, the homebuyer
credit program’s impact on the stability of the District’s high-minority neighborhoods
was less evident and significant than others. 
Additionally, all housing sub-markets by structure type exhibited smaller volatility
and more stability during the intervention period. The impact on the stability of
townhouse and condo sub-markets is, however, clearly larger than what was observed in
the single-family detached housing sub-market in Washington.  
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X. Supplemental Indicators: the Impact on Homeownership, Housing Supply/
Vacancy, and Affordability
The purpose of this section is to examine several important indicators developed
from other data sources to supplement the two key benchmarks of the impact (house price
appreciation rate and volatility) discussed above. Using administrative data from the
Bureau of Census, it is designed to test hypothesis 4 that the targeted homebuyer tax
incentive program is effective in helping to solve core urban problems including low
homeownership rates, disinvestment, and high vacancy. Since the two house-price-related
key benchmarks reveal that the tax credit intervention was indeed effective and successful
in lifting the stagnated housing prices and stabilizing District neighborhoods, the same
force should also help increase homeownership, increase residential investment and
owner housing supply, and reduce vacant units. Therefore, these supplemental indicators
also serve as a validation of the two house-price-related benchmarks. However, except for
the building permits, all other supplemental indicators capture information on only two
points of time, 1990 and 2000. In this regard, they should be treated only as suggestive
and partial, rather than conclusive, evidence of the impact of the District homebuyer tax
credit program. 
Additionally, this section also includes an examination of potential detrimental
impact on housing affordability in the District. With a rapid growth in house prices and a
presumably increase in the owner housing supply, it is possible that they could have taken
place at the expenses of housing affordability for both renters and future homebuyers. 
The Impact on Homeownership 
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Table 36 and also Figure 29 show that the District’s homeownership rate indeed
increased substantially, from 38.9 percent in 1990 to 40.8 percent in 2000. The 1.9
percentage point increase is particularly remarkable for Washington, D.C. when
compared to its surrounding suburbs where the average growth rate was at 1.1 percentage
points. Moreover, although homeownership growth in the District’s minority
neighborhoods did not perform as well as those in its suburb, the District’s low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods substantially outpaced its suburban counterparts. 
In the 1990s, the District's low-income neighborhoods increased their
homeownership rates by 2.9 percentage points, or 2.7 percentage points higher than the
increase in the suburbs. The moderate-income neighborhoods in Washington were even
more remarkable in that their homeownership rates changed from 52.3 percent in 1990 to
58.6 percent in 2000, an astonishing growth of 6.3 percentage points, or 8.4 percentage
points higher than the change observed in the suburban moderate-income neighborhoods.    
The Impact on Housing Supply and Vacancy
Although housing demand and supply may not move in tandem, they reach new
market equilibrium by adjusting to each other sooner or later. The District first-time
homebuyer credit program is a demand-driven intervention, but its success should also be
capitalized somewhat in an increased owner housing supply through new construction,
rehabilitation, and conversions of rental properties into owner units (including vacant
units).  The supplemental indicators reported below suggest that this is exactly what has
happened in the District.
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Table 36. Homeownership Rates (%) in Washington, DC  and Surrounding Suburban Markets
1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000
Washington, DC 38.9 40.8 1.9 46.1 48.5 2.4 34.9 36.8 1.8
Surrounding Suburban Markets 63.0 64.1 1.1 69.2 72.7 3.5 46.3 52.0 5.7
    Alexandria City, VA 40.5 40.0 -0.5 46.7 50.9 4.2 20.8 21.1 0.3
    Arlington County, VA 44.6 43.3 -1.3 49.1 51.6 2.4 23.3 24.2 0.9
    Fairfax County, VA 70.8 70.9 0.2 74.0 77.1 3.1 51.2 55.2 4.0
    Montgomery County, MD 67.9 68.7 0.8 73.3 77.0 3.7 46.1 52.7 6.5
    Prince Georges County, MD 58.9 61.8 3.0 69.7 74.3 4.6 49.5 57.0 7.5
DC - Surrounding Markets -24.1 -23.3 0.8 -23.1 -24.2 -1.1 -11.3 -15.2 -3.9
1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000
Washington, DC 56.1 49.8 -6.3 52.3 58.6 6.3 29.9 32.8 2.9
Surrounding Suburban Markets 83.3 79.6 -3.7 64.3 62.2 -2.1 33.3 33.5 0.2
    Alexandria City, VA 65.4 63.3 -2.1 43.4 37.1 -6.3 18.6 25.4 6.8
    Arlington County, VA 71.8 55.0 -16.7 42.6 35.8 -6.8 26.1 26.4 0.3
    Fairfax County, VA 84.1 80.5 -3.6 64.3 58.6 -5.6 38.5 33.1 -5.4
    Montgomery County, MD 84.9 84.4 -0.5 66.5 62.9 -3.5 31.5 28.5 -3.0
    Prince Georges County, MD 88.7 87.9 -0.8 74.1 72.8 -1.4 36.1 38.6 2.5
DC - Surrounding Markets -27.3 -29.9 -2.6 -12.0 -3.6 8.4 -3.4 -0.7 2.7
1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000
Washington, DC 45.6 48.1 2.5 34.9 33.3 -1.7 36.8 38.9 2.0
Surrounding Suburban Markets 73.7 79.1 5.4 51.2 63.0 11.8 48.8 53.4 4.7
    Alexandria City, VA 58.7 63.6 4.8 33.3 33.5 0.1 26.4 30.4 4.0
    Arlington County, VA 54.6 57.1 2.5 34.0 32.3 -1.7 27.5 30.5 3.0
    Fairfax County, VA 75.5 84.2 8.6 51.7 65.7 14.0 43.4 50.8 7.3
    Montgomery County, MD 78.9 81.3 2.4 56.4 71.0 14.6 31.0 51.6 20.6
    Prince Georges County, MD 69.7 85.1 15.4 60.5 68.4 7.9 54.6 59.7 5.1
DC - Surrounding Markets -28.2 -31.1 -2.9 -16.3 -29.7 -13.4 -11.9 -14.5 -2.6
Low-Minority Tracts Moderate-Minority Tracts High-Minority Tracts
All Non-Hispanic Whites Minority
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First, I collected data on the housing units authorized by building permits from the
Residential Construction Branch of the Census Bureau. This data set provides
information on residential building permits on an annual basis for Washington, D.C. and
its five surrounding suburban jurisdictions for 1983 through 2002. This information
should provide conclusive empirical evidence indicating the trend in private investment
on new housing construction before and after the homebuyer credit intervention in the
District, as compared to its comparison markets. As illustrated in Figure 30 and
documented in tables 37a and 37b, housing units authorized by permits in the District
reached 881 per year during the 1998-2002 impact period, which more than doubled the
376 permits per year issued prior to the intervention. The year 1998 saw a huge spike in
the building permits issued in this first full year of the program (15 permits in 1997 vs.
429 permits in 1998). In contrast, the average building permits issued in the surrounding
suburbs during 1998-2002 were about 700 less than those issued each year during the
1983-1997 period. A largely similar pattern can also be seen for single-family (detached
and attached) and for multifamily units. 
Then, I conducted an interrupted time series, in which the ratio of building
permits in the District to permits in the suburbs is used as the dependent variable while
the homebuyer credit intervention is included as the input dummy variable (see Table 37c
and also Figure 37). The results indicate that the difference in the permit ratio between
the impact and pre-intervention periods was positive, significant, and large for all units
and for single-family units. The difference for multifamily units was insignificant but
very large. Specifically, for every 100 housing units authorized in the suburbs, there were
16.3 more units authorized in the District per year during the impact period than the units
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Table 37a. Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits in Washington, DC and Surrounding Suburban Markets (1983-2002)
Difference between D.C. and
Washington, DC AVERAGE Alexandria Arlington Fairfax Montgomery Prince Georges Surrounding Markets (by Ratio)
Total Units
1983 164 5,404 333 636 11,786 10,879 3,386 3.0%
1984 393 5,156 536 292 13,108 8,639 3,205 7.6
1985 590 5,217 333 878 11,150 9,946 3,780 11.3
1986 640 5,172 178 1,341 11,170 7,509 5,661 12.4
1987 1,198 5,680 1,495 910 13,247 7,119 5,629 21.1
1988 852 4,935 499 2,218 11,138 5,768 5,051 17.3
1989 410 4,787 2,013 2,506 7,904 6,710 4,801 8.6
1990 368 3,021 54 1,024 4,199 5,077 4,752 12.2
1991 333 2,202 104 585 3,806 3,276 3,237 15.1
1992 132 2,827 84 496 5,434 3,485 4,638 4.7
1993 305 3,186 263 251 6,937 3,141 5,339 9.6
1994 210 3,251 285 344 7,795 3,590 4,242 6.5
1995 35 3,072 251 618 7,226 3,682 3,584 1.1
1996 0 3,205 603 1,299 7,898 3,062 3,162 0.0
1997 15 3,019 1,300 57 6,698 3,682 3,360 0.5
1998 429 3,719 1,300 459 7,144 5,315 4,376 11.5
1999 683 3,284 1,090 970 7,494 4,253 2,615 20.8
2000 806 3,227 1,100 811 5,816 4,950 3,456 25.0
2001 896 3,334 1,329 920 6,121 5,249 3,049 26.9
2002 1,591 2,963 1,244 17 5,979 5,013 2,563 53.7
    Sub-Periods
      1983-1997 (Mean) 376 4,009 555 897 8,633 5,704 4,255 8.7
      1998-2002 (Mean) 881 3,305 1,213 635 6,511 4,956 3,212 27.6
Suburban Surrounding Markets
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Table 37b. Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits by Structure Type in Washington, DC and Surrounding Suburban Markets (1983-2002)
Difference between D.C. and
Washington, DC AVERAGE Alexandria Arlington Fairfax Montgomery Prince Georges Surrounding Markets (by Ratio)
Single-Family Units
1983 54 4,409 85 622 9989 8321 3030 1.2%
1984 88 4,260 195 235 10123 7563 3184 2.1
1985 152 4,487 123 252 9533 9007 3520 3.4
1986 142 4,183 164 267 9137 6507 4838 3.4
1987 286 3,967 97 243 8557 6622 4318 7.2
1988 253 3,535 116 273 7314 4922 5051 7.2
1989 91 2,643 311 174 4455 3848 4427 3.4
1990 180 1,935 34 128 2746 2494 4273 9.3
1991 83 1,721 104 108 3430 2081 2882 4.8
1992 92 2,424 84 110 4791 2889 4248 3.8
1993 99 2,761 157 241 6047 2707 4655 3.6
1994 96 2,564 189 168 5688 2976 3800 3.7
1995 35 2,259 215 328 4446 2833 3474 1.5
1996 0 2,087 160 152 4436 2616 3072 0.0
1997 11 2,084 667 57 4586 2333 2775 0.5
1998 255 2,481 680 117 4436 3548 3622 10.3
1999 319 2,087 646 143 4220 3467 1959 15.3
2000 187 2,075 386 59 3818 2931 3179 9.0
2001 131 2,062 401 171 3498 3,191 3049 6.4
2002 383 1,755 380 17 2982 2,909 2485 21.8
    Sub-Periods
      1983-1997 (Mean) 111 3,021 180 224 6,352 4,515 3,836 3.7
      1998-2002 (Mean) 255 2,092 391 101 3,791 3,209 2,859 12.6
Multi-Family Units
1983 110 995 248 14 1797 2558 356 11.1%
1984 305 896 341 57 2985 1076 21 34.0
1985 438 730 210 626 1617 939 260 60.0
1986 498 989 14 1074 2033 1002 823 50.3
1987 912 1,713 1,398 667 4690 497 1311 53.3
1988 599 1,400 383 1945 3824 846 0 42.8
1989 319 2,144 1,702 2332 3449 2862 374 14.9
1990 188 1,086 20 896 1453 2583 479 17.3
1991 250 481 0 477 376 1195 355 52.0
1992 40 403 0 386 643 596 390 9.9
1993 206 425 106 10 890 434 684 48.5
1994 114 687 96 176 2107 614 442 16.6
1995 0 813 36 290 2780 849 110 0.0
1996 0 1,118 443 1147 3462 446 90 0.0
1997 4 936 633 0 2112 1349 585 0.4
1998 174 1,238 620 342 2708 1767 754 14.1
1999 364 1,197 444 827 3274 786 656 30.4
2000 619 1,152 714 752 1998 2019 277 53.7
2001 765 1,272 928 749 2623 2058 0 60.2
2002 1208 1,209 864 0 2997 2104 78 100.0
    Sub-Periods
         1983-1997 (Mean) 266 988 375 673 2,281 1,190 419 27.4
         1998-2002 (Mean) 626 1,214 896 534 2,720 1,747 353 51.7
Suburban Surrounding Markets
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Conditional Least Squares Estimation Parameter Standard Error t Value Approx Pr > |t|
Estimated Mean 9.788 2.838 3.5 0.003
Moving Average Factor -1.000 0.185 -5.4 <.0001
Autoregressive Factor -0.334 0.410 -0.8 0.428
Intervention ("input" dummy variable) 16.331 5.183 3.2 0.006
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise To Lag Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq
6 3.76 4 0.098
12 9.97 10 0.443
Parameter Standard Error t Value Approx Pr > |t|
Estimated Mean 3.199 1.245 2.6 0.021
Moving Average Factor 1.000 1.992 0.5 0.623
Autoregressive Factor 0.978 2.111 0.5 0.650
Intervention ("input" dummy variable) 8.456 4.287 2.0 0.066
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise To Lag Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq
6 3.46 4 0.483
12 10.54 10 0.394
Parameter Standard Error t Value Approx Pr > |t|
Estimated Mean 27.233 11.693 2.3 0.033
Moving Average Factor 0.105 0.621 0.2 0.868
Autoregressive Factor 0.594 0.570 1.0 0.312
Intervention ("input" dummy variable) 28.234 24.316 1.2 0.263
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise To Lag Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq
6 4.52 4 0.340
12 13.17 10 0.214
Note: 1. Dependent variable is the geographic difference between Washington, DC and surrounding suburban markets,
which is measured by the ratio of annual permits authorized in DC to average annual permits in the surrounding markets.
2. The intervention or input variable has a value of 1 if the ratio is observed in or after 1998; 0 otherwise.
3. There are 20 observations/residuals analyzed in each model.
Single-Family Units Authorized by Permits
Multi-Family Units Authorized by Permits
Table 37c. Interrupted Time Series Analysis (ARIMA) of 
Annual Residential Building Permit Ratio:
Washington, DC vs. Surrounding Suburban Markets (1983-2002)





































































































































































































































































































authorized prior to the intervention. The impact for new single-family construction was
8.5 more permits in the District for every 100 permits issued in the suburbs. The impact
was even larger for multifamily building permits that were estimated at 28.2 per 100
suburban permits. 
Nevertheless, the above results regarding the building permits should be
interpreted with caution. As a measure of overall residential investments from both public
and private sectors, it seems to be conclusive. It is not accurate, however, if used to
measure the new construction response only from the private sector. The difference is
that, as discussed earlier, the HOPE VI program was also active in the District of
Columbia during most of the 1990s. HOPE VI rehabilitation projects contributed about
3,138 new residential units (and hence building permits) in the District between 1993 and
2001. Specifically, HOPE VI helped the District to build 147 new townhomes for the
Ellen Wilson project in 1993, 314 units for the Wheeler Creek project in 1997, 600 new
units for the Henson Ridge project in 1999, 515 new units for the New East Capital
project in 2000, and 1,562 new units for the Arthur Capper/Carrollsburg project in 2001. 
These led to an average of 535 building permits per year from the HOPE VI
program that were issued during the 1998-2002 period, compared to 31 building permits
per year between 1983 and 1997. Therefore, incorporating these numbers into all types of
building permits issued, the private sector contributed merely 346 building permits per
year during the 1998-2002 period, compared to 345 permits per year prior to 1998. In
short, the supply response from new construction during the 1998-2002 impact period
was very significant if considering both private and public investments; however, it was
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not significant at all (and essentially unchanged from the pre-intervention period) if
excluding the new construction activities initiated from the HOPE VI public funds48. 
Another indicator to housing supply is housing units by tenure. According to 1990
and 2000 censuses, Washington, D.C., lost 3,644 housing units in the 1990s. However,
there is a sharply different picture of changes in housing units by tenure. While rental
units dramatically decreased by 9,441 units, owner units increased by 4,220 units from
1990 to 2000. As measured by share (percent of total housing units), owner units in the
District increased by 2.01 percentage points in the 1990s, or 0.3 points higher than owner
unit share in the suburbs. In contrast, rental unit share in the District declined by 2.65
percentage points, compared to a decline of 2.11 percentage points in the suburbs. (See
Table 38 and Figure 31). This information seems to suggest that a dramatic shift from
rental properties to owner units has been taking place in the District. And this shift may
well be a market response to a huge housing demand and rapidly appreciating owner
housing market that is created in part by the homebuyer credit program.
As shown in Table 39 and Figure 32, total vacant units were indeed substantially
reduced in Washington, D.C., from 28,855 vacant units in 1990 to 26,507 units in 2000.
The net reduction was 2,348 units. While the suburbs also had substantial reductions at
the same period, the District still had 43 more vacant units of reduction than in the
suburbs. More importantly, it is clear that the reduction of vacant units in the District
exclusively came from vacant units for rent, which had a decline by 4,016 units. In
                                                
48 Isolating the impact of HOPE VI program on the overall building permits was suggested by Jacqueline

















































   
   




   
   









   
   




   
   









   
   




   























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 39. Vacant Housing Units in Washington, DC  and Surrounding Suburban Markets
1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000
All
    Washington, DC 28,855 26,507 -2,348 2,930 3,021 91 13,218 9,202 -4,016
    Surrounding Markets (average) 10,499 8,194 -2,305 2,086 1,623 -463 5,710 2,708 -3,002
        Alexandria City, VA 4,972 2,362 -2,610 737 239 -498 3,077 929 -2,148
        Arlington County, VA 6,327 4,074 -2,253 894 262 -632 3,650 1,200 -2,450
        Fairfax County, VA 15,621 8,697 -6,924 3,897 1,444 -2,453 7,787 2,388 -5,399
        Montgomery County, MD 13,495 10,067 -3,428 3,136 2,011 -1,125 6,760 3,475 -3,285
        Prince Georges County, MD 12,079 15,768 3,689 1,767 4,159 2,392 7,276 5,547 -1,729
    DC - Surrounding Markets 18,356 18,313 -43 844 1,398 554 7,508 6,494 -1,014
By Census Tract Income
High-Income
    Washington, DC 3,994 4,427 433 655 365 -290 1,377 1,035 -342
    Surrounding Markets (average) 2,379 2,730 351 785 549 -235 767 629 -138
        Alexandria City, VA 508 551 43 106 88 -18 169 136 -33
        Arlington County, VA 730 1,989 1,259 127 158 31 246 548 302
        Fairfax County, VA 5,973 4,836 -1,137 1,930 859 -1,071 2,261 1,084 -1,177
        Montgomery County, MD 3,973 4,221 248 1,460 861 -599 936 1,066 130
        Prince Georges County, MD 709 2,053 1,344 301 781 480 222 309 87
    DC - Surrounding Markets 1,615 1,697 82 -130 -184 -55 610 406 -204
Moderate-Income
    Washington, DC 3,721 1,671 -2,050 549 275 -274 1,627 505 -1,122
    Surrounding Markets (average) 4,948 2,917 -2,031 1,026 642 -384 2,675 894 -1,781
        Alexandria City, VA 2,271 1,067 -1,204 329 69 -260 1,542 469 -1,073
        Arlington County, VA 3,924 961 -2,963 682 38 -644 2,048 241 -1,807
        Fairfax County, VA 7,904 2,925 -4,979 1,816 467 -1,349 4,518 949 -3,569
        Montgomery County, MD 6,415 4,411 -2,004 1,339 948 -391 3,426 1,575 -1,851
        Prince Georges County, MD 4,227 5,223 996 965 1,689 724 1,839 1,236 -603
    DC - Surrounding Markets -1,227 -1,246 -19 -477 -367 110 -1,048 -389 659
Low-Income
    Washington, DC 21,140 20,409 -731 1,726 2,381 655 10,214 7,662 -2,552
    Surrounding Markets (average) 3,172 2,546 -626 275 431 156 2,269 1,185 -1,083
        Alexandria City, VA 2,193 744 -1,449 302 82 -220 1,366 324 -1,042
        Arlington County, VA 1,673 1,124 -549 85 66 -19 1,356 411 -945
        Fairfax County, VA 1,744 936 -808 151 118 -33 1,008 355 -653
        Montgomery County, MD 3,107 1,435 -1,672 337 202 -135 2,398 834 -1,564
        Prince Georges County, MD 7,143 8,492 1,349 501 1,689 1,188 5,215 4,002 -1,213
    DC - Surrounding Markets 17,968 17,863 -105 1,451 1,950 499 7,945 6,477 -1,469
By Census Tract Racial Composition
Low-Minority 
    Washington, DC 5,746 3,955 -1,791 915 294 -621 2,280 899 -1,381
    Surrounding Markets (average) 5,171 1,934 -3,237 1,394 342 -1,052 2,226 408 -1,818
        Alexandria City, VA 835 503 -332 200 83 -117 362 116 -246
        Arlington County, VA 3,529 1,675 -1,854 672 139 -533 1,784 430 -1,354
        Fairfax County, VA 12,227 3,223 -9,004 3,506 586 -2,920 5,699 577 -5,122
        Montgomery County, MD 7,474 3,936 -3,538 2,246 813 -1,433 2,499 811 -1,688
        Prince Georges County, MD 1,788 333 -1,455 345 87 -258 786 107 -679
    DC - Surrounding Markets 575 2,021 1,446 -479 -48 431 54 491 437
Moderate-Minority
    Washington, DC 2,481 1,235 -1,246 374 112 -262 1,218 469 -749
    Surrounding Markets (average) 2,860 2,034 -826 366 310 -56 1,811 653 -1,158
        Alexandria City, VA 3,175 597 -2,578 267 41 -226 2,139 291 -1,848
        Arlington County, VA 1,636 1,696 60 131 70 -61 983 469 -514
        Fairfax County, VA 2,860 3,285 425 331 466 135 1,749 937 -812
        Montgomery County, MD 4,275 3,090 -1,185 791 623 -168 2,794 1,275 -1,519
        Prince Georges County, MD 2,352 1,500 -852 312 350 38 1,390 293 -1,097
    DC - Surrounding Markets -379 -799 -420 8 -198 -206 -593 -184 409
High-Minority 
    Washington, DC 20,628 21,317 689 1,641 2,615 974 9,720 7,834 -1,886
    Surrounding Markets (average) 2,469 4,226 1,757 326 971 645 1,673 1,647 -26
        Alexandria City, VA 962 1,262 300 270 115 -155 576 522 -54
        Arlington County, VA 1,162 703 -459 91 53 -38 883 301 -582
        Fairfax County, VA 534 2,189 1,655 60 392 332 339 874 535
        Montgomery County, MD 1,746 3,041 1,295 99 575 476 1,467 1,389 -78
        Prince Georges County, MD 7,939 13,935 5,996 1,110 3,722 2,612 5,100 5,147 47
    DC - Surrounding Markets 18,159 17,091 -1,068 1,315 1,644 329 8,047 6,187 -1,860
Total Vacant Units Vacant Units for Sale Vacant Units for Rent
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Figure 31. Housing Units by Tenure in Washington, DC and Surrounding 











































Washington, DC Surrounding Markets DC - Surrounding Markets
Figure 32. Change in Vacant Housing Units in the 1990s: 


































































Total Vacant Units -43 82 -19 -105 1,446 -420 -1,068
Vacant Units for Sale 554 -55 110 499 431 -206 329
















contrast, despite the overall decrease of housing stock and vacancy in the District, vacant
units for sale had a net gain of 91 units in the 1990s. 
Further, the decline of vacant units for rent as well as the increase of vacant units
for sale was mostly found in the low-income and high-minority neighborhoods in the
District, even considering the difference with its suburbs. Therefore, there appeared to be,
once again, a dramatic shift that may have been taking place from vacant units for rent to
vacant units for sale in the District in general and low-income and high-minority
neighborhoods in particular. This finding suggests that the homebuyer credit program
may indeed have an impact on owner housing supply not through new construction but
conversion of rental properties (occupied and vacant) to owner units (occupied and
vacant).   
The Impact on Housing Affordability
The rapid increase in house prices during the impact period, along with a supply
response in which a large number of rental properties were converted into owner units,
suggests that the D.C. homebuyer tax credit may have an adverse effect on neighborhood
gentrification and housing affordability in the District49. The adverse effect is two-fold:
Both renters and future homebuyers are at risk of being priced out of the affordable
markets, especially in the gentrifying and gentrified neighborhoods where house prices
went up more rapidly and/or vacant units for rent were converted into owner units in a
larger quantity. Although there is no hard evidence as to how many future homebuyers
could be adversely affected, the substantial price increase attributable to the D.C.
                                                
49 The potential adverse effect on gentrification and existing D.C. residents was strongly suggested by Mark
Lopez of the University of Maryland at College Park.
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homebuyer credit program in the past five years should be self-explainable for the
detrimental impact in this regard. 
Information collected from the 1993-1998 American Housing Survey gives a close
look at the potential adverse effect on the District’s renters. Theoretically, if the D.C.
homebuyer credit program did generate any adverse effect on renters, it would be
reflected through at least two types of renter displacements: (1) renters who had to move
because of involuntary displacement imposed by private landlords or government
agencies, and (2) renters who moved or were displaced voluntarily because the previous
rental units were no longer affordable. Table 40 compares the 1993 and 1998 AHS data
on reasons for the move and choice of current residence for householders who moved
during the past year50. The findings suggest that a large portion of the District’s renters
were voluntarily displaced for increased rental and financial burdens during the first 12
months after the D.C. homebuyer credit program took effect. 
Specifically, the AHS data show that from 1993 to 1998, there was no increase in
District renters who moved during the previous year because of private or government
displacement. This was also true in the Washington, DC metro and two surrounding
suburban counties, Prince George’s and Fairfax. Hence, the empirical evidence does not
support the assumption that the D.C. homebuyer credit program might have an effect on
the involuntary displacement for District renters.    
                                                
50 The data for the AHS Metro is generally collected in the second half of the year when the survey is
carried out. Thus, while the 1993 movers (during the past year) were those moved between the 2nd half of
1992 and 2nd half of 1993, the 1998 movers were those moved between the 2nd half of 1997 and 2nd half of
1998. In other words, the latter roughly corresponds to the householders moved during the first 12-month
period immediately after the D.C. homebuyer credit took effect in August 1997.
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Table 40. Reasons for Move and Choice of Current Residence for Householders Moved During Past Year
(number in thousands)
1993 1998 Share Growth (%) 1993 1998  1993-98 Increase (%) Share Growth (%)
Washington, DC-MD-VA MSA
Reasons for Leaving Previous Unit
     Private Displacement 2.4 1.3 -1.6 12.7 7.1 -44.1 -2.9
     Government Displacement 0.5 2.1 1.4 3.0 1.3 -56.7 -0.9
     To Be Closer to Work/School/Other 4.8 10.2 4.0 33.4 31.7 -5.1 -1.9
     To Establish Own Household 16.2 23.4 3.1 31.2 37.2 19.2 1.6
     Change from Owner to Renter 1.5 2.5 66.7 0.4
     Change from Renter to Owner 18.7 19.5 -3.7
     Wanted Lower Rent or Maintenance 1.5 3.5 1.6 14.6 15.7 7.5 0.0
Choice of Present Neighborhood
     Convenient to Job 24.6 32.6 1.8 77.1 71.0 -7.9 -5.3
     Convenient to Public Transportation 6.6 7.0 -1.2 29.8 36.7 23.2 2.0
Choice of Present Home: Financial Reasons 40.0 31.6 -17.6 86.0 95.9 11.5 1.4
Comparison to Previous Neighborhood
     Better Neighborhood 46.9 47.6 -10.5 78.7 70.2 -10.8 -6.4
     Worse Neighborhood 8.2 7.8 -2.3 41.9 38.6 -7.9 -2.9
     About the Same 24.1 35.9 5.6 73.1 93.0 27.2 6.3
     Same Neighborhood 2.1 1.7 -0.9 12.0 9.5 -20.8 -1.5
Total Respondents 83.5 104.2 210.3 226.5 7.7
District of Columbia
Reasons for Leaving Previous Unit
     Private Displacement 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.2 -21.4 -2.0
     Government Displacement 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.9 -40.0 -1.7
     To Be Closer to Work/School/Other 0.5 2.2 20.4 9.4 7.9 -16.0 -5.7
     To Establish Own Household 1.3 0.9 -8.8 7.4 7.7 4.1 -1.0
     Change from Owner to Renter 0.0 0.9 2.1
     Change from Renter to Owner 1.3 1.7 1.5
     Wanted Lower Rent or Maintenance 0.0 0.5 6.4 1.0 3.8 280.0 6.3
Choice of Present Neighborhood
    Convenient to Job 2.0 2.6 2.1 11.7 9.1 -22.2 -8.7
    Convenient to Public Transportation 0.8 1.8 10.6 4.9 9.7 98.0 10.0
Choice of Present Home: Financial Reasons 1.5 1.3 -6.8 12.8 20.5 60.2 14.9
Comparison to Previous Neighborhood
    Better Neighborhood 3.2 2.6 -16.7 13.3 10.8 -18.8 -8.9
    Worse Neighborhood 1.2 0.8 -8.5 9.5 7.9 -16.8 -5.9
    About the Same 1.8 2.7 6.5 13.1 18.7 42.7 10.0
    Same neighborhood 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 3.6 50.0 2.2
Total Respondents 6.4 7.8 39.2 43.1 9.9
Princes George's County, MD
Reasons for Leaving Previous Unit
     Private Displacement 1.2 0.0 -9.2 3.0 0.9 -70.0 -4.4
     Government Displacement 0.0 0.4 2.7 1.0 0.0 -100.0 -2.3
     To Be Closer to Work/School/Other 0.6 1.8 7.7 3.5 4.0 14.3 3.3
     To Establish Own Household 2.9 6.0 18.7 6.7 6.8 1.5 3.9
     Change from Owner to Renter 0.0 0.6 0.0 -100.0 -1.4
     Change from Renter to Owner 3.2 2.6 -6.7
     Wanted Lower Rent or Maintenance 0.3 0.0 -2.3 2.8 3.2 14.3 2.7
Choice of Present Neighborhood
    Convenient to Job 4.9 2.2 -22.4 13.6 8.7 -36.0 -6.6
    Convenient to Public Transportation 0.5 0.9 2.3 2.9 5.0 72.4 7.5
Choice of Present Home: Financial Reasons 5.5 3.9 -15.5 15.8 13.1 -17.1 0.8
Comparison to Previous Neighborhood
    Better Neighborhood 8.5 5.6 -26.8 18.3 11.5 -37.2 -9.5
    Worse Neighborhood 1.2 0.5 -5.8 7.6 8.4 10.5 6.4
    About the Same 3.4 6.5 18.3 13.1 13.5 3.1 8.2
    Same neighborhood 0.0 0.9 6.1 2.7 0.9 -66.7 -3.7
Total Respondents 13.1 14.7 43.3 35.1 -18.9
-100.0
Fairfax County, VA
Reasons for Leaving Previous Unit
     Private Displacement 0.4 0.0 -1.9 2.2 1.2 -45.5 -2.9
     Government Displacement 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 -100.0 -1.3
     To Be Closer to Work/School/Other 0.6 0.8 0.3 4.9 4.9 0.0 -0.9
     To Establish Own Household 4.4 3.2 -8.2 5.9 4.6 -22.0 -4.3
     Change from Owner to Renter 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0
     Change from Renter to Owner 2.9 5.4 7.2
     Wanted Lower Rent or Maintenance 0.3 0.4 0.1 2.3 2.5 8.7 0.1
Choice of Present Neighborhood
    Convenient to Job 6.6 11.6 13.7 14.6 16.6 13.7 2.2
    Convenient to Public Transportation 1.6 1.8 -0.5 2.9 4.9 69.0 4.4
Choice of Present Home: Financial Reasons 9.6 6.9 -18.1 13.2 15.0 13.6 1.9
Comparison to Previous Neighborhood
    Better Neighborhood 11.6 13.5 -2.2 14.4 15.7 9.0 0.5
    Worse Neighborhood 1.8 2.6 1.6 4.7 6.1 29.8 2.6
    About the Same 7.5 7.2 -7.2 16.0 15.4 -3.8 -4.5
    Same neighborhood 0.7 0.0 -3.2 1.6 0.4 -75.0 -3.3
Total Respondents 21.6 26.2 37.7 40.6 7.7
Owner-Occupied Units Renter-Occupied Units
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Nevertheless, the data also show that voluntary displacement was clearly
happening. In 1993, only 1,000 renters in the District moved during the previous year
because they “wanted lower rent.” This number dramatically jumped to 3,800 renters in
1998—a year after the homebuyer credit program began, resulting in a 280-percent
increase. In comparison, the increase was merely 7.5 percent in the Washington
metropolitan area, 14.3 percent in Princes George’s County, Maryland, and 8.7 percent in
Fairfax County, Virginia. Using the share of all movers, renters who were displaced by
higher rent still had a 6.3-percent growth in the District from 1993 to 1998, compared to a
growth rate of 0 percent in the Washington MSA, 2.7 percent in Prince George’s County,
and 0.1 percent in Fairfax County.
  Another indicator— “choice of present home: financial reasons” —verifies the
displacement impact of the D.C. homebuyer credit program. The data show that the
number of the District’s renters who moved for financial reasons grew substantially from
12,800 in 1993 to 20,500 in 1998, an increase of 7,700 renters or 60.2 percent. The
change was merely 11.5 percent in Washington metro area, -17.1 percent in Prince
George’s County, and 13.6 percent in Fairfax County. Similarly, the growth rate by share
of all movers was the highest in the District at 14.9 percent, compared to 1.4 percent in
the Washington metro area, 0.8 percent in Prince George’s County, and 1.9 percent in
Fairfax County. 
In summary, the findings indicate that the D.C. homebuyer credit program appears
to have generated an adverse effect on the District’s homeownership and especially rental
affordability. In particular, the empirical evidence points out that the District’s renters had
substantially higher rates of voluntary displacement in 1998 because of rent and financial
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reasons. This outcome should not be surprising. After all, among renters in the
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, the District’s renters (especially low-income
renters) are the most vulnerable to any significant increase in housing costs and reduction
in rental supply: According to the 1998 American Housing Survey, median household
income for renters in 1998 was merely $21,263 in the District, compared to $36,231 in
the Washington metro area, $32,592 in Prince George’s County, and $47,049 in Fairfax
County. Since the D.C. homebuyer credit intervention had a substantial, positive and
significant impact on house prices and also helped reduce the number of vacant units for
rent, these impacts must have been translated into a large increase in rents, thus pricing
out many renters from the existing units. This detrimental impact on rental affordability is
expected to be more evident and serious in some of the low/moderate-income and
moderate-minority neighborhoods because they experienced a more significant growth in
house prices and reduction in rental units and were, therefore, more likely to be
gentrified.
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XI. Conclusion: Key Findings and Implications for Policy and Research 
This study is motivated by the need to identify public policy interventions that
address two critical problems facing the United States. One is urban decline and central
city neighborhood distress, while the other is the inequality of the nation’s most important
housing policy—the home mortgage interest and real estate tax deductions. After an
extensive literature review of these problems and analysis of various policies and
programs, a targeted homeownership tax credit program as implemented in the District of
Columbia stands out. By targeting specific income levels and first-time homebuyers, this
innovative homeownership tax credit intervention intentionally or unintentionally impacts
the intersection of both problems at the same time. 
Data from the Internal Revenue Services only released to this author indicate that
the D.C. homebuyer credit program was indeed successful and popular and was
increasingly so over time, regardless of the number of returns claiming for the credit,
amount of the claims, and estimated rate of initial claims. The credit was extremely
successful in attracting the renters or first-time homebuyers. It was also effective in
reversing the population exodus by retaining existing D.C. residents and luring
homebuyers with previous residences in the District’s suburban areas. Moreover, the
distributional effect of the credit beneficiaries by income was also positive and
substantial. The pyramid-shaped income distribution was centered on the low-income
homebuyers or those well below the area median income. 
Based on a unique database that compiles the transaction-assessment records,
census information, and other administrative data sets, I conducted a three-stage
intervention analysis in the framework of difference-in-differences approach to examine
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the impact of the District homebuyer credit program on amenity-adjusted house prices.
This approach was supplemented and verified by a cross-border median price comparison
and two other verification methods. Using house price appreciation rate as a key measure
of the impact, the empirical findings indicate that the price impact and distributional
effects of the targeted homeownership tax credit programs were significant, positive, and
large. Using house price volatility as the other benchmark, I found that the targeted
homebuyer credit intervention was indeed effective in stabilizing the central city
neighborhoods, as well as the overall housing market.  
Data from a number of supplemental indicators suggest a consistent picture that
the policy intervention in Washington, D.C., seemed to have stimulated overall
investments on new construction, increased the demand and supply on owner units,
increased homeownership rates, and reduced vacant units in the city. However, the results
also suggest an insignificant supply response from private residential investments, as well
as an adverse effect on housing affordability, especially for the District’s renters. 
Summary of empirical evidence from the Internal Revenue Services
The D.C. homebuyer tax credit is very successful and popular. Based on the IRS
data released only for this study, 21,821 claims, in the amount of $76.7 million, were
filed for the tax credit from 1997 to 2001. (The estimated amount of the credit during the
1998-2002 period was about $89.5 million). The annualized averages were 4,643
returns/claims in the amount of $3,507 per year. On average, the program participants or
initial claimants accounted for about 77 percent of all home purchasers in the District
each year studied. Moreover, the number of returns, amount, and rate of initial claims
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generally exhibit a rising trend over time, with substantial growth observed in 1998 and
1999 and high levels maintained in years 2000-2001.
The participants’ first-time homeownership rate (or rate of purchasers of their first
homes ever owned) was estimated at 67.1 percent of all home purchasers in the District
per year. This first-time homebuyer rate was 27 percentage points higher than the national
average (40 percent) and 16 percentage points higher than the central city average in the
United States (51 percent). The D.C. homebuyer credit program was also effective in
stabilizing the population base for the District by retaining D.C. residents and attracting
homebuyers from suburbs. While the vast majority of the credit claimants (i.e.,
beneficiaries) were D.C. residents, the homeownership credit also attracted a sizable
number of homebuyers whose previous addresses were in District suburbs.  Specifically,
the initial claimants of the credit with previous D.C. addresses accounted for about a half
(47.5 percent) of all home purchasers in the District. The homebuyers with previous
residence in the District’s suburban areas accounted for an average of 14 percent of all
home purchasers in the District. Both the first-time homebuyer rate and rates of
participation by the existing D.C. residents and previous suburban residents also exhibit a
trend of steady growth over time.  
The results also meet the prior expectations that the distributional effect of the
D.C. homeownership credit beneficiaries, as classified by adjusted gross income, was
very positive and substantial. The income distribution of the credit claimants, by both
number and amount of claims, has a typical pyramid-shape centered on low-income
households and vastly supported by low/moderate-income households. The IRS data
indicate that the largest cluster of the credit beneficiaries was low-income homebuyers or
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those with incomes between $30,000 and $50,000, which correspond to only 42 to 69
percent of the area median income. The top beneficiary groups were low/moderate-
income households, or those earning an annual income between $20,000 and $75,000,
which corresponds to 28 to 104 percent of the area median income. In terms of average
amount of claims by income, however, the results indicate that the higher the income, the
higher amount per claim each year. There was a rising trend over time observed for all
these patterns. 
Summary of key findings on house price appreciation
Controlling for both observed price determinants (including housing unit
characteristics, location, events, and neighborhood-based developments) and unobserved
factors, the District’s amenity-adjusted house prices increased by an additional 4.9
percentage points per year above its five comparison suburban markets during the impact
period of 1998-2002. This finding is further verified by comparing the median house
prices and median price per square foot for three geographic samples (census tracts
adjacent to the District/Maryland border, D.C. vs. five surrounding suburbs, and D.C. vs.
Baltimore City). The robustness of this finding is also checked by examining a number of
other potential factors that took place concurrently with the homebuyer credit program
and thus might have also affected the District’s housing market. These outcomes and
robustness checks indicate that such a substantial price increase was largely, though not
exclusively, attributable to the targeted homebuyer credit program as implemented in
Washington, D.C., since August 1997. Therefore, these findings provide a strong
justification for the targeted homebuyer credit intervention on the ground of efficiency.
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The findings also indicate that the targeted homeownership credit intervention is
justified for the sake of equity or distributional effect. The income-targeted homebuyer
tax credit program may explain most of the following distributional effects, which are
both statistically significant and strong: As compared to more expensive single-family
detached houses that are more likely owned by high-income and other advantaged
population groups, townhouse and condominium units are significantly lower-priced and
therefore more likely owned by low-income and other disadvantaged households.
However, the findings indicate that the District homebuyer credit program was a major
contributor of a net house price appreciation of 9.2 and 7.3 percentage points per year for
a typical townhouse and condo, respectively, as compared to merely 1.7 percentage points
for a typical single-family detached. These distributional effects are also similarly
reflected in the comparisons of various neighborhood housing markets by income and
race. 
A typical low- and moderate-income neighborhood in the District had a stronger net
impact than a typical high-income neighborhood did. Their annual rates of house price
growth were 5.7, 4.4, and 3.1 percentage points, respectively. When comparing the effects
by neighborhood racial composition, the results are mixed. A typical low-minority
(predominately white) neighborhood had a net effect of 4.4 percentage points per year in
house price appreciation during the 1998-2002 period, whereas a typical high-minority
neighborhood had an annual net effect of only 4 percentage points. However, the
moderate-minority neighborhoods stood out as the biggest beneficiary of the program
among all housing sub-markets. The net effect on such a typical neighborhood was 11.3
percentage points per year in the amenity-adjusted house price appreciation.   
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Other direct and secondary impacts
There are a number of important direct or secondary impacts that are derived from
the targeted homeownership tax credit programs as examined in this paper. 
First, the targeted homeownership tax credit program directly built wealth for
existing homeowners and first-time homebuyers through the growth of their home equity.
The aggregate home equity wealth is estimated at more than $2 billion for the years 1998
through 2002. And this wealth-building effect in the District was felt not only by
homeowners in rich or white neighborhoods but also by those in poor or minority
neighborhoods. In addition, not just owners of single-family detached houses increased
their home equity through the rapid price appreciation, but the same also occurred for
owners of lower-priced townhouses/rowhouses and condominiums. On the other hand,
the findings indicate that the policy intervention created substantially more home equity
wealth for the homeowners of single-family detached houses and for the high-income and
white neighborhoods. This is because these homeowners had a much higher base of house
prices to begin with, and their compounding effects make important differences over
time. This highlights the importance and timeliness of such policy interventions as the
District homebuyer credit program that may raise price appreciation rates more rapidly for
the disadvantaged than the advantaged. As a result, one would expect to see that over
time the gap between the two would gradually become smaller.  
Second, the District homebuyer credit program was also effective in stabilizing all
types of neighborhoods (except for high-minority neighborhoods) and the urban market as
a whole. For instance, the difference in differences in volatility of house price movement
(as expressed by coefficient of variation ratio) is estimated at 0.43 for Washington, D.C.,
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during the impact period. This means that the policy intervention was so successful that
the price volatility observed during the impact period was merely 43 percent as volatile as
those observed prior to the intervention. 
Third, the targeted homebuyer credit intervention stimulated housing demand and
increased homeownership rates in the District. The increase in homeownership rates in
the low- and moderate-income neighborhoods was particularly striking, estimated at a
range of 2.7 to 8.4 percentage points higher than in its suburbs form 1990 to 2000.
Moreover, in reaching a new equilibrium, a stronger housing demand in turn stimulated
housing supply in the urban and neighborhood markets, thereby increased the levels of
overall level of new construction (measured by residential building permits), conversion
of rental properties into owner units, and possibly rehabilitation and home improvements.
As a result, many vacant units in the District, especially vacant units for rent, have been
eliminated from the rental housing stock due to this effect. 
Nevertheless, although the homebuyer credit program had a significant impact on
the number of residential building permits issued for both public and private investors,
the supply response from the private investments was insignificant, excluding the new
units funded by the HOPE VI revitalization program. Moreover, the empirical evidence
also suggests that the homebuyer credit program could have generated some unintended
consequences and adverse effects on housing affordability for both future homebuyers
and renters in the District. In particular, the District’s renters who moved or were
displaced because of rent burdens increased by 2,800 households from 1,000 in 1993 to
3,800 in 1998 (a year after the homebuyer credit program in place). The increase was
equivalent to a 6.3 percent growth as expressed by the share of all householders who
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moved during the past 12 months, compared to no change in the Washington metro area
during the same time period.   
Fourth, the homebuyer credit program also contributed directly to the city’s
property tax bases and thus government revenues. In the case of Washington, D.C., the
increased property tax revenues were generated not only from the increased residential
property value in one type of neighborhood or structure but also across all types of
neighborhoods and structures, including traditionally lower-priced condos and
townhouses and homes in underserved low-income and minority neighborhoods. The
overall impact on the District’s residential real estate tax revenues is conservatively
estimated at $50.2 million for 1998 through 2002. 
The results of these secondary impacts include the following: 
 The increased home equity coupled with historically low rates of home mortgages
contributed to the local economy through a refinance boom. Cash-out has been
recognized as a primary factor that stabilizes the economy both locally and nationally. 
 A financially better-off city government would be able to provide more public goods
and provide better government services, including schools, police, public
transportation, etc. These further improve the attractiveness of the city to potential
homeowners who are future taxpayers for properties.  
Implications for public policies and research
A significant and largely positive impact and distributional effect of the D.C.
homeownership tax credit suggest that this innovative tax instrument with income-
targeting can indeed serve as a viable supplement or remedy to existing tax treatments for
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affordable homeownership. It also represents an innovative approach to reviving central
cities and stabilizing distressed neighborhoods. This study of the program’s overall
effectiveness, enormous economic impact, positive distributional effect, and weaknesses
should provide important insights on possible improvements of the D.C. homebuyer
credit program itself and on any future policy designs around these themes and their
potential impacts. 
For instance, an income-targeted homeownership tax credit has recently been
proposed in Congress. Senators Gordon Smith and Debbie Stabenow proposed a first-
time homebuyer tax credit of up to $6,000. According to the Housing Affairs Letter
published on June 6, 2003, the proposed Homeownership Tax Credit Act (S 1175) would
allow qualified homebuyers within the 27 percent tax bracket or lower to claim the credit.
It could be a $3,000 credit for single buyers. First-time homebuyers would claim the tax
credit in the year following their home purchase. The proposal immediately picked up the
support of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America. 
In a broad public policy perspective, three other important implications can be
drawn from the experiences of the targeted homebuyer tax credit program. First, if
designed well, a public policy intervention can become one stone that kills two birds at
the same time. The conventional wisdom holds that the principal role of government or
public policies in general should be tilted toward accomplishing social goals or
addressing concerns related to social justice. Accordingly, the success or effectiveness of
a government program or policy is often judged by its impact on equity, that is, whether
and to what extent it helps “disadvantaged” populations in the society. While these
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normative principles have dominated public policy debates and policy practices, they
have struggled to balance the concerns on economic efficiency. 
As demonstrated in this paper, a policy intervention can be successful in meeting
both the equity and efficiency criteria. The District First-Time Homebuyer Credit
program was effective in not only promoting social justice through its sizable and
significant distributional effects but also producing substantial net benefits to society. A
simple benefit/cost ratio can be calculated as home equity wealth of more than $2 billion
(created by the program) divided by costs of tax credits of about $89.5 million51 for years
1998 through 2002. This yields 22.3, greatly more than 1 as required by the standard cost-
benefit analysis. Even applying a discount rate or other costs to the equation, one would
reasonably expect that they would not be able to significantly alter the outcome of
substantial net benefits. Plus, there are many other types of social benefits that are not
easily quantifiable and therefore not incorporated into the benefit/cost ratio equation as
well, such as the benefits of stable neighborhoods, increased homeownership rates, and
housing producers’ surplus.   
The second implication is that the targeted homeownership tax credit program
also facilitated two types of income and wealth redistribution that advance social goals of
resource allocation. One is income/wealth redistribution from high-income to
low/moderate-income households. By targeting only certain homebuyers, the program
was able to benefit substantially low-income families who were renters or other types of
homebuyers, as well as low/moderate-income neighborhoods. The benefits are realized
through both direct tax credits (up to $5,000) in qualified homebuyers’ income tax returns
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and higher rate of price appreciation for properties in low/moderate-income
neighborhoods and for lower-priced townhouse/condos. For instance, the largest cluster
of the credit beneficiaries was made up of those earning annual incomes between only
$30,000 and $50,000. This group made a total of 8,104 claims in the amount of $26.3
million over the 1997-2001 tax years. 
The second form of income/wealth transfer takes place from suburbs to central
cities or from federal government to state/local governments. The District of Columbia
homebuyer credit is solely financed by the federal government at the expense of federal
income tax revenues, including those from suburban areas. However, the beneficiary is
only Washington, D.C., since its government was able to levy at least $50.2 million in
property taxes in the period of 1998-2002 because of substantial increases of residential
property values resulting from the homebuyer credit program. Additionally, if one
compares the revenue loss of about $89.5 million to the IRS with the revenue gains of
more than $50.2 million to the District government, the fiscal impact to governments as a
whole may be substantial. However, the loss may be offset by the gains from other tax
revenues, such as sales and income taxes, which may have also resulted from the impact
of the homebuyer credit intervention. 
The third public policy implication is that, while all homebuyers and existing
homeowners are winners in the District, there are still losers from the implementation of
the program. The losers are renters and future or potential homebuyers in the District.
Basically, an unintended effect of the homebuyer tax credit program on the District’s
housing market dynamics is that “haves” and “have nots” are now facing dramatically
                                                                                                                                                
51 The estimate of $89.5 million for tax credits for years 1998 through 2002 is derived from the 1997-2001
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different financial and housing situations. Affordability and hence displacement have
become serious problems for low-income renters facing an even more tightened rental
housing supply and increased rents in the District. With a substantial rise of house prices,
homeownership becomes even less affordable than before for future homebuyers in the
District. In short, both renters and future homebuyers are at the risk of being priced out
from the District market because of the substantial impact of the homebuyer credit
program on overall housing market dynamics. These unintended detrimental impacts
require some policy actions to deal with in the future. On one hand, the worsening
affordability and displacement for renters seem to be suggesting that a homeownership
policy intervention would be more justified on the equity ground if it could also contain
or be accompanied by a form of compensation for renters who can be adversely affected
by the spillover effect from homeowner market. On the other hand, the results indicate
that the D.C. homebuyer credit program had little impact on the short-run supply from
private investments on new construction. This implies that a supply-side policy
intervention may be warranted to accompany this demand-side homeownership tax credit
program so that any adverse effect on homeownership affordability for future homebuyers
could be minimized. These should be important questions for researchers to further
explore and represent a tough trade-off for policy analysts and decision-makers in the
future.
There are several important and specific implications for future policy designs
with a similar theme. Although the targeted homeownership credit program as
                                                                                                                                                
IRS data as discussed in the “empirical evidence from IRS” section. 
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implemented in the District is clearly a success in many measures, it still contains some
weaknesses that any future policy/program design should attempt to avoid. 
One of the greatest strengths of the D.C. homeownership tax credit is that its
targets mainly low/moderate-income homebuyers in a central city setting. While the
national homeownership rate has been continuously pushed to higher levels in the last
decade or so, significant gaps in homeownership rates exist between low-income,
minority households and high-income white households and between central cities and
their suburban areas. Central cities generally feature young, low/moderate-income renters
who are eager to establish their households and own a piece of property for the American
Dream. Therefore, low/moderate-income households in central cities represent perhaps
the best niche market for further increasing homeownership rates for this country, which
is exactly one of the reasons why the D.C. homebuyer credit program has proven to be so
successful and popular.  
Another strength of the D.C. homebuyer credit program and its enhancements is
its ability to attract first-time homebuyers. As discussed in this paper, an important reason
that the substantial impact of the homeownership credit is not explainable by the standard
subsidy theory is its unique feature of subsidizing first-time homebuyers’ housing
investment. While the program itself does not explicitly offer any built-in capacity of
removing or reducing market “imperfections” such as the entry barriers of wealth and
income to homeownership market, its individual and private-sector innovative
enhancements did allow first-time homebuyers to use the D.C. tax credit toward the down
payment or closing costs.  Therefore, it is very important that any homeownership tax
credit design in the future should explicitly include a mechanism that enables homebuyers
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to covert the tax credit into cash for down payment or closing costs at the time of home
purchase through, for instance, directly transferring the tax credit to their mortgage
lenders or other players involved in the home-buying process.  
The empirical evidence from the D.C. housing market also indicates that the
predominately minority neighborhoods received fewer benefits, in terms of house price
appreciation and neighborhood stability, from the D.C. homebuyer credit intervention
than the moderate-minority and white neighborhoods. Thus, combining income-targeting
with neighborhood-targeting appears to be crucial for any future policy design. On one
hand, any future program/policy in this regard should replicate the District model to
provide a tax incentive to lower-income households for buying homes in the entire city
(not just one place or another). On the other, the future intervention should also include a
larger incentive to attract homebuyers to the targeted neighborhoods, especially
predominately minority neighborhoods. By doing so, the distressed, predominately
minority neighborhoods would be able to enjoy the maximum benefits of the intervention. 
Currently, the District homebuyer credit program can be carried forward to a
claimant’s subsequent tax returns. However, these tax credits are not refundable and
hence less attractive to the very low-income households who have few tax liabilities. For
instance, the IRS data indicate that only 1,001 credit claims were made by the very low-
income homebuyers earning under $20,000, which was just about 5 percent of the total
returns claiming for the D.C. homebuyer credit during the 1997-2001 period. Therefore, if
the tax credit were refundable, this policy intervention would strongly stimulate and
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encourage very low-income households to participate in homeownership, preventing them
from missing more opportunities to build wealth through homeownership.
This study has important implications for research. It substantially improves our
understanding of public subsidies and their actual values in a reality where the
assumptions of the standard subsidy theory are no longer held. Such an improvement
makes an important contribution to the literatures of public policies, public/welfare/urban
economics, and housing markets. The research also makes an important contribution to
the literature by generating, for the first time, a systematic cross-sectional/inter-temporal
analysis of house price dynamics by income and race at the census tract level, by
neighborhoods, and by structure type. 
Moreover, the empirical approach used in this study, a three-stage intervention
analysis (including hedonic regressions and interrupted time series models) in the
framework of difference-in-differences approach represents a methodological advance
that improves our understanding of the dynamic interplay between urban property
markets and public policy interventions. This innovative methodology, as well as its three
verification methods (particularly the cross-D.C./Maryland border comparisons in median
house price per square foot), can be used to assess the effectiveness and impact of many
other urban and housing policy interventions.
Furthermore, this study also provides a number of important indicators that can be
used as standardized and testable benchmarks in evaluating the effectiveness of many
other urban policy interventions in a similar setting. The key benchmarks related to the
interventions’ overall effectiveness and distributional effect are the rate of initial credit
claims, first-time homebuyer rate, rate of participation by the previous suburban residents,
250
and income profiles of beneficiaries. The key benchmarks related to housing markets are
the rates of house price appreciation used to evaluate the economic impact and
distributional effect on housing markets and house price volatility (as measured by
coefficient of variation) to evaluate neighborhood stability. The supplemental
benchmarks include (1) homeownership rate, (2) number of housing units authorized by
building permits to measure the impact on housing supply (especially the trends on new
construction), (3) growth of owner vs. rental units as measured by their shares in the
overall housing stock, (4) number of vacant units, and (5) involuntary and voluntary
displacement rates for renters.
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Appendix Table 1. Estimates Based on the Greater Washington Research Center's Survey on 
DC First-Time Homebuyer Credit*
Number Percent
Total Survey Mailed** 1,600 100.0
     Valid Responses Received 529 33.1
     No Response Received 960 60.0
     Returned Mails 111 6.9
Purchasers Claiming the Homebuyer Credit*** 371 70.1
Of Those Claiming the Credit****:
     Credit Caused Purchasers to Buy at This Time 189 50.9
     Credit Caused Purchasers to Buy in the District 158 42.6
           Purchasers with Previous Address in the District 79 50.0
           Purchasers with Previous Address outside the District 79 50.0
    Their Previous Address Was:
           In the District 228 61.5
           In the Suburbs 68 18.3
           Out of the Metro Area 72 19.4
Homebuyer Credit Claimants by Previous Homeownership Status****
     Claimants with Previous Address in the District
           First Home Ever Owned 228 61.5
           Owned Home in Previous Address or Elsewhere 0 0.0
     Claimants with Previous Address outside the District
           First Home Ever Owned 94 25.3
           Owned Home in Previous Address or Elsewhere 46 12.5
Purchasers Claiming the Credit by Sales Price Bracket****:
     Less Than $200,000 230 61.9
          $25,000 - $100,000 90 24.2
          $100,000 - $150,000 86 23.3
          $150,000 - $200,000 53 14.4
     Over $200,000 142 38.2
* With support from the Fannie Mae Foundation, Local Initiatives Support Corporation and others, the Greater 
Washington Research Center conduced the survey in the end of 1998 and early 1999.
** The denominator for calculating "percent" is total surveys mailed.
*** The denominator for calculating "percent" is valid responses received.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Structure Traits, Neighborhood Characteristics and Neighborhood Events 
in Comparison Markets in Maryland and Virginia1
Explanatory Variables
Housing Unit Characteristics
   Lot Size (1,000 S. F.) 13.2 29.2 11.9 25.7 4.5 5.1 75.4 209.6 15.0 1455.5
   Living Space (1,000 S. F.) 1.9 0.9 1.4 0.6 1.8 0.8 1.3 0.6 1.8 0.8
   Number of Bedroom 2.2 1.1 3.3 0.9
   Number of Bathroom 2.8 1.1 2.3 0.9 2.5 1.1 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0
   Total Rooms 7.5 2.1
   Number of Story 1.7 0.5 1.7 0.5 2.1 0.6 1.5 0.6 1.8 0.4
   Age of Unit When Sold (years) 23.0 20.2 26.8 21.3 42.9 37.9 35.9 22.7 14.3 13.4
   Owner-occuiped (%) 92.7 90.5 86.0 84.7 92.3
   Presence of Fireplace (%) 68.4 55.7 68.3 47.4 74.8
   Presence of Patio (%) 8.4 14.3 12.0 13.9 2.8
   Presence of Deck (%) 48.7 46.0 43.0 28.5 37.2
   Presence of Balcony (%) 18.5
Type of Porch (%)
   Porch 26.8 19.8 27.0 25.3 16.6
   Screened Porch 5.5 6.2 3.6
   None 67.5 68.5 79.9
Type of Basement (%)
   Basement 84.7 66.5 24.7 0.9
   Finished 39.4
   Walk-out 28.6
   Full 1.4 26.9
   Partial 3.3
   Daylight 6.6
   Partial Daylight 31.7
   None 35.9 70.0 30.6
Parking Type (%)
   Garage (detached or attached) 25.1 85.8 5.7 13.7 34.9
   Basement 9.4 6.2 28.5 7.9 12.2
   Carport 4.7 6.5 3.9 2.0 3.9
   Build-In or Covered 12.9 1.5 1.3
   None 47.9 61.9 76.4 47.7
Structure Type (%)
   Single-Family Detached 70.8 85.5 68.1 43.2 49.3
   Townhouse 24.1 14.5 31.9 4.9 34.1
   Condo 5.1 0.0 0.0 51.9 16.7
Quality/Condition (%)
   Luxury 0.2
   Excellent 1.1
   Good 29.1 1.0
   Average 61.6 15.0
   Fair 2.9 83.7
   Other 5.1 0.2
Exterior Wall Material (%)
   Aluminum/Brick 18.2
   Aluminum/Vinyl or Aluminum Siding 20.4 12.4 7.5 20.6
   Wood Siding 6.5
   Shingle 0.5 1.1 2.6
   Brick or Stone 26.4 27.2 78.1 84.2 18.0
   Brick/Shingle 0.7
   Frame 39.1 71.1 5.5
   Frame Wood/Brick 7.9 1.7 7.7
   Stucco 0.5 1.2 6.6
   Wood 3.7 19.0
   Block or Block/Alum 0.4
   Other 5.2 2.9 0.8 2.3
Heat System (%)
   Forced Air 66.8 36.9
   Heat Pump 19.7 5.8 12.3 29.6












   Hot water 1.4 11.2 1.9
   Radiant 3.9 6.1 24.1
   Electric Baseboard 0.4 1.7 1.3
   Gravity
   Warm Air 5.8
   Other 5.3 0.2 3.3 32.6 0.3
Type of Air Conditioning (%)
   Central/Building Air Conditioning 84.4 42.0 98.0
   Separate System 1.7
   Split System 84.2 83.3
   Other 14.1
Roof Materials (%)
   Built-up 0.8
   Asphalt Shingle 51.7 42.1
   Asbestos 1.3 0.9
   Composition Shingle/Roll Composition 85.1 99.5 9.3 88.8
   Slate 3.1 5.8 2.5
   Tar & Gravel 4.7
   Wood shake 5.2 1.0 4.4
   Other 5.8 33.1 53.1 1.2
Locational Accessibility
   Workers whose travel time
        to work <25 minutes (%) 45.8 41.0 56.0 56.5 40.6
   Workers whose travel time
        to work 25-45 minutes (%) 31.4 34.5 30.3 33.9 33.6
   Workers whose travel time
        to work >45 minutes (%) 22.8 24.4 13.7 9.6 25.9
Census Tract Characteristics
   Median family income ($1,000) 68.2 20.4 52.1 10.8 59.2 19.1 57.2 15.6 66.9 14.9
   Share of nonwhite population (%) 24.4 52.7 32.2 25.7 19.9
   Poverty rate (%) 3.5 4.8 7.3 7.1 2.9
   Affordability (%) 12.5 12.5 11.5 8.6 15.2
   Foreign-borns (%) 16.7 8.1 11.7 19.7 13.7
   Population aged 65 or older (%) 9.0 7.6 11.1 11.3 5.1
   Homeownership rate (%) 78.6 72.3 54.1 47.5 74.5
   Household size 2.9 0.3 3.0 0.3 2.3 0.3 2.1 0.4 2.8 0.4
   Turnover (% owner households
      moved since 1985) 45.7 36.2 41.3 46.9 58.4
   Vacancy rate (%) 3.8 3.9 7.6 8.2 5.4
Events & Neighborhood Developments (%)
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
No. of Observations 164,023 107,611 16,471 29,186 263,615
1. Mean values and standard deviations are reported here, unless noted otherwise.
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Appendix Table 4. Hedonic Regressions for Comparison Housing Markets in Suburban Maryland
(Dependent Variable: Log of Nominal Transaction Price )
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T
Intercept 10.449 *** 365.4 11.067 *** 336.0
Housing Unit Characteristics
   Lot Size (1,000 S. F.) 0.0004 *** 11.1 0.001 *** 21.5
   Living Space (1,000 S. F.) 0.174 *** 92.9 0.155 *** 49.2
   Number of Bathroom 0.059 *** 45.2 0.050 *** 26.7
   Number of Story 0.002 0.6 0.002 0.6
   Age of Unit When Sold (years) -0.005 *** -36.6 -0.007 *** -39.1
   Unit Age Squared 0.00005 *** 35.7 0.00004 *** 21.2
   Owner-occuiped1 0.058 *** 18.6 0.066 *** 18.1
   Presence of Fireplace2 0.095 *** 42.9 0.046 *** 18.4
   Presence of Basement 0.093 *** 31.6 0.054 *** 21.0
   Presence of Porch2 0.020 *** 9.9 0.025 *** 8.2
   Presence of Patio -0.011 -3.4 -0.006 -1.5
   Presence of Deck2 0.054 *** 29.7 0.038 *** 15.2
Parking Type2
   Garage (detached or attached) 0.122 *** 45.5 -0.020 *** -4.4
   Basement 0.139 *** 44.6 0.026 *** 4.2
   Build-In 0.022 *** 5.7 -0.073 *** -7.4
   Carport 0.044 *** 10.6
Structure Type3
   Townhouse -0.228 *** -70.9 -0.124 *** -30.3
   Condo -0.012 -0.3
Quality/Condition4
   Luxury 0.168 *** 9.4
   Excellent 0.142 *** 16.8
   Good 0.082 *** 38.2 0.170 *** 15.1
   Fair -0.119 *** -23.0 -0.073 *** -18.0
   Other -0.346 *** -11.8 -0.319 *** -13.7
Exterior Wall Material5
   Shingle 0.003 0.3
   Brick/stone, brick/siding or stone/siding 0.043 *** 13.4 0.033 *** 11.3
   Frame -0.001 -0.4
   Frame/brick or frame/stone 0.032 *** 8.1 -0.008 *** -0.9
   Stucco 0.029 * 2.5
   Other -0.015 -0.6 -0.053 *** -0.6
Heat System6
   Heat Pump -0.030 *** -8.7
   Hot water 0.022 ** 3.0
   Radiant 0.056 *** 9.8 0.025 *** 4.8
   Electirc baseboard 0.011 0.8 -0.051 *** -6.1
   Other 0.009 0.6 -0.104 *** -3.7
Roof Materials7
   Composition shingle 0.026 ** 2.9 -0.102 *** -6.8
   Slate 0.143 *** 13.8
Montgomery County Prince Georges County
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   Wood shake 0.094 *** 9.6
   Other 0.083 *** 6.2
Air Conditioning
   Split System -0.034 *** -4.4 0.083 *** 22.8
   Other -0.080 *** -10.9
Locational Accessibility
   Workers whose travel time
        to work <25 minutes (%) 0.008 *** 34.1 -0.001 *** -6.5
   Workers whose travel time
        to work 25-45 minutes (%) 0.007 *** 25.6 -0.002 *** -6.5
Neighborhood Characteristics
   Median family income ($1,000) 0.006 *** 73.6 0.007 *** 34.0
   Share of nonwhite population (%) -0.003 *** -21.9 -0.002 *** -23.1
   Poverty rate (%) 0.004 *** 9.4 0.002 *** 7.2
   Affordability 0.002 *** 7.1 -0.001 * -2.2
   Foreign-borns (%) 0.007 *** 36.2 0.004 *** 22.6
   Population aged 65 or older (%) 0.004 *** 13.8 0.008 *** 19.4
   Homeownership rate (%) -0.001 *** -8.4 -0.002 *** -28.4
   Household size -0.107 *** -27.3 0.002 0.3
   Turnover (% owner households
      moved since 1985) 0.000 *** 6.3 0.001 *** 6.8
   Vacancy rate (%) -0.004 *** -10.0 -0.005 *** -11.3
Events & Neighborhood Developments
   Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects2 -0.006 *** -3.8 0.002 0.7
  September 11 Terrorist Attack8 0.047 *** 5.9 0.040 *** 4.0
Transaction Date9
1988 0.159 *** 34.6 0.097 *** 15.5
1989 0.304 *** 64.2 0.198 *** 32.1
1990 0.321 *** 65.4 0.262 *** 42.7
1991 0.293 *** 60.8 0.259 *** 40.9
1992 0.298 *** 63.8 0.288 *** 46.6
1993 0.301 *** 65.7 0.298 *** 49.1
1994 0.308 *** 66.2 0.299 *** 49.0
1995 0.285 *** 60.3 0.306 *** 49.8
1996 0.272 *** 58.6 0.313 *** 50.8
1997 0.286 *** 62.0 0.302 *** 50.2
1998 0.318 *** 71.5 0.318 *** 47.5
1999 0.396 *** 89.3 0.389 *** 59.4
2000 0.496 *** 112.1 0.415 *** 70.8
2001 0.630 *** 136.0 0.482 *** 80.0
2002 0.796 *** 163.6 0.623 *** 98.9
Adjusted R2 0.713 0.466
Number of Observations 164,023 107,611
Note: 1. Omitted variable is renter-occupied. 2. Omitted variable is "none." 3. Omitted variable is single family detached. 4. Om
          5. Omitted variable is "aluminum siding/vinyl." 6. Omitted variable is "heat pump". 7. Omitted variable is "built-up." 8. Th
          of 1 if the sales took place in Oct. and Nov. of 2001, 0 otherwise. 9. Omitted variable is "1987". 
         *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1.
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Appendix Table 5. Hedonic Regressions for Comparison Housing Markets in Suburban Virginia
(Dependent Variable: Log of Nominal Transaction Price )
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient T
Intercept 11.278 *** 86.7 11.022 *** 98.1 11.336 *** 680.9
Housing Unit Characteristics
   Lot Size (1,000 S. F.) 0.0103900 *** 14.9 -0.0000263 + -1.9 0.0000003 1.1
   Living Space (1,000 S. F.) 0.231 *** 38.5 0.195 *** 30.7 0.175 *** 140.1
   Number of Bedroom 0.067 *** 22.0 0.018 *** 17.8
   Number of Bathroom 0.053 *** 13.1 0.080 *** 21.6 0.052 *** 61.9
   Total Rooms 0.017 *** 34.0
   Number of Story 0.026 *** 4.4 0.047 *** 9.1 -0.019 *** -11.3
   Age of Unit When Sold (years) -0.001 * -2.4 -0.014 *** -36.4 -0.015 *** -125.3
   Unit Age Squared 0.000010 *** 7.6 0.000132 *** 27.0 0.000172 *** 85.6
   Owner-occuiped1 0.057 *** 8.1 0.084 *** 14.7 0.032 *** 17.9
   Central/Building Air Conditioning2 0.081 *** 10.6 0.080 *** 9.3 -0.002 *** -0.5
   Presence of Fireplace2 0.171 *** 24.3 0.059 *** 9.9 0.091 *** 69.3
   Presence of Patio2 0.008 0.9 0.030 *** 3.9 0.012 *** 4.1
   Presence of Deck2 0.018 ** 3.1 0.034 *** 5.1 0.020 *** 18.1
   Presence of Balcony2 0.061 *** 8.8
Type of Porch2
   Porch 0.027 *** 4.1 0.033 *** 4.9 0.017 *** 13.0
   Screened Porch 0.054 *** 4.8 0.064 *** 6.5 0.050 *** 19.5
Type of Basement2
   Basement 0.017 1.6 0.084 *** 16.2
   Finished -0.056 *** -8.7
   Walk-out 0.051 *** 7.6
   Full 0.035 + 1.7 0.044 *** 26.9
   Partial 0.063 *** 22.1
   Daylight 0.076 *** 31.0
   Partial Daylight 0.070 *** 39.9
Parking Type2
   Garage (detached or attached) 0.064 *** 5.2 0.035 *** 4.8 0.071 *** 37.6
   Basement 0.086 *** 9.2 0.054 *** 5.6 0.090 *** 51.7
   Carport 0.069 *** 5.3 0.053 *** 3.6 0.045 *** 16.5
   Build-In or Covered 0.274 *** 60.3
Structure Type3
   Townhouse -0.065 *** -10.5 -0.283 *** -21.8 -0.217 *** -95.4
   Condo -0.409 *** -26.8 -0.445 *** -157.4
Exterior Wall Material4
   Aluminum/Vinyl or Aluminum Siding 0.039 ** 3.0 -0.028 *** -17.3
   Wood Siding 0.014 *** 6.4
   Shingle 0.033 1.3 0.083 *** 5.7
   Brick or Stone 0.075 *** 6.5 0.150 *** 16.6 0.004 * 2.3
   Brick/Shingle 0.025 *** 4.3
   Frame Wood/Brick 0.024 *** 11.2
   Stucco 0.090 *** 4.5 -0.029 *** -13.1
   Wood 0.088 *** 6.8 -0.019 *** -12.4
   Block or Block/Alum 0.009 1.1
   Other 0.057 ** 3.2 0.090 *** 3.8 -0.010 ** -2.7
Heat System5
   Heat Pump 0.076 *** 6.5 -0.150 *** -8.0 0.005 0.6
   Hot Air -0.007 -0.8
   Hot water -0.005 -0.4 0.011 1.2
   Radiant 0.017 * 2.3
   Electric Baseboard -0.027 ** -2.8
   Forced Air -0.057 *** -3.9
   Gravity 0.043 *** 4.6
   Warm Air -0.187 *** -18.0
Alexandria City Arlington County Fairfax County
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   Other -0.008 -0.6
Roof Materials6 0.026 *** 5.2
   Asbestos 0.119 *** 6.4
   Roll Composition -0.069 *** -7.0
   Slate 0.106 *** 9.1 0.106 *** 7.8
   Tar & Gravel -0.023 *** -8.3
   Wood shake 0.060 ** 2.8 0.094 *** 38.6
   Other 0.080 *** 11.3 -0.036 ** -3.0 -0.050 *** -11.4
Locational Accessibility
   Workers whose travel time
        to work <25 minutes (%) -0.003 ** -3.2 0.008 *** 6.8 0.001 *** 12.2
   Workers whose travel time
        to work 25-45 minutes (%) -0.005 *** -4.2 0.010 *** 8.4 0.003 *** 16.5
Neighborhood Characteristics
   Median family income ($1,000) 0.003 *** 6.5 0.007 *** 11.3 0.007 *** 105.3
   Share of nonwhite population (%) -0.003 *** -4.8 -0.001 -1.5 -0.003 *** -30.1
   Poverty rate (%) -0.001 -0.9 -0.012 *** -8.0 0.001 * 2.4
   Affordability 0.014 *** 17.0 -0.002 * -2.4 0.002 *** 9.1
   Foreign-borns (%) -0.011 *** -19.6 0.002 ** 2.7 0.007 *** 50.5
   Population aged 65 or older (%) 0.009 *** 6.5 -0.024 *** -24.9 0.007 *** 32.3
   Homeownership rate (%) -0.005 *** -13.2 -0.001 * -2.5 -0.003 *** -36.2
   Household size -0.016 -0.8 -0.194 *** -16.2 -0.139 *** -61.0
   Turnover (% owner households
      moved since 1985) 0.003 *** 4.5 -0.002 *** -6.7 -0.002 *** -30.4
   Vacancy rate (%) 0.004 *** 4.3 0.003 *** 6.7 -0.004 *** -28.9
Events & Neighborhood Developments
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects2 -0.043 *** -3.6 -0.028 *** -4.7 0.023 *** 16.5
September 11 Terrorist Attack7 0.064 ** 2.8 0.080 *** 4.2 0.041 *** 8.7
Transaction Date8
1988 0.170 *** 10.4 0.121 *** 10.4 0.163 *** 62.1
1989 0.284 *** 16.9 0.253 *** 21.0 0.276 *** 101.7
1990 0.317 *** 18.9 0.269 *** 21.6 0.276 *** 96.3
1991 0.256 *** 14.8 0.238 *** 19.0 0.242 *** 85.4
1992 0.268 *** 16.8 0.252 *** 20.9 0.228 *** 83.9
1993 0.254 *** 16.1 0.274 *** 23.8 0.224 *** 83.8
1994 0.276 *** 17.7 0.225 *** 18.8 0.247 *** 93.0
1995 0.274 *** 17.6 0.191 *** 15.9 0.237 *** 85.2
1996 0.241 *** 15.4 0.232 *** 19.1 0.232 *** 85.0
1997 0.260 *** 17.4 0.238 *** 20.0 0.233 *** 86.1
1998 0.325 *** 22.5 0.291 *** 25.9 0.270 *** 103.8
1999 0.387 *** 27.3 0.380 *** 32.3 0.344 *** 130.6
2000 0.509 *** 35.6 0.503 *** 44.7 0.463 *** 174.8
2001 0.624 *** 42.3 0.647 *** 55.7 0.603 *** 218.2
2002 0.823 *** 55.7 0.874 *** 75.9 0.725 *** 206.6
Adjusted R2 0.704 0.691 0.811
Number of Observations 16,471 29,186 263,615
Note: 1. Omitted variable is renter-occupied. 2. Omitted variable is "none." 3. Omitted variable is single family detached. 4. Omitted variable is "frame" 
         for Alexandria City, "aluminum siding/vinyl" for Arlington County, and "aluminum/brick" for Fairfax County. 5. Omitted variable is "forced air" 
         for Alexandria City and "heat pump" for both Alrington and Fairfax Counties.  6. Omitted variable is "asphalt shingle" for Alexandria City and 
         Arlington County, and "roll composition" for Fairfax County. 7. The 9/11 dummy variable has a value of 1 if the sales took place in Oct. and 
         Nov. of 2001, 0 otherwise. 8. Omitted variable is "1987".       
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